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Meno 80d5-e5 is one of the most well-known passages in the Platonic dialogues. It has 
traditionally been called ‘Meno’s paradox’ by commentators. Meno asks Socrates, who 
claims not to know what virtue is at all, how he will inquire into the thing which he does not 
know at all. Although there have been a considerable number of studies on the interpretation 
of the passage, there has as yet been no consensus amongst commentators on what paradox 
the argument presents. There are three main puzzles in the traditional interpretations: (1) why 
what is regarded as an ‘eristic’ argument by Socrates might be of any philosophical 
importance: (2) where exactly ‘the paradox’ is situated: (3) whether Socrates’ response 
disarms ‘the paradox’. My thesis will give clear accounts of these puzzles. Firstly, Socrates’ 
evaluation of Meno’s question as ‘eristic’ has a two-fold meaning: it is eristic because Meno 
makes use of two horns of the ready-made eristic argument that one cannot come to know 
either what he knows or what he does not know, the original technique of the refutation of 
which appears in the Euthydemus. Then, Meno’s question is eristic also in a deeper sense, 
because the argument is committed to the denial of ‘knowledge’. Socrates detects this deeper 
counterargument against the possibility of ‘knowledge’ and attempts to disarm it with the 
myth of the immortality of the soul. Finally, my main suggestion will be that the question 
presented by Meno originates with Gorgias’ Περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἢ Περὶ φύσεως, a rhetorical 
challenge to Eleatic epistemology, which demonstrates that it is impossible for human beings 
to access the truth of reality either through intellect or sense perception. It will be 
demonstrated that the paradox of Meno 80d5-e5 is in fact concerned with a conflict between 
Gorgias’ rhetoric and Socratic dialectic. 
 
  
   
The Underlying Paradox of Plato’s Meno 80d5-e5 
- 3 - 
 
First of all, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Dr Luca Castagnoli, who was my 
primary supervisor since I started my Master’s course at the University of Durham in October 
2009 until December 2011. Without his warm encouragement, supportive discussions, 
lectures, and detailed criticisms, my work would have been so much the worse for it. 
I also wish to express my sincere appreciation of Professor George Boys-Stones for his deep 
insights and imagination by which I was encouraged to see the broader historical context of 
my research topic, and Mark Wildish to whom I am deeply indebted for his all intellectual 
support throughout the development of my embryonic ideas. 
Special thanks are extended to Professor Yahei Kanayama. He was the first person who 
personally taught me ancient philosophy, and since then has been lavish in encouraging and 
supporting my study in every aspect. 
Warm thanks also go to Professor Takeshi Hamaoka, Dr Phillip Horky, Dr Richard King, Dr 
Valentina Di Lascio, Professor Christopher Rowe, Justine Wolfenden, and also all my 
graduate colleagues with whom I have been working in the Department of Classics and 
Ancient History and in the Department of Philosophy, including Hanae Imai, Jun Yeob Lee, 
and Yoon Cheol Lee. 
I also owe my research to all the researchers from whose articles and from discussions with 
whom I have learnt a lot. Although I sometimes critically analyse their arguments in order to 
emphasize the importance of my alternative interpretation, my research has been, of course, 
developed through my learning from the earlier outcomes of their research. 
Needless to say, none of those I have mentioned above have any responsibility for remaining 
errors in my thesis. 
Lastly, I wish to express special gratitude to my family, my grandparents, father, mother, and 
my two beloved sisters. They have always provided me moral support and inspired me from 
the perspectives of their own specialities. 
 
 
 
   
The Underlying Paradox of Plato’s Meno 80d5-e5 
- 4 - 
 
 
 
I.     Introduction                                                                                                                       
 
II.    Three Puzzles over Plato’s Meno 80d5-e5 
1.     Two Versions of an Eristic Argument                                                                       
2.     ‘Paradoxes’                                                                                                                
3.     Socrates’ Response                                                                                                    
 
III.   Underlying Foundations of the Eristic Argument 
1.     All-or-Nothing Knowledge in the Euthydemus                                                        
2.     Four Features of Eristic Arguments                                                                          
3.     Eristic Features of Meno’s question                                                                          
4.     A Reconstruction of Meno 80d5-e5 & The Underlying Paradox                                  
 
IV.   Epistemology of Meno’s Myth 
1.     Myths as Logoi 
2.     The Immortality of the Soul 
3.     ‘Knowledge’ in the Myth 
4.     The Demonstration of Socrates’ Two Stories 
5.     Socrates’ Epistemological Positive Dogmatism 
 
V.    Gorgias’ Epistemological Negative Dogmatism 
1.     Gorgias’ On What-Is-Not or On Nature 
2.     What-Is and What-Is-Not in Gorgias’ Challenge to the Eleatics 
3.     Denial of the Possibility of ‘Knowledge’ 
4.     The Impossibility of Making Someone Know 
5.     The Paradox Again  
 
VI.   Conclusion 
  
 
5 
 
14 
16 
23 
27  
 
 
30 
35 
42 
45 
 
 
55 
59 
65 
72 
78 
 
 
83 
86 
92 
98 
102 
 
109 
 
   
The Underlying Paradox of Plato’s Meno 80d5-e5 
- 5 - 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
In Plato’s Meno, there is a well-known passage which has traditionally been called ‘Meno’s 
paradox’, and it has for a long time attracted the attention of many commentators with its 
ambiguous features and controversial way of being presented by Plato. Despite the fact that 
there have been a considerable number of studies on the interpretation of the passage,
1
 no 
consensus has yet been reached on what paradox it presents. The passage reads: 
 
Meno: 
καὶ τίνα τρόπον ζητήσεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο ὃ μὴ οἶσθα τὸ παράπαν ὅτι ἐστίν; ποῖον γὰρ ὧν 
οὐκ οἶσθα προθέμενος ζητήσεις; ἢ εἰ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα ἐντύχοις αὐτῷ, πῶς εἴσῃ ὅτι τοῦτό ἐστιν ὃ 
σὺ οὐκ ᾔδησθα; 
 
Then, Socrates, how will you inquire into the thing which you do not know at all what it is? 
Placing what of the things which you do not know will you inquire into it? Or, even if you 
happened to meet it, how could you know that this is what you did not know? 
 
Socrates: 
μανθάνω οἷον βούλει λέγειν, ὦ Μένων. ὁρᾷς τοῦτον ὡς ἐριστικὸν λόγον κατάγεις, ὡς οὐκ ἄρα 
ἔστιν ζητεῖν ἀνθρώπῳ οὔτε ὃ οἶδε οὔτε ὃ μὴ οἶδε; οὔτε γὰρ ἂν ὅ γε οἶδεν ζητοῖ - οἶδεν γάρ, καὶ 
οὐδὲν δεῖ τῷ γε τοιούτῳ ζητήσεως - οὔτε ὃ μὴ οἶδεν - οὐδὲ γὰρ οἶδεν ὅτι ζητήσει. 
 
I understand what you want to say, Meno. Do you see what an eristic argument you are bringing 
up: that it is not possible for a man to inquire into either what he knows or what he does not 
know? For, he would not inquire into what he knows, since he knows, and there is no need for 
such a person to inquire, nor into what he does not know, since he does not even know what he 
is going to inquire into (80d5-e5; my translation).
2
 
                                                     
1
 E.g. Phillips 1948; Eckstein 1968; Moline 1969; Moravcsik 1971; Calvert 1974; White 1974-5; Scott 1978, 
1995, 2006; Nehamas 1985; Welbourne 1986; Fine 1992, 2007, 2010A; Irwin 1995; Tarrant 2005; Kahn 2006; 
Ionescu 2007; McCabe 2009; Charles 2010; Sedley 2011. 
2
 For English translations, I use Plato: Complete Works (1997), ed. by J.M. Cooper for Plato; Aristotle: 
Complete Works (1984), ed. by J. Barnes for Aristotle; Early Greek Political Thought from Homer to the 
Sophists (1995), eds. by M. Gagarin & P. Woodruff  for Gorgias; The Presocratic Philosophers (1983), eds. by 
G. Kirk, J. Raven & M. Schofield for the Presocratics; Outline of Scepticism (2000), eds. by J. Anna & J. Barnes  
and Against Logicians (2005), ed. by R. Bett for Sextus Empiricus, modifying where necessary to clarify my 
points. I also specify the relevant source where the argument depends on a particular translation (my own or 
otherwise).  
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The dialogue containing this passage begins with Meno’s abrupt question of how ‘virtue 
(aretē)’3 is to be acquired. “Is it possible for you to say”, Meno asks Socrates,4 a young man 
from an aristocratic Thessalian family, “whether virtue is teachable (didakton)5? Or, can it 
not be taught, but learned by training? Or, neither be taught or learned, but do men possess it 
by nature or in some other ways? (70a1-4)”6 However, Socrates does not straightforwardly 
                                                     
3
 While ‘virtue’ is the most widely accepted translation for the Greek ‘aretē’, Sharples maintains that 
‘excellence’ is more appropriate for the context, because the Greek aretē was used not only in the moral sense, 
which can be considered one of the distinctive features of the Socratic use, but also in the wider sense, e.g. 
military prowess, and the governmental or administrative ability which brings social success (1991: 4). It is 
certainly the case that not only Meno but also Socrates sometimes uses aretē in the later meaning in the Meno 
(e.g. 91a1-6). In such contexts, this Greek term implies a sense of superiority to other people (cf. also Meno’s 
first statement of men’s aretē, and his second and third attempts to state what aretē is. 71e2-5, 73c9, 77b2-5). 
However, in order to avoid the confusion that the different translations might bring, I will use the traditional 
translation ‘virtue’ in this thesis fully accepting, as Sharples points, that the term embraces various distinct 
implications. 
4
 When I use ‘Socrates’ in this thesis, I simply mean Plato’s Socrates as presented in the Platonic dialogues, but 
not the historical Socrates nor any other ‘Socrates’ mentioned by other authors. While I do not think that Plato’s 
Socrates is merely a representation through which Plato articulates his own views, I am also suspicious of 
Scott’s alternative approach, according to which (i) Meno’s questions are Plato’s own challenges to the 
historical Socrates, and (ii) Plato puts the historical Socrates on philosophical trial as the object of his own 
analyses specifically in the Meno (Scott 2006: 27-30, 71-74, 87-91, 140-142). It is unclear from Scott’s 
argument (i) why Meno can be specifically considered to represent Plato’s own positions, and (ii) what 
conclusions Plato draws as his own beyond those thought to be historically ‘Socratic’. It seems to me more 
plausible to suppose that Plato’s Socratic views are always one of the objects of Plato’s investigations like those 
of any other interlocutor in any other dialogue. It is, then, more important to differentiate Plato the author from 
Plato’s Socrates, rather than Plato’s Socrates from the historical Socrates. This thesis will show that the Meno is 
actually not a response to Plato’s own challenges but to Gorgias, the rhetorician and his epistemological 
challenge to the Eleatics (or, more precisely, to what can be considered to be a problem of the Eleatics). What is 
presented as a contrast by Plato in the Meno is, according to my interpretation, the difference between his 
Socratic epistemology and Gorgias’. Cf. also Frede 1992. 
5
 The Greek ‘didakton’ can also be translated variously into modern English, as, for example, ‘teachable’, 
‘something taught’, ‘that can or ought to be taught’. Since this dialogue, unlike other Platonic dialogues, lacks 
an introduction to explain the situation and contexts of Meno’s question, Meno’s way of stating the question so 
far does not guide us towards any restricted translation. Although Sedley maintains that the question is 
understood not as whether it is in actuality taught, but as whether it is “the sort of thing whose transmission is 
via teaching (2011: xii)”, we should probably be more open-minded because both Socrates and Meno, I think, 
use ‘didakton’ in various senses depending on different contexts, as they also use the other term, ‘aretē’ (see 
note 3). While the whole interest throughout the dialogue, at least for Socrates, could lie in whether aretē in its 
nature is teachable or not, for Meno, it would require a more complicated interpretation: From 86c7-d2 and 
91a2-6, Meno’s main concern can be interpreted to be his personal interest in how to acquire such virtue as 
would enable him to rule over people rather than his wish to know ‘virtue’ for the sake of its essential features. 
There is, on the other hand, another possibility, namely that Meno is at the outset attempting to refute Socrates, 
whatever answers Socrates gives to the question, rather than purely wondering and asking it to Socrates (cf. 
Socrates’ comments on an eristic questioner at 75c8-d2. See also chapter III). Meno’s intention could be, as will 
be argued in this thesis, more eristic, following the manner of Gorgias’ rhetoric, which, as is immediately 
pointed out by Socrates, had a strong influence on the Thessalians including Meno (this interpretation will 
explain better the reason for the lack of contexts of Meno’s question). Although it is difficult to determine firmly 
what Meno’s question exactly intends, it is likely that Meno asks the same question twice with different 
purposes: Meno might change his mind as he finds that it is not possible for him to refute someone, i.e. Socrates, 
who does not answer Meno’s question by claiming not to know whether virtue is taught. Cf. also Weiss 2001: 3; 
Tarrant 2005: 11; Scott 2006: 14-18 for various different commentaries on Meno’s first question. 
6
 My translation: Ἔχεις μοι εἰπεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἆρα διδακτὸν ἡ ἀρετή; ἢ οὐ διδακτὸν ἀλλ' ἀσκητόν; ἢ οὔτε 
ἀσκητὸν οὔτε μαθητόν, ἀλλὰ φύσει παραγίγνεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἢ ἄλλῳ τινὶ τρόπῳ; See Sharples 2004: 4-6; 
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answers Meno’s question, but maintains that if Meno wants to ask anyone in Athens such a 
question, everyone will say that he is so far from knowing whether virtue can be taught and 
that he even does not know what virtue itself is. He too, Socrates continues, is the same as 
anyone else, as he blames himself for not knowing what virtue is at all (ὡς οὐκ εἰδὼς περὶ 
ἀρετῆς τὸ παράπαν) (71a1-b3). Meno is surprised and asks whether Socrates really does not 
know even what virtue is. Socrates answers that not only does he not, but he has also never 
met anyone else who does know what it is (70c3-71c4). 
 
Socrates’ disavowal of knowledge over virtue is strongly contrasted with Gorgias’ art of 
rhetoric.
7
 When Meno asks in what way virtue is acquired, Socrates immediately identifies 
Meno’s educational background as that by which Gorgias accustomed the Thessalian citizens 
especially in Larissa to give a bold and grand answer to any questions which one may be 
asked, as someone who does know is likely to do. Gorgias is, according to Socrates, able to 
answer anyone who wishes to question him, and every question is answered (70b5-c3). 
Socrates’ evaluation of Gorgias’ art of rhetoric implies that the person who has acquired it is 
capable of answering whatever is asked even when he does not know it at all.
8
 This state is 
described as the complete opposite to that of Socrates who cannot answer either the question 
of the teachability of virtue or even that of what virtue is. Meno, on the other hand, thinks 
that to be able to answer a question means to know the answer of it, so he believes that both 
Gorgias and himself know what virtue is (71c5-e).
9
  Socrates asks Meno, if he knows, to tell 
him what virtue is. Then, Meno attempts to state what virtue is three times in different ways. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Tarrant 2005: 11-12; Scott 2006: 15; Ionescu 2007: 1-2 for historical and political background of the question 
over the teachability of virtue. Cf. also Protagoras 322d ff. 
7
 In the Platonic dialogues ‘hē rhētorikē tekhnē’ is traditionally translated as the art of ‘oratory (e.g. D.J.Zeyl’s 
translation in Cooper 1997)’ or the art of ‘rhetoric (e.g. Dodds 1959; Thompson 1971; Allen 1984)’. Translators 
of Aristotle, on the other hand, tend to use the word ‘rhetoric’, which I also use throughout this thesis on the 
grounds that the two are commonly used interchangeably. There are, however, two possible different nuances, 
one in each translation, depending on how the rhetorical art is being understood, i.e. either as piecemeal 
memorized speech focusing on the practice and a merely apparently persuasive tool (cf. Gorgias 448d8-10; 
“what is called oratory”) or the technical and analytical ability to apply different speeches to different listeners 
on different occasions for the purpose of persuasion (cf. Gorgias 452e1-4; Phaedrus 270b4-9; Aristotle’ 
Rhetoric 1377b21 ff.). See also the Sophistical Refutations 184a1-8 for Aristotle’s diagnosis of Gorgias’ 
teaching which regards it as the former, although I think that this does not necessary need to correspond to 
Gorgias’ own view on the art of rhetoric. 
8
 In the Gorgias, Gorgias himself accepts that his art of rhetoric merely produce a kind of persuasion that results 
in being convinced without knowing, but that does not make someone know (454e5-9). Cf. chapter V-3, 4 for a 
detailed analysis on Gorgias’ arguments on knowledge and teaching. 
9
 Cf. Irwin 1995: 131; Scott 2006: 13. 
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Socrates’ inquiry into what virtue is leads Meno into the same state of aporia as Socrates.10 
Socrates asks “what do you say virtue is? (τί φῂς ἀρετὴν εἶναι;) (71d5)”, and Meno’s three 
answers are all refuted. Firstly, Meno maintains that there are many virtues (πάμπολλαι 
ἀρεταί εἰσιν) for every action, every age, every task of ours, and everyone of us: e.g. the 
virtue of a man, of a woman, of an elderly man, of a boy, of a girl, of a free man, of a slave, 
etc.; Meno continues, for example, that the virtue of a man consists of being able to manage 
public affairs to benefit himself and his friends, and to harm his enemies, while the virtue of a 
woman is being capable of managing domestic matters well and being submissive to her 
husband (71e1-72a4).
11
 Socrates, however, objects that the essence (ousia) of virtue is not 
many but should be one (72b1). Since Socrates wishes him to say that which fits all of those 
virtues, Meno presents the second answer that virtue is to be able to rule over people (73c9). 
Socrates again objects that this answer cannot be applied for the cases of a child or a slave, 
and also ‘justly and not unjustly’ should be added to it, because if someone rules over people 
unjustly, that should not be virtue. Meno agrees. Socrates also maintains that if they always 
have to add justice as an essential element for virtuous behaviours, since not only justice, but 
also courage, moderation, wisdom, munificence etc. are also a kind of virtue, but not the 
same as virtue as a whole, they again grasp a messy variety of virtues, but not the one thing 
which covers all virtues (73d-74a). 
 
Before Meno’s third attempt, Socrates provides examples of how to say what ‘shape’ and 
‘colour’ are. Socrates firstly gives the example “Shape is that which alone of existing things 
(τῶν ὄντων) always accompanies colour (75b10-11)”, but Meno is not convinced by this 
answer, and contentiously argues that the questioner, if not sure what colour is, would be still 
in aporia about ‘shape’ (75c2-7). Socrates, then, replies that “Shape is the limit of a solid 
(76a7)”, and, following Empedocles’ and Gorgias’ way as required by Meno, also gives 
another example, “Colour is an effluvium from shapes which fits sight and is perceived 
(76d4-5)”. Meno is finally satisfied with the last answer, although Socrates in fact says that it 
is not better than the former one (76e3-77a4).
12
 Then, Meno’s final attempt to state what 
                                                     
10
 ‘aporia’ is usually translated into English as ‘being at a loss’, ‘perplexity’, or also ‘lack of resourcefulness’: 
Cf. Politis (2006: 96).  Meno, for example, describes his state as a feeling of numbness for both his mind and his 
tongue (80b1). I use the Greek ‘aporia’ without translation, because this Greek term is a key word with its 
philosophical significance as I will argue (cf. chapter V-5). 
11
 Scott compares this answer with Wittgenstein’s attack on the unitarian assumption (2006: 25). Although it 
might be the case that Wittgenstein accepts this sort of answer by Meno and that Gorgias objects Socrates’ 
assumption, it will require further investigation to determine whether Gorgias attacks the unitarian assumption 
for the same reason and in the same way as Wittgenstein does (as I suspect and Scott also notes). Cf. chapter V. 
12
 Cf. also chapter V-3. 
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virtue is is borrowed from an anonymous poet; virtue is to desire beautiful things (τῶν 
καλῶν) and have the power to acquire them (77b4-5). However, Socrates and Meno agree 
that no-one does not desire good, namely beautiful, things, and so that it should be common 
to everyone in any way (78b4-5). And, the acquisition of good things again must be 
accompanied by justice, moderation, piety or some other parts of virtue, since if it is not 
acquired in virtuous ways, it will again not be virtue. This answer, therefore, also has to be 
refuted for the same reason as the second answer (78d7-e2). Socrates maintains that when it 
is not just, conversely, ‘not to acquire (aporia)’ is virtue (78e3-5), and that it follows that 
every action is virtue if it is performed with a part of virtue (79b9-c1).
13
 Socrates then tells 
Meno to return to the same question again to think about what he takes virtue to be as a 
whole (ὅλος) when he says what he says (79d-e2). Meno has finally been led into a state of 
speechlessness (79e7-80b2). 
 
The Meno, according to my interpretation, contains an underlying conflict that continues 
thoroughout, that is, between Socratic method of dialectic vs. Gorgias’ art of rhetoric. Since 
Socrates does not remember what Gorgias says virtue is, Socrates urges Meno, who believes 
that Gorgias knows, to remind him of what Gorgias used to say (71c10-d1). Meno is 
obviously relying on his memory of what Gorgias said, and his manner of answering is also 
affected by Gorgias’ rhetoric. Nevertheless, it is controversial to simply believe that Meno’s 
answers can be straightforwardly understood as Gorgias’ own views.14 As Meno recollects 
later, Gorgias denies that he teaches virtue, unlike some other contemporary sophists,
15
 but 
only claims to be able to make other people clever at speaking (λέγειν οἴεται δεῖν ποιεῖν 
                                                     
13
 This is a striking conclusion, which is led through three refutations, for two reasons: first, while Meno always 
describes virtue in terms of behaviours, actions and their actual outcomes, Socrates clarifies that, depending on 
whether it contains virtuous elements or not, completely opposite behaviours, actions, and outcomes can be 
virtue. It could imply Plato’s interest in the relation between the essence of virtue, as knowledge, and ‘virtuous’ 
actions, as often merely true opinion (see 96e1 ff.). Cf. also 79b4-5. Second, Socrates here uses the same term 
‘aporia’ which generally expresses Socrates’ or his interlocutor’s intellectual state, as well as what is considered 
the characteristic conclusions, namely aporetic ends, of some other Platonic dialogues (e.g. the Euthyphro, 
Charmides, Laches, Euthydemus, Protagoras, Theaetetus), which may, again, implies that, when it is just, not 
only the state of being poor but that of intellectual ‘aporia’ is also virtue. 
14
 Cf., e.g. Sharples 2004: 125-126. Although some commentators do not distinguish Meno’s answers from 
Gorgias’ views (e.g. Weiss 2001: 24; Ionescu 2007:10), it is not likely that Gorgias, regarding himself as a 
rhetorician, devotes himself to any specific claims as Meno presents. It would be worth noting how Meno’s first 
and second answers are similar to Polus’ and Callicles’ views in the Gorgias (466c, 486a-b), and Protagoras’ in 
the Protagoras (319a, 334b-c), and comparing their views with Gorgias’ comments that the art of rhetoric is 
concerned only with logos (Gorgias 450c1), and those who has learned it should be careful to use it ‘justly’ 
(Ibid. 456c-d, 457a-b), which are quite different from their views. Cf. also chapter III and V. 
15
 Those sophists who are said to have claimed that they teach virtues in Plato’s dialogues include, e.g., 
Euthydemus, Dionysodorus (Euthydemus 273d) and Protagoras (Protagoras 323c). 
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δεινούς) (95c3-4). 16  Socrates’ memory is, therefore, right, as Gorgias is unlikely to be 
committed to the claim that he really ‘knows’ what virtue is and more likely teaches nothing 
except the art of rhetoric. Socrates, moreover, at the outset also says that they should leave 
Gorgias out of their arguments, since he is not there, and ask Meno to give his own view, 
since it is probably the same as Gorgias’ (71d1-5). It is more plausible that Meno is an 
example of what someone who has learned from Gorgias is like, rather than that Meno 
directly represents Gorgias’ positions. 
 
Meno is, on the other hand, being invited into the metaphysical inquiry into the nature of 
virtue through Socratic dialectic. Socrates raises three requirements which they should follow 
for dialectical practice (διαλεκτικός; 75d4), and Meno gradually accepts them. The first thing 
is the priority of knowing what it is over what sorts of thing it is. Socrates maintains that, 
before inquiring into the way in which virtue is acquired, they should know what virtue is.
 17
 
He asks Meno “If I do not know what something is, how could I know what qualities it 
possesses? Or do you think that someone who does not know at all who Meno is could know 
whether he is good-looking or rich or well-born, or the opposite of these? (71b3-8)” Meno 
agrees that it would not be possible.
18
 The second thing is that each interlocutor should 
answer with the form (eidos) of virtue. Socrates claims “even if they [the virtues] are many 
                                                     
16
 In the Gorgias, it is also said that Gorgias contradicts his own words by hesitating to admit that he does not 
teach his pupils what is just, beautiful and good, even though there is a possibility that they might use the art of 
rhetoric for unjust purposes (463a, 461b, 482d). Cf. also chapter V-4. 
17
 This is called ‘Socratic priority of definition’ by some commentators (e.g. Robinson 1953: 49-60; Charles 
2006, 2010; Karasmanis 2006). Charles summarizes that it is traditionally said that there are three different 
types of definitions in the Meno, namely (a) real definitions, (b) conceptual definitions, and (c) true factual 
claims which identify the phenomenon (2006: 110-111). I am, however, slightly hesitant to use the term ‘the 
priority of definition’ for the Meno, because, as I will argue about the practice of stating what shape and colour 
respectively are (see note 177), I cannot find any clear evidence that Socrates requires Meno to give any kind of 
‘definition’ of virtue. The priority of knowing what it is over what it is like, taking the former to be identifying 
what it is, quite different from defining what it is: it would be possible for you to know what it is like without 
knowing the definition, but it would not be possible without identifying what it is. See also note 18, chapter III. 
18
 Although some commentators maintain that this example is not sound, this line of interpretation, I think, 
ignores the fact that Socrates assumes someone who does not know who Meno is at all (71b5-6: ὅστις Μένωνα 
μὴ γιγνώσκει τὸ παράπαν ὅστις ἐστίν), which obviously means the impossibility of identification of who Meno 
is. For example, White points that if you do not Meno at all, you have to rely on hearsay etc. (1974: 293). 
Although, as White further says, you might be able to know that Meno is good-looking by hearsay, it does not 
mean that you can know what properties Meno has before knowing who Meno is. Rather, if you do not know 
who Meno is at all, what you know would be merely described as there apparently being a person whose name 
is ‘Meno’ and he is said to be good-looking, but not literally that Meno is good-looking. Again, Sedley 
maintains that Socrates’ later claim that “even someone who was blindfolded would know from your 
conversation that you are handsome (76b4-5)” contradicts the Socratic priority of knowing who Meno is over 
what Meno is like and that “this is one of many subtle ways in which Plato can in the Meno be seen critically re-
evaluating his own Socratic legacy (2011: xiii)”. However, Sedley’s interpretation is also controversial, because 
what you know would be that someone who talks with Socrates must be good-looking, but not that Meno is so. 
Although you might be able to say later that the person who you thought must be beautiful was in fact Meno, 
this is, again, not the same as being able to know what ‘Meno’ is like before knowing who Meno is. 
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and various, all of them have one and the same form which makes them virtues, and it is right 
to look to this when one is asked to make clear what virtue is (72c6-d1, italics mine)”. The 
form is here also explained by Socrates as that “which is the same in all these (τὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν 
τούτοις ταὐτόν) (75a5)”. The third thing is that “The answer must not only be true, but in 
terms admittedly known to the questioner (75d5-7)”. These Socratic dialectical requirements 
are contrasted with those of ‘eristic’ kinds of arguments. Socrates says that “If the questioner 
was one of those clever, eristic, and contentious ones (εἰ μέν γε τῶν σοφῶν τις εἴη καὶ 
ἐριστικῶν τε καὶ ἀγωνιστικῶν ὁ ἐρόμενος), it would be your job to take the argument and 
refute it (σὸν ἔργον λαμβάνειν λόγον καὶ ἐλέγχειν) (75c8-d2, my italics)”, 19  but if 
interlocutors are friends, like Socrates and Meno, and want to discuss with each other 
(διαλέγων), they should “reject the kind of answer that tried to answer in terms still being the 
subject of inquiry and not yet agreed upon (τὴν διὰ τῶν ἔτι ζητουμένων καὶ μήπω 
ὡμολογημένων) (79d3-4)”. Dialectic is here sharply contrasted with eristic argument used for 
refutation in that dialectic proceeds on the basis of agreed terms between interlocutors. 
 
Having accepted these requirements, Meno realizes that he is now speechless, although he 
before meeting Socrates had made many brilliant speeches about virtue in front of large 
audiences on thousands of occasions (79e6-80b4). Meno mentions something he has 
previously heard: Socrates is always in a state of aporia, and also brings others to the same 
state. Meno compares Socrates firstly with a wizard (ὁ γόης), who bewitches (γοητεύω) and 
beguiles him and leads him into this terrible state,
20
 and secondly with a stingray, which 
makes anyone coming close to it feel numb (80a1-b7). Meno blames the fact that he now 
feels numb in both his mind and tongue, and cannot even say what virtue is. Socrates replies 
to Meno that the difference between the stingray and himself is that, while the stingray itself 
is not numb, Socrates is numb himself. He is also in a state of aporia no less than anyone else 
to whom he is said to bring aporia, as he does not know what virtue is, either. Socrates 
describes Meno as also not knowing what virtue is now, and invites Meno to the joint inquiry 
                                                     
19
 Cf. note 5. 
20
 This simile by Meno, an image of a wizard and ‘logos’ as an incantation, is possibly borrowed from Gorgias: 
Cf. Encomium of Helen [10-11] “Sacred incantations with words (διὰ λόγων) inject pleasure and reject pain, for 
in associating with the opinion of the mind, the power of an incantation enchants, persuades, and alters it 
through bewitchment (γοητεύω). The twin arts of witchcraft (γοητεία) and magic have been discovered, and 
there are illusions of mind and delusion of judgement. How many men on how many subjects have persuaded 
and do persuade how many others by shaping a false speech (λόγος)!” (See also Euthydemus 293a3). Cf. also 
Wardy 1996: 78; Scott 2006: 70. 
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into what virtue is. Finally, Meno asks if Socrates does not know what virtue is at all, how 
inquiry and discovery is possible for him, as presented in the passage 80d5-e5 above. 
 
Socrates points out that Meno brings up “an eristic argument (ὁ ἐριστικός λόγος)”, and 
restates the question as a general claim as to the impossibility of inquiring into neither what 
one does not know nor do know. But rather than impugning the argument itself, Socrates 
responds to it with the myth of the immortality of the soul and the theory of recollection 
which he believes true, and introduces the well-known geometrical demonstration with a 
slave. Socrates says: the soul is immortal and reincarnates many times, so it has already 
learned everything, and there is nothing that it has not yet learned. And, since the whole of 
nature is akin, it is not surprising for a man to recollect all things which the soul has known, 
starting from one thing and proceeding to everything else. Therefore, learning and inquiring 
are as a whole recollection, and inquiry and discovery are possible by means of recollection 
(81c5-d5). Socrates maintains that the eristic argument would make them lazy, but what he is 
committed to encourage them to be energetic and keen on inquiry, and thus suggests to Meno 
that he believes the latter rather than is persuaded by the eristic argument (81d5-e2). Socrates, 
having been asked by Meno, demonstrates the immortality of the soul and the recollection by 
showing that even one of Meno’s slaves can ‘recollect’ a correct answer to a geometrical 
question which the slave has not learned at any time since he was born (82a7-86c3). 
 
My main suggestion of this thesis is that the question presented by Meno in the passage 80d5-
e5 (i.e. ‘Meno’s paradox’) originates with Gorgias’ On What Is Not or On Nature (Περὶ τοῦ 
μὴ ὄντος ἢ Περὶ φύσεως), which appears in two extant sources: the third part of a peripatetic 
anonymous author’s treatise, On Melissus, Xenophanes, and Gorgias (979a11-980b22), and 
amongst the deniers of the criterion of Truth in Sextus Empiricus’ Against the Logicians ([65-
75]). Each source presents Gorgias’ three main theses: (1) there is nothing, (2) even if there is 
something it cannot be known, (3) even if it is known, it cannot be shown to others. Since 
there has been no close study discussing the Meno 80d5-e5 from this perspective, I will begin 
with a broad analysis of various interpretations of the passage 80d5-e5 in chapter II: it will be 
shown that there have been primarily three puzzles and general misunderstandings amongst 
commentators, which I will attempt to resolve one after another. Firstly, many commentators 
are prone to misunderstand the reason why Socrates points out that Meno’s question as 
‘eristic’ and think that it contradicts the assumption that the passage 80d5-e5 embraces a 
philosophical importance. In chapter III, I will argue that it is possible for the argument to be 
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eristic and philosophically important at the same time. Secondly, some commentators regard 
the theory of recollection and the slave’s geometrical demonstration as Socrates’ main 
responses to the eristic argument. However, in chapter IV, I will examine how important role 
the myth plays for the sake of Socrates’ commitment to its ontology and epistemology as 
withstanding the attack of the opposite epistemological position suggested by the eristic 
argument. Thirdly, although the passage 80d5-e5 is traditionally called ‘Meno’s paradox’, 
there has been still no consensus amongst commentators on what can be considered to be a 
‘paradox’ whilst it is generally believed that Socrates’ reply does not disarm the ‘paradox’. 
These confusions arise, I think, mainly because commentators do not differentiate what is the 
cause of the ‘paradox’ for us from what is thought as a ‘paradox’ by Socrates as ‘paradox’ in 
the Meno. Chapter V will show that the paradox is for Socrates concerned with one of the 
most difficult contradictions which comes from Eleatic metaphysics and epistemology, and 
the paradox is in fact situated, as Plato presents, between Socrates’ response, namely 
epistemological positive (optimistic) dogmatism and what the eristic argument, on the other 
hand, suggests, namely Gorgias’ epistemological negative (pessimistic) dogmatism.21 This 
thesis will demonstrate that the passage 80d5-e5 in the Meno embraces an unresolved 
paradox concerning the impossibility of reaching knowledge of truth by human beings. 
  
                                                     
21
 One might wonder what I mean by ‘epistemological negative dogmatism’, and why I do not use ‘scepticism’ 
as many commentators do (e.g., Kerferd 1955 11, n.1, 24; Hay 1990; Porter 1993: 23; Schiappa 1997: 16; Long 
1999: 305). I will clarify the difference between epistemological negative dogmatism and other types of 
scepticism below (see chapter III-4, V, and note 190). 
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II.   Three Puzzles over Plato’s Meno 80d5-e5 
 
 
 
The first contemporary scholar who calls the argument presented by Meno at 80d5-e5 
‘Meno’s paradox’ is Phillips (1948). Phillips, in his The Significance of Meno’s Paradox, 
addresses a philosophical paradox which is present in the passage 80d5-e5, by arguing 
against traditional interpretations that had regarded Meno’s question as a mere obstructing 
digression from the main theme, viz. Socrates’ metaphysical inquiry into what virtue is: 
 
Meno’s puzzle has generally, and, as I believe, erroneously been taken to represent merely a bit 
of typical sophistic logic-chopping. Shorey, for example refers to it as ‘this eristic and lazy 
argument’. Taylor’s comment on the passage is that, ‘At this point Meno again tries to run off on 
an irrelevant issue. He brings up the sophistic puzzle… etc.’ And Ritter asserts in similar vein 
that Meno ‘encumbers the investigation with the proposition advanced by the eristics, that there 
is no sense in looking for something which one does not already know.’ As over against such 
interpretations of Meno’s paradox as irrelevant eristic, I wish to submit the thesis that the 
objection is perfectly germane in the context of the problem being discussed – namely the nature 
of ethical knowledge – and that, moreover, the entire passage is one of real philosophical import 
and is basic for understanding the Theory of Ideas and the related notion of Reminiscence 
(Phillips 1948: 88).
22
 
 
Phillips thinks that, although Meno has not thought through the implications of his own 
question, Socrates restates it in more precise terms and reveals it as a paradox which 
challenges the metaphysical entities which are the objects of Socratic inquiry. Phillips 
maintains that the paradox is committed to a sophistic theory of knowledge, in his words ‘the 
nominalistic empiricism’, which will demolish the entire Socratic enterprise (1948: 88). The 
paradox is, according to Phillips, concerned with “two opposing conceptions of the nature of 
knowledge (Ibid. 91)”: on the one hand, the knowledge provided by perception and 
experience, originating from external objects, and, on the other hand, the knowledge provided 
by reason, originating from internal resources. While the sophistic theory of knowledge, i.e. 
Meno’s argument, is (for Phillips) only concerned with the former kind of empirical 
knowledge, Phillips argues, Socratic inquiry can provide the latter, alternative kind of 
                                                     
22
 Those quotations by Phillips are respectively: Shorey 1933: 157; Taylor 1936: 137; and Ritter 1933: 102. 
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metaphysical knowledge. Thus, Meno’s question, Phillips concludes, attacks only the latter, 
Socratic kind of knowledge by claiming that it is impossible to achieve the sort of knowledge 
which they are pursuing in this dialogue, i.e. knowledge of what virtue is. Phillips argues that 
‘Meno’s paradox’ can be applied only to the “Socratic type of inquiry (Ibid. 89)”, but not to 
any empirical inquiry, and that Meno’s question has no quarrel with any question such as: 
“How many citizens are there in Athens?” because you can count the number of people and it 
can be answered empirically (Ibid. 88-89). 
 
In spite of Phillips’ remarkable insight, there are many controversial features of his 
interpretation which cannot be overlooked. Phillips fundamentally misses that Meno’s 
question points out Socrates’ controversial state as an inquirer, in which he does not know 
what virtue is at all (see p. 7).
23
 Since Meno explicitly adds “at all (τὸ παράπαν) (80d6)” to 
his question, it is clear that Meno’s argument assumes an inquirer who is not only completely 
blank about any specification of the object, but also even cannot identify it to begin the 
inquiry.
24
 Phillips’ example of empirical question is, therefore, irrelevant to what Meno’s 
argument questions. Asked how many citizens there are in Athens, the inquirer must clearly 
know what he is asked; for example, the inquirer would know that the question asks about 
the population of Athens, what the word ‘citizens’ stands for, what place ‘Athens’ is, and 
what the question requires him to answer. So, the inquirer must know the object of inquiry 
well enough to determine how he should inquire into and discover it. This situation is far 
from the state which Meno’s question describes as that of the inquirer, i.e. of not knowing 
what it is at all.  
 
Secondly, Phillips’ interpretation is, I think, relying on an oversimplified dichotomy of 
sophists as empiricists and Socrates as rationalists, and to read the same sort of metaphysical 
concern as is thought to appear in other later dialogues also into the Meno, without a careful 
analysis of the Meno itself.
25
 It would be certainly the case, as Phillips maintains, that 
metaphysical inquiry into ethical knowledge may presuppose two premises: one is that there 
is a real essence of virtue, and the other is that the human reason is endowed with the 
capacity to apprehend it (1948: 89). Again, if Meno’s paradox is really established on the 
                                                     
23
 See also chapter III-4 for the detailed analysis. 
24
 Cf. Scott 2006: 76-77. 
25
 In addition, Phillips problematically thinks that sophists share a certain theory of knowledge (epistēmē) 
opposed to the Socratic one (cf. also chapter IV-3-4). I will discuss various different views on knowledge 
amongst sophists in chapter V. Note that Socrates also claims to be in a state of aporia over what knowledge is 
in the Theaetetus (145e8-a1 and 161b1-5).  
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basis of “nominalistic empiricism”, it could deny the former of these two premises, i.e. the 
existence of a real essence of virtue. However, it is, I think, overhasty to see the ‘paradox’ as 
presenting the same sort of concern as modern nominalists could have on metaphysical 
entities (cf. note 11). According to my interpretation,
 
the ‘paradox’ rejects the possibility of 
both metaphysical and empirical inquiry into whatever one does not know at all.
26
 Although 
Phillips has drawn attention to the point that the passage 80d5-e5 could present a serious 
philosophical paradox, his argument also left many interpretative questions for the next half 
century. 
 
Since then, a considerable number of interpretations have been published over the passage 
80d5-e5, and three main puzzles are still under discussion amongst commentators: 
 
[1] Is Socrates’ restatement identical with Meno’s original question? 
[2] Is it really a paradox? If so, in what sense is it a paradox? 
[3] If it is a paradox, does Socrates’ response disarm it? 
 
This thesis will give a clear and integrated answer to these three puzzles by resolving three 
misunderstandings which I mentioned above.
27
 But before commencing my own arguments, I 
would like to outline the research context, first of all, and briefly sketch my positions as they 
stand amongst other interpretations. 
 
 
 
1.   Two Versions of an Eristic Argument 
 
The first question ([1]) addresses the fact that, even though Socrates says that he understands 
what Meno wants to say (80e1-e2), it seems to many readers that Socrates adds some 
modifications to Meno’s original question. Meno clearly attacks Socrates’ helpless state of 
aporia as an inquirer, and questions about the possibility to inquire into what he does not 
know what it is at all. However, Socrates, on the other hand, apparently understands it as a 
claim about the general impossibility of inquiring into what one does not know, changing the 
subject from Meno’s second person singular (‘you’) to third person singular (‘a man’). Since 
                                                     
26
 See chapter III-4, IV-3-4, V-3. 
27
 Pp. 12-13. 
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Socrates does not give any clear explanations of his restatement, an ambiguous impression 
that something is changed by Socrates leads commentators to following questions: why on 
earth does Socrates restate Meno’s initial question? Should we, believing Socrates’ claim, 
think that they are identical, though they seem to be somehow different? And, which is the 
paradox, or is neither of them a paradox at all, but merely an ‘eristic’ argument as Socrates 
calls it? The more deeply commentators read what is not said into the passage, the more 
difficult the contradictions tend to be between their interpretations and what Socrates actually 
claims. Thus it is often concluded that Socrates probably misrepresents Meno’s original 
question or modifies it into a different claim, both of which are one of the things that I will 
rebut in this thesis. 
 
These days, however, only a minority of commentators thinks that Meno’s question and 
Socrates’ restatement can be held to be completely the same. 28  Moline, after Phillips, 
maintains that Meno does not state any paradoxes, it is rather a parody, but that Socrates is 
the one who replaces it with a paradox for his own purposes (1969: 154, 156). Moline gives 
two main reasons for this conclusion: firstly Meno’s intention is, Moline argues, obviously a 
personal challenge focusing on Socrates’ position with using the second person singular 
(‘you’) and vocative (‘Socrates’), but not the first person plural (‘we’) including Meno 
himself. Moline says that if it is a paradox it should be a claim but should not be expressed in 
the form of a mere question. Secondly, Meno’s aim is, Moline thinks, to embarrass Socrates, 
who claims that he does not know the object of inquiry, namely what virtue is, at all, because, 
Meno initially does not believe Socrates’ claim of being totally perplexed and ignorant about 
what virtue is. So, Meno’s use of “ποῖον (80d6)” is, according to Moline, just sarcastic.29 I 
only (partially) agree with his following claim concerning the first reason: Socrates makes it 
of “a flat, sceptical claim which has been rendered general in scope by means of the 
impersonal locution “a man” (Ibid. 159)”. But, his second reason does not explain either why 
Socrates takes it so seriously if it is merely irony, or how Meno’s ‘irony’ is exactly related to 
                                                     
28
 Amongst those who think that the two are identical, for example, White thinks that Socrates’ restatement just 
clarifies the paradoxical aspect of Meno’s original question and that Plato does not intend any difference 
between them, from the fact that Socrates does not say that he changes it (1974: 290). However, even this line of 
interpretations does not give a clear account of the exact relation between Meno’s question and Socrates 
restatement, which I will analyse in chapter III. 
29
 Moline also points that Aristotle calls it ‘τὸ ἐν τῷ Μένωνι ἀπόρημα (the aporēma in the Meno)’ but not 
‘Meno’s aporēma (τὸ ἀπόρημα τοῦ Μένωνος)’ in the Posterior Analytics (17a29) (1969: 156-157). However, he 
does not discuss closely what ‘aporēma’ is for Aristotle and as a result this reason does not strongly support his 
argument. Cf. note 45, 190. 
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Socrates’ restatement. Moline does not eventually go on further to examine even how 
Socrates’ restatement works as a paradox. 
 
Contrary to Moline, Scott, in one of the most recent monographs on the Meno, maintains that 
Meno’s original question is the one which presents the real paradox, but Socrates’ is not, 
while he also, like Moline, confidently distinguishes Socrates’ restatement from what Meno 
originally asks (2006: 78). Along his main point of interpretation which regards Meno’s 
questions as Plato’s own challenges to historical Socrates’ views,30 Scott interprets Meno 
here as challenging the Socratic duty of inquiry, and thinks that the challenge might render 
the Socratic life of examination pointless. In order to avoid applying the one name ‘Meno’s 
paradox’ to Meno’s question and/or Socrates’ restatement, Scott calls the former ‘Meno’s 
challenge’ and the latter the ‘eristic dilemma’ (Ibid. 75-76). He translates the passage 80d5-
e5 as follows: 
 
(M
1
) And how will you inquire, Socrates, into something when you don’t know (ὃ μὴ οἶσθα) at 
all what it is? Which of the things that you don’t know will you propose as the object of your 
inquiry? (M
2
) Or even if you really stumble upon it, how will you know that this is the thing you 
didn’t know before?31 
 
I know what you want to say, Meno. Do you realize what an eristic argument you’re bringing up 
– that it’s impossible for someone to inquire into what he knows or doesn’t know: he wouldn’t 
inquire into what he knows, since he already knows it and there’s no need for such a person to 
inquire; nor into what he doesn’t know, because he doesn’t even know what he’s going to 
inquire into (Scott 2006: 76-78). 
 
Scott thinks that Socrates uses ‘eristic’ only to describe his own restatement, but not to 
describe what Meno asks, which is, I think, directly connected to his interpretation that 
regards Socrates’ restatement as an eristic dilemma (so it is not a real paradox) and Meno’s 
                                                     
30
 Cf. note 4. 
31
 Scott here translates “ὃ μὴ οἶσθα” as “when you don’t know”. This way of asking the question particularly 
focuses on Socrates’ problematic state as an inquirer. This is, I think, more applicable than my translation to a 
context in which Meno intends to attack Socrates’ personal position. My translation, on the other hand, by 
focusing on the unknown object (what you do not know), as I will argue in chapter III-4 and V-3, presents 
Meno’s question as closer to the original argument which is concerned with the specific object whose intrinsic 
nature is unknown. The difference between a not-knowing inquirer and the unknown object is, I think, the 
problem of two different perspectives, namely that of the inquirer or that of the object in a specific inquiry. 
When you see the inquiry from the inquirer’s perspective, there is an unknown object, while from the object’s, 
there is a not-knowing inquirer. See chapter V for further details.  
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question as Plato’s genuine philosophical challenge. Accordingly, Scott reconstructs what 
Socrates says as follows: 
 
S
1
 If you know the object already you cannot genuinely inquire into it. 
S
2
 If you do not know it you cannot inquire, because you do not even know what you are 
inquiring into. 
[Implicit premise: S
3
 Either you know something or you do not know.] 
S
4
 Therefore you cannot inquire into any object (Scott 2006: 78). 
 
Scott here changes the subject of Socrates’ restatement from the third person singular to the 
second person so that S
2
, the problem of inquiry, corresponds to M
1
 in Meno’s question. By 
doing so, he maintains that, in Socrates’ restatement (eristic dilemma), while S1, the problem 
of inquiry into what you know,
 
is added, M
2
, the problem of discovery, is missing. The 
problem of the impossibility of discovery is, according to Scott, a real philosophical paradox, 
which Socrates omits from Meno’s original question and does not give any responses to 
(Ibid. 75-91).
32
 
 
Scott thinks that the problem of inquiry M
1 
is not worth serious consideration. “The weakness 
of M
1 
is clear (2006: 76)”, he says, the impossibility of beginning inquiry is easily solved by 
means of distinguishing true belief from knowledge, because (as he adds the implicit premise 
S
3
 and as I agree) the dilemma is relying on the false dichotomy of all-or-nothing knowledge 
(1995: 30; 2006:79).
33
 However, I found that Scott’s following solution for the problem of 
inquiry is controversial. He argues that such a state as presented by Meno’s question does not 
fit Socrates’ position: i.e. it is obvious that Socrates has plenty of beliefs and ideas about 
virtue, as we can see from the conversations in which Socrates refutes Meno’s three answers: 
Socrates in fact, according to Scott, does not mean that he has no true beliefs and ideas about 
what virtue is.
34
 A number of beliefs which Socrates has are enough to begin the inquiry into 
what virtue is, because, Scott generalises, even a partial grasp of something allows anyone to 
                                                     
32
 Scott thinks that the reason why Meno is not against Socrates’ obvious reformulation, missing the problem of 
discovery originally stated in Meno’s question, is that the argument does not comes from Meno himself and 
Meno leaves Socrates recall it in full (2006: 78). Although the arguments, as I agree, had existed the outside of 
their conversation, it is not clear whether that could be the good reason why Meno does not point out Socrates’ 
dropping what Scott calls a real philosophical matter, and also whether it supports his argument that only the full 
version recalled by Socrates is eristic, but Meno’s is of real importance. 
33
 Another interpretation which holds that the distinction between true belief and knowledge disarms Meno’s 
paradox for similar reasons is Irwin (1977: 139). 
34
 Scott’s solution is indeed the same as Moline’s second reason to hold, conversely, that Meno’s question is 
parody, but Socrates’ a real paradox. 
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specify the object of inquiry and enables him to engage in an inquiry towards full knowledge 
of it. But, even if Scott is right, do Meno’s question and Socrates’ restatement at 80d5-e5 
satisfy with this solution to count mere beliefs same as partial knowledge? 
 
What makes Scott, on the other hand, think that only the possibility of discovery is a serious 
philosophical problem is that he sees the missing part in Socrates’ reformulation (M2) being 
susceptible of two different readings. One is continuous with the problem of the inquiry of 
M
1
. Although you cannot make a discovery about the object either by means of inquiry or by 
accident if you are at a total loss about it, Scott claims that this can be solved in the same 
way, “distinguishing between grasping a subject sufficiently having a specification of it, and 
attaining full knowledge through inquiry (2006: 77)”. There is, on the other hand, another 
reading of M
2
 that includes the real philosophical problem, which Scott calls “a deeper 
interpretation (Ibid. 83)”: although the fact that you have an initial specification of the object 
will allow you to start the inquiry into it, the problem is that the initial assumptions included 
in the specification play “a crucial role in determining the direction and outcome of the 
inquiry (Ibid. 77)”. So, how can you know the initial specification is correct? This is what 
Scott calls the problem of ‘foreknowledge principle (Ibid. 84-85)’. Scott’s interpretation 
about M
2 
is based on Socrates’ conclusion of his response to Meno’s challenge: 
 
As for the other points, I wouldn’t absolutely insist on the argument. But I would fight, both in 
word and deed, for the following point: that we would be better, more manly and less lazy if we 
believe that we ought to inquire into what we do not know, than if we believed that we cannot 
discover what we do not know and so have no duty to inquire (86b6-c2, emphasis added and 
trans. by Scott; 2006: 82). 
 
Scott maintains that “on this view inquiry is pointless rather than impossible (Ibid.)”, and 
thinks that this comment by Socrates implies that only the problem of discovery is something 
which Socrates’ response could not disarm. 
 
This is quite confusing, because I cannot see any reasons why the ‘foreknowledge principle’ 
cannot be applied to the problem of inquiry when it can be applied to the problem of 
discovery. Socrates here also mentions the duty to inquire, and it seems to me that Socrates’ 
point concerns both the beginning of inquiry and its conclusion with discovery. Even if you 
can start the inquiry with your uncertain identification of the object, it does not guarantee, in 
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the same way that the problem of discovery cannot be resolved, that your inquiry is not 
pointless (as Scott says), and the pointless inquiry cannot, in any way, be called a genuine 
inquiry into the object which you indeed intend. Fine is also suspicious about whether Scott’s 
solution will solve the problem of inquiry,
35
 and maintains that the problem is how to acquire 
knowledge if we begin with mere beliefs and do not already have knowledge of the object 
(2007: 347). Fine points out that if we began inquiring into something which we do not know 
at all with mere beliefs, “we could never emerge from the circle of beliefs to the light of 
knowledge (Ibid. 349)”. 
 
Scott’s argument is, I think, established on twin standards as to what are genuinely regarded 
as both the inquiry and the discovery of a specific object. According to my interpretation of 
Scott’s arguments, the discovery of what [A] is could be impossible if you begin with mere 
beliefs about [A], because your initial assumptions, which are merely beliefs, determine the 
direction of your inquiry into [A], and even if you think that you have finally discovered [A], 
it does not guarantee that what you have discovered is really [A]. Even if you in fact have 
discovered [B], but which you believe is [A], there is no way for you to find that what you 
think is [A] is in fact [B] (for instance, even if someone tells you that what you have found is 
[B], how can you know that he is right and you are wrong if you initially did not know what 
[A] is at all?). In case that what you have found is [B], I think, Scott will not say that this is 
the genuine discovery of [A], even if you believe that it is [A]. 
 
If this standard is, as Scott discusses, applied to the discovery of [A], it should also be 
applicable to the inquiry into the specific object [A]. Let us suppose that you start the inquiry 
into [A] with mere beliefs about what [A] is, but the fact is that you are inquiring into [B] by 
mistaking [B] for [A] believing that you are inquiring into [A]. Just as the discovery of [B] 
cannot be said to be that of [A], your inquiry cannot be said to be the inquiry into [A]. Your 
inquiry is the inquiry into what you believe is [A], but in fact is into [B]. You might be able 
to say that although you were inquiring into [A] you eventually discovered [B] at the end. It 
does not mean that you genuinely inquired into [A] (but you inquired into what you thought 
[A]) if we follow the standard applied to the discovery of [A] above. Conversely, if you want 
to call the inquiry into what you think [A] a genuine inquiry into [A] (even if that is in fact 
[B]), you have to regard that discovery of what you think is [A] (even if that is in fact [B]) as 
                                                     
35
 Cf. also McCabe 2009: 234, n.1. 
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also a genuine discovery of [A]. If we have only one standard to determine whether it is a 
genuine inquiry and discovery of a specific object, I think that the problem of inquiry and 
discovery are after all a single problem. 
 
I think that Meno’s question, despite what Scott thinks, has only one standard. And, my 
interpretation of the two versions of the eristic argument, namely Meno’s question and 
Socrates’ restatement, is as follows: 
 
[M] Then, Socrates, how will you inquire into the thing which you do not know at all what it is? 
[M1] Placing what of the things which you do not know will you inquire into it? [M2] Or, even 
if you happened to meet it, how could you know that this is what you did not know? 
 
I understand what you want to say, Meno. Do you see what an eristic argument you are bringing 
up, that [S] it is not possible for a man to inquire into either what he knows or what he does not 
know? For, [S1] he would not inquire into what he knows, since he knows, and there is no need 
for such a person to inquire, [S2] nor into what he does not know, since he does not even know 
what he is going to inquire into (80d5-e5, cf.  p. 5). 
 
Meno’s initial question is: how Socrates will inquire into what he does not know at all what it 
is ([M]), because he cannot start the inquiry, not being able to identify it as the object of his 
inquiry ([M1]) and even if he encountered it he cannot realize that this is what he wished to 
know ([M2]). The problem of Socrates’ coming to know what he did not know at all ([M]) is, 
according to my interpretation, supported by two crucial reasons for the impossibility of 
inquiry ([M1]) and discovery ([M2]), but this is originally a single problem. Meno’s question 
is as a result identical to the latter half of Socrates’ restatement ([S2]), namely the 
impossibility of inquiry into what one does not know. 
 
My suggestion to the first question ([1]) will be, therefore, that Meno’s question originates 
with one of a set of ready-made arguments, as Socrates restates it, on the impossibility of 
inquiry into either what one know or does not know ([S]). Socrates’ restatement version of 
the two claims ([S1] and [S2]) is simply the original version of Meno’s question ([M]), and 
Meno uses one of them ([S2]) as a counterargument, attacking Socrates’ two claims that 
Socrates does not know what virtue is at all but that he wishes to inquire into what virtue is 
which he does not know at all. The original technique of the refutation, I think, appears in the 
   
The Underlying Paradox of Plato’s Meno 80d5-e5 
- 23 - 
 
Euthydemus.
36
 Despite taking the form of a question, interestingly, Meno’s question is not 
concerned with whether or not Socrates really does not know the object of inquiry at all,
37
 or 
what Socrates means when he says that he does not ‘know’ what it is at all, because its aim is 
to refute its adversary’s argument. So, Socrates’ criticism that it is an eristic argument is a 
faithful account for both of Meno’s question and his restatement, as they both purport to 
refute its interlocutor’s argument, which I will closely examine in the chapter III. 
 
 
 
2.   ‘Paradoxes’ 
 
The second question surrounding the interpretation of the passage 80d5-e5 ([2]) is in what 
sense it is a paradox if Meno’s question and/or Socrates’ restatement present any paradox. 
‘Paradox’ is, in ordinary contexts and roughly speaking, used in two different senses in 
English; either for an apparently self-contradictory argument or a generally unaccepted view 
which is in actuality well-founded and true, or for a statement which is indeed self-
contradictory. People ordinarily use the term ‘paradox’ and ‘paradoxical’ in such loose 
meanings in daily contexts.
38
 On the other hand, in philosophical contexts and stricter senses, 
it is said that there are at least two main types, ‘semantic paradoxes’ which depend on 
semantic elements such as meaning and designation (e.g. Liar paradox and Barber paradox) 
and ‘logical paradoxes (or paradoxes of set theory)’ which depend on purely logical or 
mathematical terms (e.g. Russell’s paradox). And, there are also other various paradoxes, for 
example, ‘pragmatic paradoxes’ which involve a contradiction not in what is said, but 
between what is said and what is done, Zeno’s Paradox, whereby apparently indispensable 
notions are inconsistent with what is generally perceived, and the Prediction Paradox which 
appears, for example, in an ‘unexpected’ examination informed by the examiner in advance 
(so expected in some ways). ‘Paradox’ is, moreover, also used as a synonym for an antinomy, 
which is a pair of propositions, namely a thesis and antithesis, both of which seems to be 
supported by valid reasoning, but contradict each other.
39
 
                                                     
36
 As will argued below, McCabe points out the certain connection between the argument in the Euthydemus and 
‘Meno’s paradox’ (2009), although her interpretation is founded on a different perspective from mine. 
37
 This is something which Meno at the outset carefully confirms: he asks Socrates “Do you really not know 
what virtue is? (ἀληθῶς οὐδ' ὅτι ἀρετή ἐστιν οἶσθα;) (71b9-c1)”, and Socrates admits it. 
38
 Cf. Oxford English Dictionary (1991), XI, 185, Oxford: Clarendon. 
39
 I am using the term ‘antinomy’ in a broader sense than that of Kantian antinomy of pure reason. Cf., for 
example, Proudfoot, M. and Lacey, A.R. (2010), The Routledge Dictionary of Philosophy, New York: 
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Calvert criticizes Phillips, because he thinks that ‘Meno’s paradox’ is not paradoxical at all, 
if the paradox is, as Phillips maintains, between sophistic empiricism and Platonic 
rationalism (1974: 145). If it is a paradox, Calvert claims, it should deny something obvious, 
namely what is usually thought possible, and he thinks that the paradox must be the 
impossibility of transition from ignorance to knowing, which is relying on an extreme 
dichotomy between knowing and not-knowing in the Eleatic doctrine (Ibid.).
40
 Since Phillips 
names the argument ‘Meno’s paradox’, the term has, in any case, been applied to the passage 
85d5-e5 for a long time without determining what paradox the passage presents. Besides 
Phillips’, the variety of interpretations on what should be considered as a paradox includes, 
for example: 
 
(1) This paradox is self-contradictory (Eckstein: 1968: 29-30).
41
 
(2) This is a paradox between atomistic view and Socratic holistic view of knowledge 
(Ionescu 2007: 40). 
(3) This is a paradox which is concerned with two different conceptions of learning, 
namely learning as empirical inquiry and learning as a priori inquiry (Moravcsik 
1971: 113-115). 
 (4) This is a paradox depending on a fallacious dichotomy of all-or-nothing knowledge, 
which regards the transition from ignorance to knowing as impossible (Calvert 1974: 
144; and partly Scott 2006). 
(5) This is a paradox between the identification and the definition of the object of 
inquiry which is concerned with the problem of ‘Socratic priority of definition’ 
(White 1974-5: 153; Welbourne 1986: 236-241; Irwin 1995: 130-132; Charles 2006: 
116-122, 2010). 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Routledge; Bunnin, N. and Yu, J. (2004), The Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy, Oxford: Blackwell; 
Flew, A. and Priest, S. (2002), A Dictionary of Philosophy, London: Pan; Audi, R. (ed.) (1999), The Cambridge 
Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge: CUP. 
40
 My arguments basically follow the line of Calvert’s position as I discuss below. 
41
 Eckstein’s argument is as follows; if Socrates, who thinks that he can learn what he does not know, could 
learn Meno’s claim that you cannot learn what you do not know, it is self-defeating because Socrates could 
learn what he did not know from Meno’s claim that you cannot learn what you do not know, and the claim 
itself is as a result proved wrong. Conversely, if Socrates could not learn Meno’s claim that you cannot learn 
what you do not know, it is again self-defeating, because although the claim that you cannot learn what you do 
not know is proved right Socrates could not learn what he did not know and still thinks that he can learn what he 
does not know (1968: 29-30). This, however, cannot be applied to the situation of not knowing the object of 
learning at all, and also can be solved in the same way as in semantic paradoxes (cf. Olin 2003: 15-16). 
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 (6) This is the same sort of paradox which appears in the Euthydemus (Taylor 1949: 
135; Tarrant 2005: 37; McCabe 2009). 
(7) This is a paradox which is concerned with external and internal accounts of knowing 
that one knows (MacKenzie 1988; McCabe 2009).
42
 
 
It is not my aim to claim that each of these interpretations is totally irrelevant to Plato’s 
concerns in the dialogue, rather I think that all the interpretations certainly are related to the 
reasons for which Meno 80d5-e5 presents various paradoxes and also that those paradoxes 
are, I think, what Plato in actuality had in mind. My point, however, is that none of them 
actually identifies where the paradox is situated for Socrates in the Meno and what argument 
is that which Socrates attempts to disarm in this dialogue. Although it may seem to pre-empt 
my conclusion at this point, I will propose, as an answer to the second question ([2]), there 
are two types of paradox, one is what appears on the surface as the pair of the horns of an 
eristic argument, and the other is what I call ‘the underlying paradox of Meno 80d5-e5’ that 
provides the foundation upon which other paradoxes are established. Let us first look at the 
surface paradox, which is situated between two horns in Socrates’ restatement version of the 
eristic argument ([S]): 
 
[S1] A man would not inquire into what he does know. 
[S2] A man would not inquire into what he does not know. 
 
These two horns at first glance seem to submit a paradox on the impossibility of inquiry for a 
man into either what he knows or what he does not know ([S]). Nevertheless, this paradox 
concerning the impossibility of inquiry is, I think, just one version of the original eristic 
argument. When Meno makes use of one of the pair of the eristic arguments above (i.e. [S2]) 
for attacking Socrates’ position, he presents the impossibility not only of beginning the 
inquiry but also of recognizing the object even when Socrates happened to meet it by 
accident: 
 
[M1] You cannot begin to inquiry into it because you do not know anything about where to 
head. 
[M2] Even if you happened to meet it you cannot know that this is what you did not know. 
                                                     
42
 I discuss related matters to each of these interpretations in following places in this thesis: (1) note 41; (2) 
chapter V; (3) chapter III; (4) chapter III-4, V; (5) note 17, 177; (6) chapter III; (7) chapter III-1. 
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Although Scott thinks that [M2] is presenting the impossibility of ‘discovery’,43 [M2] does 
not necessarily mean that the encounter must be the outcome of inquiry. If it is, as [M1] 
claims, impossible to start the inquiry in any way, it is more plausible to understand that [M2] 
covers any accidental encounters rather limits to the consequence of ‘inquiry’. This follows 
that [M1] and [M2] as a whole submit a paradox of the impossibility for Socrates to, more 
generally, come to ‘know’ what he did not know what it was at all either through inquiry or 
by accident: i.e. if Socrates does not know what virtue is at all, he not only cannot start the 
inquiry into what it is but also cannot recognizes it even if ‘virtue’ is present in front of him, 
either as a result of ‘inquiry’, by accident, or by being taught by someone else. Therefore, 
what the impossibility of inquiry implies is, according to my interpretation, in fact the 
impossibility of coming to know for a man something which he was completely blank about.
 
44
 Conversely, inquiry is thought to be possible only in the way through which one comes to 
‘know’ something which he already ‘knows’ somehow about it. This is, I think, what [S1] and 
[S2] are really concerned with.
45
 Meno’s argument points out that, if Socrates is not able to 
identify what the object is, it would be impossible for Socrates to come to ‘know’ what it is. 
This is indeed challenging the possibility of coming to know what one does not know, rather 
merely the impossibility of inquiry, which I will clarify in the following section with my 
interpretation on the deeper, underlying paradox. 
                                                     
43
 Cf. pp. 18-19. 
44
 From this viewpoint inquiry can be thought just as one of many ways that are available for one to come to 
know what he did not know. When [M2] is understood in this way, it is more plausible that Meno intends to 
criticize the fact that Socrates won’t be able to recognize it even when Meno provides a right answer about what 
virtue is. Cf. chapter III-4 for the detailed reconstruction of Meno 80d5-e5. 
45
 Aristotle in the Posterior Analytics (71a29-30) paraphrases the aporēma in the Meno (τὸ ἐν τῷ Μένωνι 
ἀπόρημα) as “you will learn either nothing or what you know (ἢ γὰρ οὐδὲν μαθήσεται ἢ ἃ οἶδεν) (71a30)”. 
Aristotle here, concerning “pre-existent knowledge (προϋπαρχούσα γνῶσις: 71a1)”, maintains that since all 
teaching and learning come from already existing knowledge, before any inquiry, you should probably be said 
to know (ἐπίστασθαι) in a way but not to know in another way (cf. 71a1-25). If inquiry is not like this, it has to 
result in the aporēma in the Meno (71a29). (Cf. also 71b6-8.) I think what I suggest as the underlying paradox 
in the thesis will be identical to what Aristotle regards as ‘the aporēma in the Meno’. Aristotle rejects a kind of 
learning which derives from absolutely nothing, rather learning always come from pre-existing knowledge. I 
interpret this as follows: if ‘learning something coming from pre-existing knowledge’ is not counted as ‘learning 
something which one does not know’, and if ‘learning’ only means ‘learning something which one does not 
know at all (i.e. something which one is completely blank about)’, since there is no such learning which derives 
from complete ignorance, you won’t learn anything or learn only what you already know (this is also argued by 
Scott 2006: 84). Charles provides an alternative interpretation on the same argument in the Posterior Analytics, 
which regards this as Aristotle’s attempt to resolve the paradox in the Meno which is, according to him, caused 
by Plato’s failing to distinguish two different kinds of question, one is the definition of virtue, and the other is 
the identification of virtue (2010: 136-149). Although I agree with Charles’ interpretation on both of Aristotle’s 
and Plato’s texts, I suspect that this is ‘Plato’s’ mistake, because, as I will argue in chapter IV, Socrates’ 
response exactly provides the same sort of idea which Aristotle presents in the Posterior Analytics: i.e. all 
learning and inquiry are recollection of what soul has already known. See chapter II-3 and IV for the detailed 
analysis of Socrates’ response in the Meno. Cf. note 190. 
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3.   Socrates’ Response 
 
The third question ([3]) addresses whether or not Socrates’ response completely disarms the 
paradox, although there is virtually no interpretation which thinks it does.
46
 This question is 
closely related to the matter of which bits each commentator regards as Socrates’ serious 
reply: the myth of the immortality of the soul, the theory of recollection, and the slave’s 
geometrical demonstration. Scott regards the theory of recollection, including the slave’s 
geometrical demonstration, as Socrates’ response, but maintains that it is neither necessary 
nor sufficient to solve the eristic dilemma, because the way to solve the problem of inquiry is, 
as he analyses it, to differentiate full knowledge of the object from belief (i.e. a partial grasp 
of it). Scott thinks that the problem of discovery is also not given any response, and that the 
theory of recollection is merely “a psychological strategy of carrot and stick (2006: 81)” to 
intrigue Meno into Socratic inquiry (Ibid. 79-82). On the other hand, Fine suggests the 
alternative solution that Plato replies to it by keeping the continuous transition from true 
belief to knowledge (2007: 349). Fine thinks that the ‘foreknowledge principle’ is not 
necessary for resolving the problem of discovery, because knowledge is, as Socrates says, 
“true belief tied down by explanatory reasoning (98a4) (Ibid. 349)”,47 and Plato’s intention is, 
according to her, to show that inquiry is possible from true beliefs (Ibid. 344). As Fine points 
out, when Meno wonders what the difference is between true belief and knowledge, Socrates 
answers that when true beliefs are tied down by such strong reasoning which brings about the 
conclusion, they first become knowledge, and then remain. Socrates says this is recollection 
(98a).
48
 
 
However, the remaining problem is, if Socrates’ response is that knowledge is true beliefs 
which are tied down by strong reasoning, whether it really disarms what the passage 80d5-e5 
questions: i.e. whether what Meno question suggests simply admits that knowledge is, in fact, 
                                                     
46
 Amongst those who think that Plato erroneously thinks that Socrates’ response disarms the paradox despite 
the fact that it does not, for example, White maintains that although both the object and the specification can be 
recalled simultaneously according to the theory of recollection, it does not answer the puzzle (1974: 53). 
47
 See Gorgias 508e-509a, 527b. Cf. also Fine (2004: 61) for various other interpretations. 
48
 An alternative view is argued by Charles who focuses on the difference between Aristotle and Plato (cf. note 
45). Charles thinks that Platonic recollection provides knowledge, i.e. the essences existing independently of 
this world (2010: 148), which, I believe, cannot be applied especially for the case of the Meno. Cf. also Sedley’s 
comment which will support Fine’s argument: ““knowledge is true belief bound down by reasoning out the 
cause” has been judged by many to be Plato’s most successful account of knowledge. It is one that deeply 
influenced Aristotle (2010: xxii)”. 
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a kind of beliefs.
49
 Meno’s initial argument ([M1] and [M2]) (as I argued above) claims that 
it will be impossible for Socrates to come to know what he did not know at all what it was. If 
Socrates’ response is that he will be able to come to know what he did not know at all what it 
was by means of tying down his beliefs about what he currently thinks what it is with strong 
reasoning, it seems to me that this response contradicts the fact that Meno’s question clearly 
assumes an inquirer who is completely blank about the object of inquiry. This is, in fact, 
(contradictorily) something which even Socrates himself may be hesitant to accept 
straightforwardly, as he claims the clear difference between knowledge and true belief at 
98b.
50
 Socrates’ view on the relation between knowledge and belief seems to me not 
determinate than we expect in the Meno. Although Fine’s interpretation about the connection 
from true belief to knowledge is convincing in so far as some parts of the dialogue is 
concerned, if this is the only solution provided by Socrates, it follows that his response does 
not disarm the problem that it is impossible for one to come to know what he did not know at 
all what it was. 
 
One might think that it is not a paradox because we can know in any way whatever we 
potentially know rather than whatever we absolutely have no idea about, and that the theory 
of recollection exactly provides such a possibility of transition from the state of not-knowing 
(not-recollecting) to that of knowing (recollecting) about what we have already potentially 
known. However, the important thing which is often overlooked is that the theory of 
recollection does not explain anything more than the change between these two intellectual 
states through recollection. Even if recollection is possible, why it can be said that recollected 
things are really ‘knowledge’? Why can you say that your beliefs will become ‘knowledge’, 
rather than remain as (admittedly somehow better) beliefs forever? This problem is in fact 
given a response by the immortality of the soul, which maintains that the soul, being 
immortal, has ‘knowledge’ but not only ‘true beliefs’. 
 
My main suggestion of the thesis is, as will be argued, that there is the underlying paradox 
which does not appear on the surface of Meno 80d5-e5. This is what I regard as a conflict 
between Socrates epistemological positive dogmatism supported by the myth of immortality 
of the soul and Gorgias’ epistemological negative dogmatism which claim that it is 
                                                     
49
 Cf. Welbourne 1986: 243. 
50
 Although Grube translates ‘doxa’ as ‘opinion’, I use ‘belief’ following Scott and Fine, with regarding both are 
interchangeable and thinking it harmless for the purpose of my thesis. 
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impossible for human beings to know the truth of reality:
51
 The former regards that everyone 
‘knows’ everything by means of the knowing soul, and the latter that no one knows anything. 
Each of two epistemologies between the positive side ([P]) and the negative side ([N]) 
respectively says: 
 
[P] We know everything. 
[N] We do not know anything. 
 
And, I will suggest that the eristic argument is, founded upon these two arguments, capable to 
argue the impossibility of whatever expresses the intellectual transition from not-knowing to 
knowing, for example, inquiry, discovery, learning, etc: 
 
[S1] A man does not inquire into/discover/learn what he does know. 
[S2] A man does not inquire into/discover/learn what he does not know 
 
As I will argue in chapter IV, The immortality of the soul provides the fundamental basis for 
the possibility of knowledge. On the other hand, I will argue in chapter V that Gorgias’ 
second part of his On What Is Not or On Nature rejects the possibility of knowledge. Socrates 
adheres to the possibility of the accessibility of the truth of reality (cf. 86b1; ἡ ἀλήθεια τῶν 
ὄντων) 52 by the myth of immortality of the soul. On the other hand, Gorgias denies it by 
holding the truth of reality to be inapprehensible for human beings either through intellects or 
sense-perceptions. Both sides are equally strong arguments, so both of them cannot refute 
each other. Thus, the mutual counterarguments together present a serious paradox between 
two dogmatic epistemological positions. Thus this is what I think the real, underlying 
paradox of Meno 80d5-e5 in the same sense of antinomy. Having briefly clarified three 
puzzles raised by previous interpretations above, we can now turn to my alternative and new 
interpretation of Meno 80d5-e5 to resolve them.  
                                                     
51
 Cf. chapter V for the details. 
52
 The Greek ‘τὸ ὂν’ here is again, depending on commentators, translated in various ways; e.g. ‘reality (Grube 
in J.M. Cooper 1997)’, ‘things (Scott 2006: 93; Sedley 2010: 23)’, ‘the things (Sharples 1985: 81; Weiss 2001: 
120)’, ‘beings (Ionescu 2007: 88)’. In order to show that Socrates, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus rather 
employs the Eleatic terminology, I will use the translation ‘what-is’ for ‘τὸ ὂν’, and ‘reality’ or ‘things that are’ 
for the plural, with the original Greek words throughout in this thesis. 
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III.   Underlying Foundations of the Eristic Argument 
 
 
 
1.   All-or-Nothing Knowledge in the Euthydemus 
 
I would like to begin from the first puzzle which maintains that Socrates’ evaluation of 
Meno’s question as an ‘eristic argument (ὁ ἐριστικός λόγος 80e2; 81d6)’ contradicts the 
assumption that it has philosophical importance. And, the first question was – Is Socrates’ 
restatement identical with Meno’s initial question? My answer is simply yes; Socrates 
reformulates Meno’s question from the form of a mere contentious counterargument which 
attacks Socrates’ claim that he does not know what virtue is at all into that of its original 
generalized argument on the impossibility of inquiry for a man into either what he knows or 
what he does not know, but does not change its authentic meaning in terms of preserving its 
eristic nature. When Meno utters the question, he clearly points out Socrates’ personal state 
of aporia with the second person singular, excluding himself. Some commentators think that 
the reason why Socrates calls it ‘eristic’ is because Meno’s intention is contentious, just 
wanting to refute Socrates’ position.53 Politis points out that Meno’s state of aporia at 80a-b 
is distinct from the slave’s, who avoids the self-conceit of claiming to know the answer to the 
geometrical question asked by Socrates (2006: 95-96). Meno’s state is rather, Politis says, an 
analogy with those who believe that Socrates simply refutes their claims in order to reveal 
that they do not know what they thought they knew (cf. Apology 21b1-23a4).
 Meno’s 
comparison of Socrates to a wizard and a stingray, as Politis maintains, reveals his disgust, 
which is caused by his frustration in trying to satisfy Socrates’ demand to state the essence of 
virtue. However, if the argument is eristic merely because Meno’s intention is so, why does 
Socrates need to take it so seriously, and wouldn’t it contradict Socrates’ generalized 
applicability of the claim? Does it mean that the person who has a contentious intention is 
guilty but the argument itself is innocent?
54
 
 
                                                     
53
 Cf. chapter II-1. 
54
 Aristotle analyses ‘eristic’ arguments in the Sophistical Refutations in details. In this treatise, Aristotle 
maintains that the same argument will be sophistical or eristic depending on the purpose: it will be eristic insofar 
as its aim is an apparent victory, while it will be sophistical insofar as its aim is an apparent wisdom (171b25-
33). However, since Aristotle’s view would not be completely identical to Socrates’, I will examine in what 
sense Socrates uses the term ‘eristic’ in the Meno by seeking for as many hints as possible in Platonic dialogues 
while referring to Aristotle’s arguments. 
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Meno’s question, as many commentators think, obviously comes from outside of the 
conversation.
55
 When Meno advances the argument, he asks Socrates “doesn’t this argument 
(ὁ λόγος οὗτος) appear to you to be good (καλῶς) (81a1)?” Meno is undoubtedly talking 
about whether ‘the argument’ is good or not as an argument, rather than maintaining any 
commitment to what the argument claims. It shows that the argument is for Meno merely a 
tool to refute Socrates’ disavowal of knowing what virtue is. As Socrates elsewhere clarifies 
the difference between eristic arguments and the method of dialectic (75c8-d2), the eristic 
debater, in fact, would not need to commit himself to the claim which he uses at all, since his 
job is just to take an adversary’s claim and refute it. When Meno asks Socrates to teach him 
what Socrates explains about the myth of the immortality of the soul and that the theory of 
recollection is really so, Socrates is cautious not to be refuted by Meno’s use of eristic 
argument by answering that he will ‘teach’ it soon after saying that there is no teaching, but 
only recollecting. Although Meno here explains that he does not have such an intention, 
Socrates blames Meno for often attempting to show that Socrates is saying something 
opposed to his own words (81e3-82a5). Socrates’ comment implies what eristic arguments 
should be like, picking up the words that have slipped from the adversary’s mouth, and 
demonstrate that the adversary contradicts himself. 
 
This adjective ‘eristic’ is, as McCabe correctly points out (2009: 235), specifically connected 
to sophistry in Plato’s Euthydemus, which examines what is called ‘eristic’ by Socrates. 
Euthydemus and Dionysodorus in this dialogue appear as “another new kind of sophist 
(271c1)” according to Crito, and Socrates concedes that they are “so skilled in fighting in 
arguments and in refuting whatever may be said, no matter whether it is true or false (272a7-
b1)”.56 Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, unlike Gorgias, claim to teach virtue (aretē) better 
and more quickly than anyone else (273d8-9). Socrates reveals to Crito his strong wish to get 
this wisdom, namely the “eristic sort (ή ἐριστικός; 272b10)”.57 I agree with Sprague’s point 
that “they [Euthydemus and Dionysodorus] are not really interested in truth but only in verbal 
battles (1962: 3)”. The eristic sort of arguments can be, therefore, thought not to involve any 
fixed criterion of judging truth or falsehood of statements, but purely purport to refute their 
interlocutor’s claims and win in speech battles. 
                                                     
55
 E.g. Phillips 1948: 88; Sharples 1985: 142; Scott 2006: 82. Cf. also note 32. 
56
 Compare this with Socrates’ evaluation of Gorgias’ art of rhetoric which enables him to answer whatever is 
asked (but not to refute whatever is said) even about what he does not know (70b5-c3; see p. 7). 
57
 The adjective “ἐριστικός” does not appear so often in Platonic dialogues; except for the Meno and 
Euthydemus, for example, Lysis (211b8), Philebus (17a4), Republic (454b5, 499a1), and Sophist (225d1, e9, 
226a2, 231e2). 
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In the Euthydemus, there is, as McCabe maintains (2009: 247 ff.), a parallel argument which 
includes the same epistemological concern as that in the Meno, namely the conception of all-
or-nothing knowledge. When Socrates and young Clinias fall into the state of aporia in the 
middle of their inquiry into what knowledge is that which will make them happy, Socrates 
asks the two sophists to give them assistance to dispose of the difficulty and make progress in 
the argument. Euthydemus replies to Socrates asking whether Socrates wants to be taught the 
very knowledge which he is seeking for or to demonstrate that Socrates already possesses it 
(292e-293b). Socrates answers that he is keen for Euthydemus to show that Socrates himself 
already has the knowledge, because it will be much easier for him not to need to be bothered 
to learn it newly from anyone else.
58
 Then, Euthydemus’ demonstration that Socrates already 
knows is as follows (293b7-294a3): 
 
(1) There are some things which Socrates knows. 
(2) It is impossible for any of things that are (τῶν ὄντων) which happens to be not to be 
itself. 
(3) Socrates knows something. 
(4) Socrates is knowing if he really knows something. 
(5) If Socrates is knowing, he must necessarily know everything. 
(6) Conversely, if there is anything Socrates does not know, then Socrates would be not-
knowing, because one cannot be a knower and a not-knower, which are different 
things, at the same time. 
 
Socrates is upset and claims that there are still many things which he does not know so that 
he is far from the state of knowing everything. Socrates firstly asks, even if it is proved that 
he possesses the knowledge in theory, how he can in actuality know what that knowledge he 
was looking for is. Then, Socrates also wonders whether Euthydemus too should know ‘some 
of things that are (τὰ… τῶν ὄντων)’, but there must be others he does not know. However, 
according to Euthydemus’ argument, since it is impossible for any of things that are not to be 
                                                     
58
 McCabe compares this with ‘the lazy argument’ in the Meno in which Socrates avows that the eristic 
argument will make one lazy (81d, 86c) (2009: 250, 252). It is certainly the case that this is the reverse of his 
avowal of the duty of inquiry in the Meno: whether you in fact know what you thought you did not know (in the 
Euthydemus) or it is impossible for you to know what you do not know (in the Meno), there would be no duty of 
inquiry. McCabe’s point is, however, slightly different from this but focuses on what she calls ‘external’ account 
of knowing. The problem is whether you really know or not. So, if you merely believe that you know what you 
in actuality do not know, it makes you lazy (see McCabe’ argument below). 
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what they are (2), if Socrates knows something (3) and he is ‘knowing’ (4), he cannot be 
‘not-knowing’ (6) because of the premise (2) that Socrates cannot be a knower and a not-
knower at the same time (those are mutually exclusive), so he must know everything (5). 
Euthydemus asserts that one knows everything, if one really knows even one thing. Thus, 
Euthydemus himself also knows all things. 
 
This is surely, as McCabe also points out, a caricature of a holistic account of knowledge 
(2009: 248, n.33), which maintains that if you really know one thing, you must necessarily 
know everything: since what-is (τὸ ὂν) is one so knowledge of it is as a whole one, it is 
impossible for someone to know something but not to know other things. Again, this is also 
an obvious parallel to the epistemological claim that Socrates himself insists on through the 
kinship of all things in the theory of recollection in the Meno (81c). Quite similarly to the 
theory of recollection, Euthydemus rejects that there are some who do not know some things, 
but maintains that everyone knows everything if he really knows some things. Then, 
Euthydemus and Dionysodorus claim that they have known everything since they were born 
(294e). Ctesippus, thinking that such a thing is inconceivable, asks whatever they are unlikely 
to know (e.g. how to dance), but these sophists keep maintaining that they know each of the 
things, even disgraceful ones. Socrates finally asks whether they know that the good men are 
unjust. Since Dionysodorus is inclined to reject it, Euthydemus warns that Dionysodorus will 
commit to that the same person can be a knower and a not-knower at the same time. 
 
McCabe thinks that the theory of recollection of the Meno rejects the external account of 
knowledge but holds the internal account of it which is missing in the Euthydemus. While in 
the Euthydemus Socrates is given an account of knowing or not-knowing from the external 
perspective (i.e. Euthydemus), the theory of recollection invites the attention to the internal 
account given by the inquirer himself (2009: 234). She thinks that, following Scott’s analysis, 
Meno’s question misses Socrates’ point that we do not inquire into what we know, while 
Socrates’ misses Meno’s interest in what happens when we reach what we did not know 
through inquiry, viz. the problem of discovery (Ibid. 235). Thus, according to her, there are 
three limbs in two different versions; 
 
1.   No inquiry into what we do not know. 
2.   No inquiry into what we do know. 
3.   No discovery of what we don’t know. 
   
The Underlying Paradox of Plato’s Meno 80d5-e5 
- 34 - 
 
 
And, she maintains that the theory of recollection may be designed to disarm the fourth limb; 
 
4.   No discovery of what we do know (McCabe 2009: 236).
59
 
 
McCabe maintains that, while Meno’s challenge is concerned with the external conditions of 
knowledge, namely how the object of inquiry which we do not know at all comes into our 
purview, Socrates’ restatement, by covering the fourth limb, addresses more particularly how 
our own cognitive grip on the object of inquiry can figure in the inquiry itself, in other words, 
how we come to know that we know what we did not know. According to her, thus, the two 
versions may complete each other, neither being sufficient without the other (2009: 240). I 
agree that the self-conscious aspect is one of the important features of slave’s geometrical 
examination. Without being repeatedly asked by Socrates, the slave will not be suddenly 
engaged in the inquiry into the specific geometrical question for his own sake. It is surely 
dubious to think that the slave starts to inquire into what he does not know at all without any 
reason, or anyone asking him (as in the case of the problem of inquiry presented by Socrates’ 
restatement). Rather, the object of the slave’s inquiry is provided by Socrates and 
continuously re-asked until Socrates and Meno confirms that the slave reaches a satisfactory 
correct answer. This clearly provides certain motivation and sufficient reason for the slave to 
be engaged on the inquiry and to finish it with the discovery, by reflecting on his own belief 
about his knowledge, and reviewing his own answers many times. 
 
What I do not understand in McCabe’s arguments is what she calls internal and external 
account of knowledge and how it is related to what the passage 80d5-e5 questions. McCabe 
interprets the paradox as raising the question of both internal and external features of 
knowledge and that the theory of recollection is designed to explain what it is to know that 
we know. However, does the theory of recollection really explain about knowing that we 
know? The theory of recollection will certainly disarm the fourth limb by considering the 
discovery as the process of recovering what one initially knows through recollection. 
                                                     
59
 McCabe changes the subject from Meno’s second person singular to the generalized first person plural 
without any explanation, although neither Meno’s nor Socrates’ version uses this personal pronoun (cf. p. 19 for 
Scott’s reconstruction). However, it is certain, as I will argue, that Plato carefully chooses the specific subject 
modes for each of Meno’s question and Socrates’ restatement. In order to be used in eristic ways, Meno’s 
question and Socrates’ restatement should respectively employ the second person singular (‘you’) for attacking 
its interlocutor’s argument and third person singular (‘a man’) because it is the original version of the eristic 
argument, rather originally including the speaker himself (‘we’) who makes use of the argument. See chapter 
III-4 for the detailed analysis of the various subject modes of the eristic argument. 
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However, it is not because that can explain self-conscious knowledge, rather it suggests that 
discovery is possible in the sense that recollection is possible. If what McCabe suggests is the 
main concern of the paradox, it seems to me that Socrates’ response to what he regards as 
‘the paradox’ merely shows the effectiveness of Socratic elenchus to urge the slave to realize 
that he in actuality does not know what he thought he knew, as Socrates explicitly compares 
it with Meno’s aporia (84a3-c9). If my interpretation of McCabe’s argument is right, this 
elimination of self-conceit may be something which Socrates’ elenchus can disarm by means 
of assisting the inquirer to realize there is something to inquire into, and recover true opinions 
and eliminate false ones. 
 
 
 
2.   Four Features of Eristic Arguments 
 
 
1.   Whichever answer you choose, you will be refuted. 
 
By examining what exactly ‘eristic’ arguments are like in the Euthydemus, I would like to 
show that the arguments are useful to explain why both Meno’s question and Socrates’ 
restatement are called ‘eristic’ too – an aspect distinct from what McCabe focuses on. I think 
that there are at least four features of ‘eristic’ arguments in the Euthydemus. The first feature 
is, as Dionysodrus at the outset whispers to Socrates, that whichever answer you choose to a 
dilemmatic question, you will eventually be refuted (275e5-6). Clinias is asked which, either 
the wise or the ignorant, are the men who learn, and answers that the wise are the learners. 
However, Euthydemus refutes this: when one is to learn something, he should be ignorant 
about that, so the ignorant learns. The next question is whether the things the learners learn 
are those they do not know or those they do know, and Clinias answers that they will learn 
what they do not know following the consequence of the previous claim that the learner is 
ignorant. However, again Clinias is refuted, because Clinias knows letters, and will learn 
what someone dictates with letters, since Clinias knows all letters, he must learn what he 
knows (i.e. letters), so the learners should be those who know, but not those who do not know 
(275d-277b).
60
 Finally, the third question is whether learning is the acquisition of the 
                                                     
60
 Cf. Sophistical Refutations 166a20. 
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knowledge of what one learns, and their conversation is interrupted by Socrates in the 
middle: 
 
Don’t be surprised, Clinias… you must now imagine yourself to be hearing the first part of the 
sophistic mysteries. In the first place, as Prodicus says, you must learn about the correct use of 
words (περὶ ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος); and our two visitors are pointing out this very thing (277d4-
e5). 
 
Socrates attracts Clinias’ attention to their different uses of words in their arguments, about 
which Prodicus is said to have originally taught people. Socrates regards this as a practice 
whereby Euthydemus and Dionysodorus let Clinias realize their ambiguous usage of the same 
words by himself: 
 
you did not realize that people use the word “learn” not only in the situation in which a person 
who has no knowledge of a thing in the beginning acquires it later, but also when he who has 
this knowledge already uses it to inspect the same thing, whether this is something spoken or 
something done. (As a matter of fact, people call the latter “understand” rather than “learn”, but 
they do sometimes call it “learn” as well.) … The same word is applied to opposite sorts of men, 
to both the man who knows and the man who does not (277e5-278a7). 
 
Euthydemus and Dionysodorus are, as Sprague points out (1962: 4-5), using equivocal terms: 
‘learner’ is firstly used for the ignorant who does not know and then for those who do know.61 
Socrates says that when Euthydemus uses the word ‘learn’, he does not clarify which 
meaning he intends, either acquisition of knowledge or understanding something by using 
knowledge which one already has. In the first argument (acquisition of knowledge) that the 
learner is ignorant, Clinias is made confused between the contents of learning and the 
identification of learning. The identification is about what you do not know and about what 
you are going to learn, while the contents is what you do not know about the object of your 
learning and what you are going to learn about it. Concerning that the learner knows what he 
does not know and is going to learn, he is said to be wise enough to know the object of his 
learning, but concerning the contents of learning, he does not know yet what he will learn 
about the object, so he is still ignorant about what he is going to learn about it. The same 
person, i.e. the learner, can be said to be the wise and the ignorant on the same object at the 
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 Cf. also Sophistical Refutations 165a5 ff. 
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same time but in different senses. In the second argument that the learners learn what they 
know, in order to understand something, the learners use knowledge which they already 
possess, e.g. language, practice, etc. The learners learn (‘understand’) what they already 
know, while they learn what they do not know on the same object. The same people, i.e. the 
learners, again, can be said to learn what they know and what they do not know on the same 
object at the same time but in different senses. Socrates, therefore, says that ‘learn’ is by them 
applied to opposite sorts of men, namely to both the man who knows and the man who does 
not. Their arguments mix up these distinctions of terms, and depending on how their 
interlocutor answers, they can refute the interlocutor’s claim by employing alternative uses of 
the same term. Since there are two persons, Euthydemus and Dionysodrus, who are picking 
up the argument (ἐκδεξάμενος τὸν λόγον; 277b4),62 they do so quickly enough for their 
interlocutors not to have the time to carefully figure out the variety of different meanings 
which their uttered statements are capable of covering. Thus, Socrates characterises the 
argument as “trapping people and overturning them by means of the distinctions in words 
(278b6-7)”. 
 
 
2.   The impossibility of falsehood. 
 
The second feature of their eristic arguments is the claim that there is no lie, no contradiction, 
no false statement, and no false opinion. These claims are established upon Eleatic 
epistemology and ontology on what-is (τὸ ὂν) and what-is-not (τὸ μὴ ὂν). The demonstration 
by Euthydemus begins with the impossibility of speaking falsely (283e7-a8): 
 
(1) If it is possible to tell lies, it should be when one speaks the thing which one is 
talking about, but is not when one does not speak it. 
(2) If he speaks this thing, he speaks no other one of things that are (τῶν ὄντων) except 
the very one he speaks. 
(3) The thing he speaks is one of things that are (τῶν ὄντων), distinct from the rest. 
(4) The person speaking that thing (ἐκεῖνος) speaks what-is (τὸ ὄν). 
(5) The person who speaks what-is (τὸ ὂν) and things that are (τὰ ὄντα), speaks the truth 
(τἀληθῆ). 
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 A Similar account of ‘taking up the argument’ also appears in the Meno (75c8-d2). 
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(6) So, if Dionysodorus speaks things that are (τὰ ὄντα), he speaks the truth (τἀληθῆ) 
and tells no lies. 
 
Ctesippus, however, objects: but, a person who speaks these things (ταῦτα) does not always 
speak the things that are (τὰ ὄντα). Euthydemus continues (284b1-c6): 
 
(7) But, things that are not (τὰ … μὴ ὄντα) surely do not exist (οὐκ ἔστιν). 
(8) The things that are not (τά … μὴ ὄντα) are nowhere (οὐδαμοῦ). 
(9) Then, there is no possibility that any person whatsoever could do anything to the 
things that are not (τὰ μὴ ὄντα) so as to make those things which are nowhere (τὰ 
μηδαμοῦ ὄντα) be. 
9-2) When the rhetoricians (οἱ ῥήτορες) speak to the people, they do something. 
9-3) If they do something, they also make something. 
(10) Then, nobody speaks things that are not (τά … μὴ ὄντ'), since no one is capable of 
making what-is-not (τὸ μὴ ὄν). So, nobody speaks falsely. 
(11) If Dionysodorus really does speak, he speaks the truth and things that are (τἀληθῆ 
τε καὶ τὰ ὄντα). 
 
Ctesippus again objects: but he speaks things that are only in a certain way and not as really 
is the case. While Euthydemus attempts to continue refuting Ctesippus’ argument, 
Dionysodrus claims that Ctesippus is abusing them. Socrates tries to tell them not to quarrel 
over words (ὀνόματι διαφέρεσθαι; 285a5). Ctesippus replies to Socrates that he is simply 
contradicting the things Euthydemus is talking about, rather than abusing them. However, 
Euthydemus, in order to refute Ctesippus’ claim again, begins the demonstration on the 
impossibility of contradiction (τὸ ἀντιλέγειν) (284c7-286b6): 
 
(12) There are words (logoi) to describe each thing of things that are (ἑκάστῳ τῶν 
ὄντων). 
(13) The words describe it as it is (ὡς ἔστιν), but not as it is not (ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν). 
(14) If we [Euthydemus and Ctesippus] were both to speak the description of the same 
thing, we would not be contradicting, because we would be saying the same thing. 
(15) But, when neither of us [Euthydemus and Ctesippus] speaks of the thing, it would 
be the case that neither of us had the thing in mind at all. 
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(16) It is impossible for us to contradict, when I [Euthydemus] speak the description of 
the thing, whereas you [Ctesippus] speak another description of another thing. 
(17) Otherwise, it is the case that I [Eutydemus] speak it but you [Ctesippus] speak 
nothing at all, and that no person who does not speak can contradict one who does 
speak. 
 
Euthydemus and Dionysodorus’ argument relies on a controversial dichotomy between what-
is (τὸ ὂν) as speakable, existence and the truth, and what-is-not (τὸ μὴ ὂν) as unspeakable, 
non-existence and the false.
63
 I agree with Sprague who has identified this is the “Eleatic 
denial of the real existence of what-is-not (1962: 16)” which originates in Parmenidean 
epistemology and ontology (which I will argue more closely below).
64
 Steps (2) and (3) 
explicitly show that the argument is committed to the dichotomy: since what can be spoken is 
what-is and what-is-not cannot be spoken, all things that are spoken are what-is. In (5), what-
is is defined as synonymous with the truth: if some speaks something, he speaks one of things 
that are, so he speaks the truth (6). As Ctesippus firstly objects, it could be possible for a 
person to speak falsely about one of things that are. However, this is refuted by Euthydemus’ 
argument that what is false cannot be spoken (10), because things that are not do not exist (7, 
8). Ctesippus again claims that when someone speaks falsely he speaks the things that are in 
a certain way but not as really is the case. This is also refuted by the claim that spoken logoi 
always describe one of the thing that are (12), and words describe the spoken thing as it is but 
not as it is not (13), if two speakers describe the same thing they would say the same thing 
(14), and if neither of them describes the thing, it simply means that they do not have the 
thing in mind at all (15), otherwise, one speaks the thing but the other speak another thing 
(16), or he speaks nothing (17). The possibility that the other is speaking falsely about what-
is (i.e. to speak of one of things that are as that are not), which is different from speaking 
what-is-not (i.e. things that are not), is totally ignored and left unexamined. Then, the point 
raised by Ctesippus, whether or not there are some things amongst things that are that they 
are only in a certain way, i.e. non-existence or the false, is never taken in account in their 
argument in the Euthydemus.
65
As a whole, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus’ argument mixes 
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 The same interpretation is also found in Sprague 1962: 15.  
64
 See chapter V-2, 3. My point here is that although the dichotomy originates with the Eleatics, it would not 
necessarily be the case that the Eleatics committed themselves to such dichotomy. A close analysis of the 
Eleatic arguments is, however, beyond the scope of this thesis. Cf. also Notomi 1999: 203: he correctly 
mentions that “the sharp Eleatic dichotomy between what is and what is not must have provided eristics with a 
strong weapon of argument”. 
65
 This matter would be examined more closely in the Sophist, as I will argue in chapter V. 
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up the ontological status (existence or non-existence and speakable or unspeakable) and the 
alethic status (true or false) of the object by means of regarding on one hand what is spoken 
as only what-is, true, existence, and on the other hand, what-is-not as false, non-existence and 
is impossible to be spoken. 
 
Socrates is here surprised with those sophists’ techniques of refutation, and points out that the 
followers of Protagoras and some still earlier made considerable use of this sort of argument, 
namely that there is no such thing as false speaking (286c6) and false opinion (286d4), and 
contradiction is impossible.
66
 The argument, as Socrates explicitly grasps, relies on the 
principle that the person speaking (or thinking) must either speak (or think) the truth, or, 
otherwise, not speak (or not think) at all. Thus, everyone who speaks is speaking the truth, 
but it is impossible to speak falsely, i.e. speak what-is-not. As a result, no one can make any 
mistakes either in speaking or in thought. Socrates is then confused and asks “are you making 
this statement just for the sake of argument, Dionysodorus – to say something startling – or 
do you honestly believe that there is no such thing as an ignorant man?  (286d11-13)” 
Dionysodorus answers “your business is to refute me (286e1)”. McCabe maintains that “their 
argument suggests an account of truth in which statements are true just if they say the things 
that are ‘about’ (2009: 251)”. I, however, wonder whether those sophists, Euthydemus and 
Dionysodorus, are in actuality committed to such a specific account of truth, namely 
“everything is true (Ibid. 249)” for the sake of their arguments. As far as the first feature of 
their eristic argument is concerned, it is more plausible that they can also argue the opposite, 
namely everything is false and no one speaks the truth, so it is ‘eristic’.67 
 
 
3.   Various criteria of truth. 
 
The third feature of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus’ eristic argument is that each argument is 
a set of refuting games, but not an argument in a valid sense based on a single and 
                                                     
66
 Protagoras is said, in the Theaetetus (151e-183c), to have been committed to the doctrine that everything is 
true. Cf. also a parallel argument on falsehood in thought in the Theaetetus (187c-200d). Again, Sextus, in the 
Against the Logicians, includes Euthydemus and Dionysodorus in the group of those who deny the criterion of 
truth: Sextus says that they “assign what is so, and what is true, to the things in relation to something (M. I. 
[64])”, which is said by Sextus to be the same as Protagoras’ way of denial of the criterion (Ibid. [60-64]). 
67
 Cf. Cratylus 386d; Sophistical Refutations 177b13 ff: In the Theaetetus, Socrates also maintains that 
Protagoras’ claim that man is the measure of all things results into the conclusion that human opinions are both 
true and false (170c). See also chapter V for Gorgias’ argument that every thought is what-is-not. 
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unchanging consistent premise. Every minute, they change not only the topic but also the 
usage of the terms upon which their arguments are founded. There is no consistency for each 
argument, and their present conclusions often happen to refute their own previous claims. 
When Socrates asks what on earth Euthydemus and Dionysodorus have come to teach if it is 
the case that no one makes any mistakes either in speech or in thought or in action,
68
 
Dionysodorus criticises Socrates that he now reminds (ἀναμιμνῄσκῃ) them of what they said 
at the beginning, and blames Socrates for the fact that he would even remind (ἀναμνησθήσῃ) 
them of last-year’s argument and cannot deal with the present argument (τοῖς δ' ἐν τῷ 
παρόντι λεγομένοις οὐχ ἕξεις ὅτι χρῇ;) (287b4-5). Dionysodorus’ words, dealing with 
arguments, explicitly show that their eristic ways are merely dealing each argument as an 
argument but not examining the truth value of those arguments. They obviously do not care 
even though each of their arguments contradict or logically disagree with each other. Rather 
their job is, similar to what Socrates says in the Meno (75c8-d2), to pick up the present 
interlocutor’s argument and refute it. They are dealing with each argument expediently, but 
not examining whether the argument is true or false based upon a fixed criterion, whatever 
the criterion is.
69
 
 
They each time change various criteria of the meaning of words so that alternatives are set 
contrary to what their interlocutors expect. As a result, interlocutors end up speaking about 
things on a different meaning from that the two sophists are about to use. When Ctesippus 
tells Euthydemus and Dionysodorus to demonstrate that they speak the truth (ἐπιδείξατον ὅτι 
ἀληθῆ λέγετον), he requires them to set the criterion of truth and falsehood of their argument 
in the demonstability of it (294c1-2) (so, what Ctesippus says is ‘Show me the evidence’). 
Ctesippus can be considered here to be standing on a pragmatic foundation of the truth-
falsehood criterion.
70
 On the other hand, Socrates’ request is quite different from Ctesippus’: 
when Socrates points out that they may be saying different things on different sides, ignoring 
the mutual understanding of the questions and answers amongst interlocutors, Socrates is 
asking them to fix the use of their words before talking and make Socrates understand which 
meaning they adopt (295c). To fix the use of their words means to determine in what 
meaning they are going to talk about what they are talking about. What Socrates requires is, 
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 Cf. Socrates points out that “if it is impossible to speak falsely, or to think falsely, or to be ignorant, then there 
is no possibility for a man to be mistaken in his action (286e-287a)”. 
69
 I am using the term ‘criterion’ in my thesis simply to refer to a means of determining the truth and falsehood 
in the arguments. 
70
 Compare with Meno’s identical request to demonstrate that what Socrates says is so: “ἀλλ' εἴ πώς μοι ἔχεις 
ἐνδείξασθαι ὅτι ἔχει ὥσπερ λέγεις, ἔνδειξαι (Meno 82a5-6)”. Cf. also chapter IV-4-6. 
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either they claim that they know everything or not in any sense, to fix their criterion on what 
sense they use these terms, i.e. ‘know’, ‘learn’ etc. so as to enable them to argue the truth and 
falsehood of their arguments on the fixed criterion. Without doing so, they can argue to either 
of two opposing conclusions: any claims, statements, and arguments are susceptible of being 
discussed in opposite ways. Thus, Socrates says that he is not going to answer their question 
any more, until he learns the question which they are asking (295c8-9).
71
 
 
To summarise what have been examined, we could at least say that the eristic arguments in 
the Euthydemus has four features: they are, (1) not having a fixed criterion to judge whether 
the argument is true or false, capable of dealing with any claim in any way, and (2) are not 
concerned with its reliability as reference to the ‘reality’, (3) or its own consistency between 
each argument. And, we can probably add that (4) all their arguments are established upon 
problematic, sharp dichotomies which are derived from Eleatic ontology and epistemology, 
although the eristic arguments, ironically by using Eleatic terminology,
72
 do not give any 
account or demonstration about the whole of ‘reality’ (providing there is any such thing). 
Each argument is a piece of the process of refuting the adversary’s arguments, which is, 
therefore, called a piece of wisdom by Socrates (293d8). 
 
 
 
3.   Eristic Features of Meno’s Question 
 
Now, let us return to Meno 80d5-e5, and think about why Socrates says that Meno brings up 
“an eristic argument”: 
 
M: Then, Socrates, how will you inquire into the thing which you do not know at all what it is? 
Placing what of the things which you do not know will you inquire into it? Or, even if you 
happened to meet it, how could you know that this is what you did not know? 
 
                                                     
71
 Cf. Socrates’ avoidance of answering Meno’s question at the outset of the dialogue (Meno 70a5 ff.) and also 
Sophistical Refutations 176a, 183b7. 
72
 See chapter IV-5-10, and V for the detailed argument. 
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S: I understand what you want to say, Meno. Do you see what an eristic argument 
you are bringing up (ὁρᾷς τοῦτον ὡς ἐριστικὸν λόγον κατάγεις;), that it is not possible 
for a man to inquire into either what he knows or what he does not know?...
73
 
 
Meno’s question obviously challenges Socrates’ controversial claim that he does not know 
what virtue is at all (71b-c). Taking Socrates’ disavowal of knowing what virtue is at all 
literally as Socrates has absolutely no idea about what virtue is, Meno asks how it is possible 
for Socrates to inquire into what he does not know at all what it is. Meno does not question 
whether Socrates in actuality does not know anything about virtue, or what Socrates means 
when he claims not to ‘know’ at all. Thus, the line of readings which hold that Meno’s 
challenge cannot be applied to Socrates who has many ideas and beliefs about virtue for 
inquiring into it is, I think, pointless. Rather, it points to the apparent contradiction between 
Socrates’ claim that he is completely ignorant about what virtue is and his wish for inquiry 
and discovery of that which he does not know at all what it is. Meno is picking up Socrates’ 
claims and attempting to overturn them. Socrates is, therefore, pointing out what an eristic 
argument Meno is bringing up (κατάγεις) and describes Meno as cunning (πανοῦργος) 
(81e6). Socrates identifies the original version of the eristic argument which Meno makes use 
of that it is impossible for a man to inquire into what he knows and what he does not know 
(see chapter-II-4 below). This eristic argument, as I argued above,
74
 can be applied not only 
to the impossibility of inquiry but also to the impossibility of learning: if you do not know 
what it is at all, you cannot learn it, because you do not how to learn it, and even if someone 
teaches you the thing which you do not know at all, you cannot know that this is the thing 
which you did not know. This is in fact inconsistent to Meno’s initial question of whether 
virtue can be learned or not, but Meno is, being eristic, not concerned about his own 
contradiction. This is, I think, why Socrates calls Meno’s argument “eristic”. 
 
On the other hand, Socrates here, according to my interpretation, also detects a more serious 
side to the eristic argument, while he sees in Meno’s question the same eristic features found 
in the Euthydemus, insofar as it aims to highlight the contradiction of Socrates’ own claims. 
The verb ‘κατάγω’ may include a metaphor of Meno’s understanding of eristic argument, a 
term which also has a variety of translations and interpretations. Bluck points out that the 
verb is used by Plato in the Sophist in the meaning of ‘spinning’ with other verbs which 
                                                     
73
 Cf. p. 5. 
74
 P. 29. 
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house-servants use, e.g. filtering, straining, winnowing, carding, and weaving (226b), and 
considers it is a metaphor from spinning (1961: 273). Moline, regarding Bluck’s translation 
as unconvincing, suggests ‘recall the argument from exile’; i.e., in this context that Meno 
‘recalls’ from his memory of Gorgias’ speeches, following Menexenus 242b, Epistle III 317e, 
and the Critias 118d (1969: 159). Scott argues that the verb is related to Meno’s stingray 
similes for Socrates, and that Socrates implies that Meno has only fished a half of the 
argument out of the water, and leaves Socrates to complete the task (2006: 78, n.5). Although 
every interpretation is suggestive, I would like to add an alternative interpretation following 
the image of the hunter and fisherman from the Euthydemus.
75
 Socrates and Clinias, in the 
inquiry into what knowledge philosophy should aim at, agree that in order to make them 
happy they need a kind of knowledge which combines, on the one hand, making or acquiring 
things, and on the other hand, knowing how to use those acquired things. If they know the 
right use of their possessions, as they agree, they will be able to produce real happiness from 
them, but if they do not, because of their wrong use of the things, their possession will 
produce evils (288d ff.).
76
 Then, Socrates raises the art of writing speeches (logoi) as an 
example of such knowledge, but Clinias objects by claiming that the knowledge of making 
speeches is different from that of knowing how to use the speeches and that the latter is more 
significant. Clinias’ argument is as follows: 
 
No art of actual hunting, he [Clinias] said, extends any further than pursuing and capturing: 
whenever the hunters catch what they are pursuing they are incapable of using it, but they and 
the fishermen (οἱ ἁλιῆς) hand over their prey to the cooks. And, again, geometers and 
astronomers and calculators (who are hunters too, in a way, for none of these make their 
diagrams; they simply discover those which already exist (τὰ ὄντα)), since they themselves have 
no idea of how to use their prey but only how to hunt it, hand over the task of using their 
discoveries to the dialecticians (τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς) – at least, those of them do so who are not 
completely senseless (Italics mine, 290b7-c7).  
 
There are analogies of fishermen who hunt prey and cooks who know how to produce 
beneficial things from the prey, and also dialecticians who know how to use what geometers, 
                                                     
75
 Bluck’s interpretation is, although Moline disagrees, also reasonable, if ‘spinning’ implies turning over the 
meaning of ‘not-knowing at all’ (see Sophist 290c, and chapter III-4). Cf. also Euthydemus 276d: Socrates 
compares the two sophists with skilful dancers to twirl (στρέφειν) their interlocutor. 
76
 See Sprague (1962: 9) for an alternative but similar summary. 
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astronomers, and calculators discover.
77
 If ‘κατάγω’ implies this hunting image, Meno has 
fished the eristic argument, but does not know how to make good use of it except for refuting 
the counterargument. Since Socrates knows how to use it for a philosophical purpose, Meno 
hands over it to Socrates to use the eristic argument to reveal the deeper and more serious 
philosophical problem. This is, I think, the real, underlying paradox of Meno 80d5-e5, which 
I will argue in the following section. 
 
 
 
4.   A Reconstruction of Meno 80d5-e5 & The Underlying Paradox 
 
Now, let us closely examine Meno 80d5-e5. I will now restate Meno’s question as a 
counterargument which challenges the apparent inconsistency between Socrates’ two claims, 
namely, that Socrates does not know what virtue is at all, but that Socrates also wants to 
inquire by himself into what virtue is which he does not know at all what it is.
78
 
 
 
1.   Meno’s eristic argument: 
 
[M] How will you inquire into the thing which you do not know at all what it is? 
→ [M’] You cannot inquire into the thing which you do not know at all what it is. 
[M1] Placing what of the things which you do not know will you inquire into it? 
→ [M1’] You cannot begin to inquire into it because you do not know anything about 
where to head. 
[M2] Even if you happened to meet it, how could you know that this is what you did not 
know? 
                                                     
77
 One might also think that philosophers cannot be compared with cooks, because cooking is criticised by 
Socrates as one of the arts of flattering in the Gorgias (462d-465e). However, I do not think that Socrates 
criticises cooking for its art, rather he uses various examples of arts by focusing on their specific features to 
clarify the point of his present arguments. For example, although dialectic is compared with medicine by the 
image of a doctor getting rid of false beliefs in the Sophist (230c), in the Phaedrus, it is what is thought to be the 
genuine art of rhetoric that is compared with the art of medicine to choose the most appropriate argument 
depending on the listener’s character (270b). 
78
 Just to make it clear, this is a logical matter that Socrates’ two claims contradict each other. 
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→ [M2’] Even if you happened to meet it, you cannot know that this is what you did not 
know. 
 
This eristic argument obviously assumes an inquirer who completely lacks any knowledge or 
information to identify the object of his inquiry. However, generally speaking, a situation in 
which someone who wants to know what something is is completely blank about it seems to 
me to be impossible in actuality, or probably I should say in the ordinary sense. Let us 
assume that one of your friends tells you, “I do not know what [X] is at all”, where [X] is also 
an unfamiliar word for you. You will ask him “what is [X]?” but he repeats “as I said, I do 
not know what it is at all and absolutely have no idea about what it is”. This is a quite strange 
situation if it is an ordinary context, unless he means that he does not know what [X] is 
‘almost’ at all. In the ordinary sense, it is certain that we often use the phrase that “I do not 
know something at all”. For example, you may say “I do not know how to cook at all” in 
order to explain that you are terribly poor at cooking. Again, you may also say “I do not 
know that insect at all” in order to mean that you have never seen the unfamiliar insect in the 
past. But, neither of these statements means that you are completely blank about what you are 
talking about. You have some ideas, of course, what cooking is like, so you are able to say 
that you do not know cooking at all by comparing your state with what you think knowing 
cooking should be like. You may have happened to see the insect in the field while you do 
not know anything about it, but because you have seen it you can say that you don’t know 
what the insect was at all.
79
 Hence, you must feel that your friends’ repeatedly replying that 
he does not know at all what [X] is does not make any sense.
80
 You would wonder and ask 
again “when did you hear about [X], or where does it come from?” He should be able to 
answer where it comes from, e.g. a book which he has recently read, a stranger he met 
yesterday, or his dream last night, unless he creates a completely new word by himself. There 
is no way usually, when there is the object [X] in one’s consciousness, for it to have no 
origins. Therefore, if you can utter that you want to know what [X] is, you should be at least 
conscious of what you want to know about [X] and have some clues to begin the inquiry into 
what [X] is or to recognize it when you happen to meet with it. In other words, if you know 
there is such a thing which you do not know at all, it means that you know at least whence the 
                                                     
79
 E.g. Euthydemus 271c: Crito says that he does not know either Euthydemus or Dionysodorus even after he 
has seen them and already learned their names from Socrates. 
80
 Cf. Socrates also repeatedly replies to Meno that he really does not know what virtue is at all (Meno 71c). 
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thing came into your awareness. It makes no difference whether the asked matter [X] is either 
empirical or metaphysical.
81
 
 
On the other hand, Meno brings this as a purely eristic argument to refute either of Socrates’ 
two claims. The argument does not count any beliefs as partial knowledge: either you know 
or do not know, and suppose a situation in which Socrates is completely blank about what 
virtue is and has not even the least idea about it, but wants to inquire into what it is. If 
Socrates takes this argument merely as an eristic attack picking up his words, the similar 
excuse in the Euthydemus would still be effective (p. 33). Socrates could say “no, no, 
although I said that I do not know what virtue is at all, it does not mean that I am totally 
blank about what it is. Rather, I know some things about it, and I know what I am talking 
about, although I do not say that I have ‘perfect’ knowledge about it”.82 Again, there is also 
the alternative solution, likely available for Socrates, that is, since Socrates does not know 
what virtue is, he can now give up an independent inquiry and just learn from Meno or 
someone else who claims to know what virtue is and simply believe that what they teach is 
what Socrates was looking for.
83
 Whichever Socrates chooses, he could have to abandon 
either his disavowal of knowledge or his desire for independent inquiry.
84
 However, Socrates’ 
answer is neither of these, but Socrates appears to attempt to retain his initial two claims.  
 
 
  
                                                     
81
 Compare with Phillips’ arguments above. 
82
 This is what Scott argues, by distinguishing true beliefs (which, according to Scott, is partial knowledge) from 
full knowledge, the paradox can be disarmed. 
83
 Cf. also Welbourne argues that for such a transmission of ‘knowledge’ you have to believe what the person 
who gives you it tells you is true (1986: 232). Similar arguments appear, for example, in the Gorgias (459a) and 
Sophist (233bc).  
84
 The fact is that the theory of recollection might be said to partly reject Socrates’ former claim that he does not 
know what virtue is at all, as McCabe partially argues. According to the theory of recollection, the soul has 
learnt all things including what virtue is before one was born, so it means that Socrates has known what virtue is 
since his birth in a sense that his soul knows. On the other hand, if Socrates thinks that the soul can be 
distinguished from Socrates himself, Socrates claim could remain still consistent, because it can be said that, 
although the soul knows, Socrates himself has not yet recollected, so in order to ‘know’ what the soul has 
learned, Socrates still has to complete the process of recollection. Socrates has not yet known, but already 
‘known’ in terms of being potentially capable to recollect. See chapter IV-4-9 for the detailed analysis on the 
subject of recollection in the myth of the Meno, which is quite different from other myths in other Platonic 
dialogues. 
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2.   From ‘you’ (Socrates) to ‘we’ (Socrates and Meno). 
 
For my purpose, I will now add two other claims by Socrates; the third claim that Meno also 
does not ‘know’85 what virtue is, and the fourth that Socrates has never met anyone who 
knows it.
86
 Firstly, the subject will be changed from Meno’s second person singular to the 
first person plural: 
 
[M”] We cannot inquire into the thing which we do not know at all what it is. 
[M1”] We cannot begin to inquire into it because we do not know anything about where to 
head. 
[M2”] Even if we happened to meet it, we cannot know that this is what we did not know. 
 
Now, the only way to know what virtue is should be to be taught by someone who knows 
what virtue is. However, not only Meno could not remember what Gorgias really says virtue 
is, but also according to Socrates, there has been no one who Socrates thinks knows it. 
Meno’s counterargument can now be understood as the most extreme negative (pessimistic) 
conclusion, namely no one knows what virtue is at all. One might think that Socrates himself 
has never admitted such a negative possibility as that there should be no one who knows 
what virtue is. It is the case that, despite the fact that Socrates and Meno reach the conclusion 
that there are so far no teachers of virtue at the end of the later inquiry into who is the teacher 
of it, Socrates still attempts to keep looking for some other person who may know it and will 
be able to teach them (96e).87 However, what I am talking about is not whether Socrates is 
committed to such a negative view or not, but that his claims can result into such conclusion.  
 
 
  
                                                     
85
 In this context, Socrates would say later that Meno has not yet ‘recollected’ (86b), according to the theory of 
recollection, if Socrates wishes to maintain the consistency of his own argument. Socrates here precisely 
expresses Meno’s present state as “ὅμοιος εἶ οὐκ εἰδότι (80d3)” in the subjunctive mood. 
86
 Cf. Socrates also maintains that anyone in Athens will claims that he does not even know what virtue is (71a). 
87
 Socrates’ negative view can be found in the Apology: Socrates says that it is likely the case that the god is in 
reality wise, but human wisdom is worth little or nothing (23a5-b4). As I will argue below, I do not think that 
Socrates has any specific and firm commitment on the possibility of ‘knowledge (in a metaphysical sense)’, and 
I also think that it is more likely pointless to argue whether or not he does. The Theaetetus shows that Socrates’ 
and Theaetetus’ inquiry into what knowledge is again falls into aporia, and I imagine that through these aporiai, 
Plato attempts to demonstrate rather the everlasting conflicts in epistemology, ontology, and metaphysics 
amongst earlier philosophers. Cf. for example, Sophists 246a ff. 
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3.   From ‘we’ (Socrates and Meno) to ‘no one’ (generalized). 
 
[M’”] No one can inquire into the thing which no one knows at all what it is. 
[M1’”] No one can begin to inquire into it because no one knows anything about where to 
head. 
[M2’”] Even if someone should happen to meet it, no one can know that this is what no 
one knew. 
 
Concerning [M2’”], an identical argument is found in Xenophanes, cited by Sextus in 
Against the Logicians. Xenophanes, according to Sextus, maintains that “there is no criterion 
of truth, on account of there being nothing apprehensible in the nature of the things being 
investigated (I. [51])”, and Sextus interprets the claim with the following example of people 
looking for gold in an entirely dark room, which is an analogy for philosophers:
88
 
 
For if we were to imagine some people looking for gold in a dark room containing many 
valuables, it will happen that each of them, upon seizing one of the objects lying in the room, 
will believe that he has taken hold of gold, yet none of them will be sure that he has encountered 
the gold – even if it turns out that he absolutely has encountered it. And so, too, into this 
universe, as into a large house, a crowd of philosophers has passed on the search for the truth, 
and the person who seizes it probably does not trust that he was on target (M. I. [52]). 
 
Sextus’ example is straightforward concerning its epistemology. It suggests that it is possible 
for the people to search for the gold, which is an analogy of ‘the truth’ for philosophers, 
because they ‘think’ that there is ‘the gold’ in the room. But, it is not possible for the people 
to see whether they have discovered it or not, because it is eternally dark and they are blind. 
So, the example does not deny the existence of the gold, i.e. ‘the truth’, which is exactly in 
the house, but mixed up with other similar things. And, the reason why the people cannot 
find what they are looking for is because they cannot see it properly. This focuses on an 
epistemological matter, but not on an ontological matter, concerning the object of the inquiry. 
It is not for the moment concerned with the possibility either that there is in fact no gold in 
the room or that the gold exists outside of the house, somewhere inaccessible for people. 
                                                     
88
 Sextus Empiricus there argues over many of those who deny a criterion of the truth in different ways; those 
people include Xenophanes, Xeniades, Protagoras, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, Gorgias, and are considered 
by Sextus to be the counterparts of those dogmatic philosophers who are adherents of a criterion of the truth, 
such as Plato, Parmenides, and the Pythagoreans. (Since Sextus relies on various resources, Xenophanes is 
included in both groups.) Cf. also Scott 2006: 84. 
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Therefore, Xenophanes says “everything is inapprehensible (Ibid. [49])”, although there is 
certainly ‘everything’.89 This argument is, as I argued, not merely the impossibility of inquiry 
or discovery, but more generally it implies the impossibility of coming to know what is not 
known by anyone. If philosophers are inquiring into what no one knows what it is at all, the 
argument points out, it would be impossible for anyone to come to know what it is, because 
even if someone thinks that he has found it either through inquiry or by accident, no one 
including the person who thinks he has found it cannot recognize whether that is really what 
no one knew. This is what I suggest in this thesis as the half of the underlying paradox of 
Meno 80d5-e5, but before arguing how this interpretation of the passage 80d5-e5 is exactly 
possible in chapter IV and V, let us compare our reformulated version of Meno’s question 
with Socrates’ restatement to uncover the other half of the real paradox. 
 
 
4.   Socrates’ restatement. 
 
Socrates restatement, as I argued, is the original version of Meno’s eristic argument, one of 
whose two horns ([S2]) Meno attempts to use for refuting Socrates’ position. Meno’s 
question [M] (‘How will you inquire into the thing which you do not know at all what it is?’) 
is simply what is created from [S2] by changing the subject to the second singular, adding ‘at 
all’ to clarify the point that the argument relies on the dichotomy between knowing and not-
knowing, and using the mode of a question rather than an argument. 
 
[S] It is not possible for a man (ἀνθρώπῳ) to inquire into either what he knows or what he 
does not know. 
[S1] He will not inquire into what he knows, since he knows and there is no need for such 
a person to inquire. 
[S2] He will not inquire into what he does not know, since he does not even know what he 
is going to inquire into. 
 
The point to see the underlying paradox here is how to understand ‘ἀνθρώπῳ’ in the 
argument: which of the following does the term refer to, either a personal state of someone 
                                                     
89
 Compare this with Xeniades, who may possibly deny even the existence of the truth: “everything is false, and 
that every appearance and opinion lies, and all that comes to be comes to be out of what is not… the ultimate 
criterion of all things is the sense, and they are shown to be false; therefore all things are false. (M. I. [53-54])”. 
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specific who does not know what the object of his inquiry at all, or more generally a man 
which means ‘human beings’?90 If the term is interpreted as referring to a merely personal 
state, [S2] is identical with [M1], and Socrates’ restatement is simply understood as merely a 
pair of the eristic argument. However, my suggestion is to interpret the word “ἄνθρωπος” in 
the broader sense beyond a personal concern. My point is that Socrates’ restatement is 
capable of being understood as two opposite philosophical positions on the possibility and 
the impossibility for human beings of knowledge (and as I will argue below, Socrates also 
see this paradox which I here suggest in the Meno). The reconstruction into the generalized 
argument is as follows: 
 
 [S’] It is not possible for anyone to inquire into either what everyone knows or what no 
one knows. 
[S1’] No one will inquire into what everyone knows, since everyone knows it and there is 
no need for anyone to inquire. 
[S2’] No one will inquire into what no one knows, since no one even knows what they are 
going to inquire into. 
 
In short, if ‘a man’ is understood in the general sense of ‘human beings’, there is, I believe, 
no significant or controversial difference between [M’”] and [S2’].91 There are, I think, two 
interpretations that may be considered to be available for [S2’]: Firstly, let us assume that 
everyone thinks that there is [Y] in our world, but no one knows what [Y] is at all. No one 
would know either in which direction they should proceed or in what way it might be 
discovered. This would be an improbable situation in ‘reality’ if the question of where [Y] 
came to our awareness is considered, but it would be logically possible. Otherwise, secondly, 
there may or may not be [Z] somewhere, but no one knows even that such a thing may exist, 
no one has ever seen, ever heard, and even imagined it, it has not yet had a name. (So, we 
cannot call it [Z] and should delete it from the bracket like [  ].) For its inaccessibility for 
human beings, no one will be able to access [  ] for all eternity. Who can or will begin the 
inquiry into [  ] if no one has assumed or will assume even its existence? If the latter is the 
                                                     
90
 Such usage of ‘ἄνθρωποι’ is also found in the Meno 73c1. Cf. also Sextus understands “man (ἀνήρ)” in the 
fragment of Xenophanes as “human being (ἄνθρωπος)” (M. I. [50]). 
91
 On the other hand, one may think that neither way, the personal interpretation nor the generalized 
interpretation, after all makes a significant difference, because the inquirer would not be able to know whether 
or not there is in actuality anyone else who knows what he does not know at all in any case. The important 
difference is, however, that the generalized version makes the negative claim over all other people. See chapter 
IV and V. 
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case, [S2’] might be identical to the extremely negative position of Metrodorus’: “We know 
nothing; we do not even know this very fact, that we know nothing (M. I. [88])”. Although 
McCabe understands that the paradox is the psychological state of inquirer, namely, how you 
can know that you really know what you did not know (2007), I would like to suggest that 
the underlying matter could be more seriously desperate. 
 
The unknown object may become a problem for us, only when it is known there is such 
unknown object and especially when it comes to philosophical or important matters for us, 
e.g. truth, virtue, the good etc.: if the existence of the unknown object is unknown, not 
important, and not relevant to us at all, we can leave it unknown. [Y] is an epistemological 
matter of the unknown object, while [Z] is an ontological matter of it. My suggestion is, then, 
that Meno 80d5-e5 is concerned with the problem of the [Y] version, and the object is the 
truth of things, i.e. the object of genuine ‘knowing’ and that of Socratic inquiry. In other 
words, the paradox is, I think, concerned with the possibility of knowledge of the truth of 
things, namely ‘epistemological negative dogmatism’, which holds both of the following two 
claims: (1) there is the object of genuine knowing which has not yet been known by anyone, 
but (2) it is impossible for anyone to come to know it. 
 
One might think that such an extreme negative perspective on knowledge is just too 
ridiculous, unacceptable, and the validity of the argument is not worth discussing, and 
Socrates does not imply such a paradox at all in the Meno. However, there are two sources 
which, I think, reveal Socrates’ seriousness in resolving the challenge raised by 
epistemological negative dogmatism. Firstly, Socrates clearly attempts to avoid the same 
consequence in the Euthydemus, and that it is Socrates who restates Meno’s question into a 
general argument and takes it seriously by replying to it with the myth of the immortality of 
the soul, the theory of recollection, and the slave’s geometrical question. If not needed, why 
does he proceed establishing that which apparently presents an epistemological paradox? The 
reason can be found again at the end of the argument on the impossibility of falsehood in the 
Euthydemus. Euthydemus and Dionysodorus’ arguments are there revealed not to concern the 
consistency between each of their own arguments, and they also force Socrates to answer 
their given questions in specific order, in specific ways, even when Socrates cannot 
understand what exactly their question means, and wants to get rid of the ambiguity of the 
words they use. Socrates finally criticizes their style of argument for not making any 
progress, but just continues to knock down their interlocutors’ claims, and for the fact that 
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their arguments prevent them from knowing how to stop themselves from disputing with 
each other in spite of their skillful and precise use of words (288a). This is just before 
Socrates begins his second inquiry with Clinias into what knowledge philosophy should aim 
for, and there is, thus, a clear contrast between Socratic dialectic and eristic sorts of 
argumentation. However, it is wrong to think that Socrates simply criticizes their eristic style. 
When Ctesippus makes a sarcastic remark about the two sophists, approving Socrates’ 
criticism, Socrates, on the contrary, warns that Ctesippus should not miss the serious aspect 
of their argument:
92
 
 
[Y]ou fail to recognize how remarkable the stranger’s wisdom is. It’s just that the two of them 
are unwilling to give us a serious demonstration, but are putting on conjuring tricks in imitation 
of that Egyptian sophist, Proteus.
93
 So let us imitate Menelaus and refuse to release the pair until 
they have shown us their serious side (288b6-c2). 
 
I would like to suggest that what is called ‘their serious side’ is the deprivation of the 
criterion of truth from the argument. As we have seen in this chapter, their argument is not 
concerned with any reality, but just keeps refuting their interlocutor’s arguments. This is, I 
think, understandable if we consider that they accept a kind of doctrine which denies the 
possibility for any human beings to access the truth of reality and abandon their argument as 
valid reference to it. I will argue this closely in chapter V below. 
 
Secondly, the immortality of the soul is, as I will argue in chapter IV, committed to [S1’], i.e. 
no one can inquire into what everyone knows, since everyone knows it and there is no need 
for anyone to inquire. Socrates says that the souls, being immortal, has already known 
everything and there is nothing that the soul has not yet known (81c). And the theory of 
recollection, as Socrates presents it, creates room for inquiry into what everyone ‘knows’. It 
follows that Socrates’ response involves the claim that everyone ‘knows’ everything in the 
sense that the soul knows everything, while everyone ‘do not know’ in the sense that no one 
has yet accomplished recollection. If Meno’s argument does not imply for Socrates an 
extreme form of epistemological negative dogmatism, Socrates’ response certainly does not 
                                                     
92
 Sprague thinks that Socrates’ attitude here is merely a pretence, and not worth being taken seriously (1962: 3). 
I am arguing against this line of interpretation. 
93
 Cf Odyssey iv. 382 ff.: Proteus is a sea deity which transforms himself into every shape, e.g. a lion, a dragon, 
a panther, an enormous boar, even water and a tree to escape. This would be a simile of their non-committal 
arguments to any criteria of determining truth and falsehood. 
   
The Underlying Paradox of Plato’s Meno 80d5-e5 
- 54 - 
 
make any point. Therefore, the most natural interpretation of what Socrates attempts to 
disarm in the Meno is, according to my interpretation, the extreme negative counterargument 
which holds that it is impossible for anyone to come to know what is not known. 
Furthermore, my suggestion is that this epistemological negative dogmatism originated with 
Gorgias. However, before looking closely into Gorgias’ arguments, let us first examine what 
exactly Socrates replies to the passage 80d5-e5. The next chapter will show that Socrates’ 
response focuses on epistemological positive dogmatism and that there is an epistemological 
conflict amongst Presocratic philosophers which lies in the background of Socrates’ concern.  
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IV.   Epistemology of Meno’s Myth 
 
 
 
1.   Myths as Logoi 
 
In order to clarify the second misunderstanding over Meno 80d5-e5 (cf. p. 12-13), it would be 
worth underlining how the myth of the immortality of the soul is indispensable as Socrates’ 
serious response to what the passage suggests, and how, despite this, it has been treated 
lightly as a mere tale that is of no use for genuine philosophy.
94
 Scott (and also Fine in her 
discussion with him)
95
 totally skips the myth when he examines whether or not Socrates’ 
response disarms the problem of discovery. Scott thinks that only the slave’s geometrical 
demonstration concerning the theory of recollection could be worth being investigated, but 
that the myth is not relevant to Socrates’ solution. Having argued that neither the theory of 
recollection nor the demonstration give any relevant reply to the paradox, Scott begins to talk 
about the myth as the religious background of it (2006: 92-97), and concludes that “he 
[Socrates] hopes that the exotic details associated with the theory will intrigue his wayward 
interlocutor and lure him back into inquiry (Ibid. 94)”. Tarrant also slightly undervalues it, 
and summarises it as follows: “the religious background has not been entirely necessary or 
entirely pertinent… So when we get to the end of the discussion of recollection we should be 
asking why it is that Plato has been remythologising Socratic philosophy at the start of the 
passage (2005: 43)”. Even Ionescu, despite her detailed and impressive analyses of the myth, 
says that “it was necessary to subject the literal meaning of the myth to a philosophical 
interpretation because the myth is intended primarily to appeal to our emotions and induce us 
to action rather than as a theoretical and dogmatic account of Plato’s view on knowledge 
(2007: 63)”. Few commentators regard the myth as a part of Socrates’ serious response, and 
needless to say, much less as genuine Platonic philosophy. There are also other myths which 
are relevant to the immortality of the soul appearing in, for example, the Gorgias (523ff.), 
                                                     
94
 I discussed the slave’s geometrical demonstration in detail by comparing Piaget’s identical psychological 
experiments with children in my Taught MA dissertation. Since the detailed process of the slave’s 
demonstration is, despite general opinions, not directly related to what I think ‘the underlying paradox’ of the 
Meno, I do not repeat the detailed analysis in this thesis. 
95
 Their main interest is in the state, whether latent or unconscious, in which Plato thinks our knowledge is 
within us, e.g. latent innatism, content innatism and dispositional innatism, as Fine argues (2007: 355). While I 
do not deny that could be one of Plato’s concerns in the Meno, I do not see any evidence that Plato did 
‘psychology’ in the same sense as that of modern psychologies. Cf. also Scott 1995: 24-52. 
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Phaedo (107c-115a), Phaedrus (245c-257a), and Republic (614b-621d). Interpretative 
questions that always accompany such Platonic myths are how seriously we should take those 
stories, what the underlying philosophical concerns are, and what the implications of the 
metaphors must be. 
 
However, those lines of questions on Platonic myths are often the results of anachronistic 
prejudices. When McCabe concludes that the theory of recollection does not answer the 
paradox of the internal and external account of knowledge, she also ignores the significant 
role of the myth. The myth of the immortality of the soul, if I am right, provides ‘the external 
criterion’ of knowledge, as a self-explanatory criterion of remembering, that McCabe is 
seeking for in the theory of recollection.
96
 Some recent analyses of psychological elements in 
the theory of recollection and the slave’s geometrical demonstration, as I agree, reveal 
important and interesting aspects of innate knowledge that Plato might have been aware of in 
some ways, and throw light on some questions that Plato might have had in mind. However, 
what I would like to emphasize is that the demonstration itself is not the direct response to 
what the passage 80d5-e5 questions. Commentators are prone to think that the theory of 
recollection is the only response, which is, I think, one of the greatest mistakes that distort the 
interpretation of what the paradox is really concerned with. Insofar as one believes that Plato 
is attempting to disarm the paradox with the theory of recollection and the demonstration, one 
cannot see how it could answer the paradox, because it obviously does not. I therefore tidy up 
briefly my interpretation on the correspondences between questions and responses which are 
discussed from the passage 80d5-e5 to the end of the slave’s geometrical demonstration (80a-
86c): 
 
(1) There are two claims in the passage 80d5-e5: 
1) Epistemological negative dogmatism, namely the impossibility of knowledge ([M’” 
(= M1’” + M2’”)] and [S2’]). 
2) Epistemological positive dogmatism, namely the possibility of knowledge ([S1’]). 
3) Each of the two dogmatisms is committed to the impossibility of coming to know 
(either through inquiry, learning or by accident) both what is already known and 
what is not yet known ([S’]). 
                                                     
96
 I here mean that, unlike the conception of ‘knowing’ at stake, ‘recollecting’ can be less controversially 
explained as self-recognizable, internal phenomenon (provided that it is so although I do not claim that it is the 
only true way to explain ‘recollecting’) in the sense that you may be able to recognize that you recollect 
something which you had forgotten on your own. 
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(2) The myth of the immortality of the soul rejects epistemological negative dogmatism 
([M’”] and [S2’]) by supporting the opposite positive possibility ([S1’]). 
(3) The theory of recollection, by creating the possibility of inquiry (and discovery) into 
what is already known, rejects the impossibility of coming to know it (i.e. the transition 
from ignorance to knowing in the sense that from not-recollecting to recollecting) ([S’]). 
 (4) The slave’s geometrical demonstration is introduced to show the validity of the 
immortality of the soul and the theory of recollection.
97
 
1) (The slave’s aporia is the response to Meno’s criticism of his own intellectual 
numbness and Socrates’ aporia.) 
2) (The slave’s gradual progress to the correct answer proves the effectiveness of 
Socratic elenchus.) 
3) That the slave finally reaches the answer supports the immortality of the soul, i.e. the 
soul already knows everything, being immortal. 
4) That the slave previously does not know any geometry supports the possibility of 
recollection, i.e. anyone can recollect what he currently does not know. 
 
There are at first glance two paradoxes: one is the paradox between the possibility and 
impossibility of knowledge (1-1, 2), and the other is the paradox between the possibility and 
impossibility of inquiry (and discovery) (1-3) which is traditionally thought to be the paradox 
of the Meno by many commentators. However, the latter paradox is merely dependent upon 
the former, viz. the underlying paradox between the negative dogmatism and positive 
dogmatism on the possibility of knowledge so far as the Meno is concerned. As I will argue 
in this chapter, when Socrates’ responses are carefully examined, we will see how much 
Socrates focuses on the possibility of knowledge (2) rather than the possibility of intellectual 
transition from ignorance to knowing (3) in the Meno. Again, other common puzzles are, I 
think, caused by focusing on other elements which accompany the slave’s geometrical 
demonstration (e.g. 4-1, 2). If the slave’s psychological aspects are the main points which 
Socrates intends to emphasize, ‘the paradox’ would certainly be concerned with, for example, 
as Moravcsik argues, different conceptions of learning between empirical or a priori matters 
(1971). I do not think that, because they are supplemental, the paradox on the possibility of 
inquiry and those questions implied in the demonstration are not important, or that Plato did 
                                                     
97
 One commentator who most explicitly distinguishes the relation between the theory and the demonstration is 
Calvert who says “Plato attempts to demonstrate the truth of the theory by the experiment with the slave boy 
(1974: 145)”. 
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not have such issues in mind. Rather, it is more likely that Plato is aware of these emerging 
problems when the first, fundamental paradox between epistemological negative and positive 
dogmatism is solved by the immortality of the soul and the theory of recollection. What I 
would like to emphasize is just that such biased distinctions between myth as a speculation 
and the slave’s ‘psychological’ demonstration in geometry as a serious philosophical 
argument (or even a pre-scientific experiment) are certainly misleading for the correct 
understanding of the genuine paradox in the passage 80d5-e5. 
 
Annas, in her Plato’s myths of judgement concerning Platonic myths in other dialogues, e.g. 
the Gorgias, Phaedo and Republic, points out that many modern philosophers often ignore 
and downgrade those myths, thinking that Plato himself takes all myths including his own to 
be mere mythoi, which should be surely despised by contrast with logoi or rational discourse 
(1982: 120). “He [Plato] in fact clearly believes that”, Annas maintains, “some mythoi, stories, 
do have rational depth (Ibid. 121)”, for example, the Timaeus’ cosmology is called a ‘likely 
mythos (29d2; 59c6; 68d2)’, and the Republic’s account of the growth of the state is also ‘a 
mythos (501e4)’. As Annas argues (Ibid.), it would be too simple to think that Plato is always 
hostile towards any myths, and I think that the same evaluation can also be applied to the 
myth of the immortality of the soul in the Meno. Socrates obviously responds to passage 
80d5-e5 with the myth of the immortality of the soul, including ‘the myth’ of recollection.98 
The slave’s geometrical demonstration is, as both Socrates and Meno explicitly says (82a-b), 
a demonstration for proving the truth of the myths and the theory of recollection, i.e. that the 
soul is immortal and it can recollect what it has learned. The demonstration, with its scientific 
character, in fact distracts Meno, who tends to accept ‘scientific’ explanation (e.g. 
Empedoclean doctrine on sense-perception: 76c-e), from the genuine philosophical problem 
implied by his question,
99
 which is contrary to the general view to regard the myth as 
intending to entertain Meno’s curiosity. In order to see the clear relation of the myth, the 
theory of recollection, and the demonstration, Socrates’ response should be now carefully 
read again. My aim in this chapter is to examine Socrates’ response as he gives it in the Meno. 
Although there are some myths in other dialogues (especially, recollection in the Phaedo 
                                                     
98
 Although I keep using the term ‘the myth’ for the immortality of the soul and ‘the theory’ for recollection, as 
generally used by commentators, if the ‘knowledge’ comes from the immortal soul for recollection, it probably 
should also be called ‘Socratic myth of recollection’. Although some consider ‘recollection’ Plato’s original 
contribution while the myth originated from some other sources, since ‘recollection’ can be, as will argued, 
considered as a part of the myth, the border between myth and Socratic philosophy in the Meno may be more 
obscure than generally thought. Cf. also Ionescu (2005: 50). 
99
 See chapter IV-4-6 for more detailed discussion. 
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72e3-77a5) which could be related to the Meno’s myth, since I think that each myth in each 
dialogue responds to different questions, I attempt an interpretation without supplementing 
the obscurities of Meno’s myth with any others from myths in other dialogues. 
 
 
 
2.   The Immortality of the Soul. 
 
 
1.   Introduction of the myth (81a1-9). 
 
The myth of the immortality of the soul and the theory of recollection are introduced by 
Socrates just after Meno’s question and Socrates’ restatement at the passage 80d5-e5. Meno 
asks Socrates whether this argument (ὁ λόγος οὗτος) which Meno presents does not seem to 
be sound (καλῶς) (81a1). Socrates replies that it does not to him. Meno asks Socrates to 
explain why not. Socrates responds that it is because he has previously heard wise men and 
women talking about divine matters, which seemed to him to be true and good (Ἀληθῆ, 
ἔμοιγε δοκεῖν, καὶ καλόν). Socrates explicitly means that the story that he has heard seems to 
be more reliable compared with the argument by Meno. 
 
 
2.   Reincarnation of the soul (81a10-b6). 
 
Socrates reveals that the story originated with priests and priestesses who took especial care 
to give an account (logos) of their practices, as well as with Pindar and other divine poets 
(81a10-b2). According to them, the human soul is immortal: even though the body perishes, 
which is usually called ‘death’ by people, the soul is eternally reborn. Socrates words are as 
follows: 
 
[S]ee whether you think they speak the truth (σκόπει εἴ σοι δοκοῦσιν ἀληθῆ λέγειν): They say 
that the human soul is immortal; at times it comes to an end, which they call dying; at times it is 
reborn, but it is never destroyed, and one must live one’s life as piously as possible (81b3-6). 
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Although it is known that there had been many different versions of transmigration in 
antiquity, firstly, it can be at least said that this myth provided by Socrates says that what is 
immortal and reincarnates is nothing but the human soul. Plato’s metaphysics is, as Schofield 
points, generally considered to be deeply influenced by Pythagorean doctrines (Kirk, Raven 
& Schofield 2007: 215). Schofield conjectures that it is likely that Pythagoras was the first 
who expressed the doctrine of immortality in terms of the human soul (psychē), although the 
belief in reincarnation itself may have been brought into Greece from abroad, e.g. India, 
Central Asia or Southern Russia (Ibid. 220). Diogenes Laertius writes that Xenophanes 
ridiculed Pythagoras because he stopped some people from beating a puppy, saying that he 
recognized from its yelping that the puppy contained the soul of one of his friends (KRS 
[260]). Herodotus also testifies that there were some Greeks, possibly Pythagoras or 
Empedocles, who maintained that the human soul is immortal and that when the body 
perishes, it enters other creatures such as animals on the land, those in the sea and those in the 
sky, and returns again into a human body after a three-thousand-year’s cycle.100 That Socrates 
later introduces a geometrical demonstration could be counted as evidence that the myth is 
closely connected to Pythagorean doctrine. However, as Sharples points out, Socrates does 
not allude to any closely organized group (such as Pythagoreans) but more likely refers to 
Orphics or doctrines generally emphasizing associated ritual practices (1991: 144-145). It 
seems to me that Sharples’ view of multiple sources is more convincing than to suppose that 
Socrates here relies on only one resource for the myth. 
 
Although it is not easy to specify a single origin of the myth, it is for Socrates’ purpose 
probably not necessarily an important issue who exactly first told the story. Socrates tells 
Meno to consider whether the story is true or not by himself.
101
 I agree with Scott who thinks 
that even though the ideas were originally derived from other sources, it is something that 
Socrates intends to make his own (2006: 95).
102
 Rather, Socrates applauds those people for 
being capable, or at least caring to give a clear account of their own practices. In other words, 
they can explain the reasons for what they are doing. Why is the priests’ and priestesses’ 
account of their religious practices related to the context of the dialogue? It is possibly 
                                                     
100
 Although Herodotus attributes this to Egyptian doctrine (KRS [261]), Schofield points out that there is no 
evidence found that the Egyptians thought human souls were reborn as other creatures (Ibid. 220). 
101
 For a similar example, in the Phaedrus, when Phaedrus teases Socrates for being good at creating any story, 
such as the Egyptian tale of Theuth, Socrates asks whether it makes any difference to him who tells it or where 
it comes from so long as the words are telling the truth, and tells Phaedrus to consider whether the story is true 
or false by himself (275b-d). 
102
 Cf. also Weiss 2001: 64, n.37. 
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because without such divine reasons, none of their practices can be explained.
103
 It, therefore, 
would be more natural to regard this as a parallel to Socrates himself, who also attempts to 
give a clear account of his own practice, namely inquiry into what he does not know. The 
myth will provide an indispensable reason for the Socratic duty of inquiry. Then, the last 
sentence telling us to live as pious a life as possible would be supported by the following 
poem. 
 
 
3.   Inquiry as purification (81b8-c3). 
 
The next lines are a quotation from a poem, probably by Pindar, about Persephone’s 
retribution. Persephone, the daughter of Zeus, spends two-thirds of a year in the upper world 
with her mother, Demeter, and one-third with her consort, Pluto, the king of Hades.
104
 The 
poem says that souls are returned to the place with the sun (so, probably, this world)
105
 by 
Persephone after nine-year punishment and expiation in Hades, and amongst them most 
blessed people are reborn: 
 
Persephone will return to the sun above in the ninth year 
the soul of those from whom 
she will exact punishment for old miseries, 
and from these come noble kings, 
mighty in strength and greatest in wisdom, 
and for the rest of time men will call them sacred heroes.(81b8-c3) 
 
This poem could be cited for its connection with the origin of human beings in Orphic 
theogony: the banished gods, the Titans, captured Dionysus, who is the son of Persephone, 
slashed and tore him to pieces, boiled, roasted, and ate him, although Athena preserved the 
heart of Dionysus, which gives Dionysus new life. Zeus, being angry with the Titans, 
immediately burned them up with his thunderbolt, and from the smoke of their remains Zeus 
created a new race of mortals, including human beings, animals, etc. Although their bodies 
are mortal, their souls are immortal. They pass through a series of incarnations as humans and 
other animals. Human beings, then, inherit evil tendencies from the Titans and a tiny divine 
                                                     
103
 Socrates here emphasizes the agreement between one’s account (logos) and practice. Especially in the Meno, 
the relation between logos and actions is also one of the main issues for Plato. Cf. also 79b-c, 96e-97d. 
104
 Cf. Frazer 1990: 394. 
105
 Cf. Ionescu 2007: 51-52. 
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portion from Dionysus. Purgation is required for the souls to be releases from the cycle of 
this misery.
106
 A noticeable feature of this poem is the process of purification of the soul 
through its reincarnation. Sharples thinks the poem’s recommendation that we live as piously 
as possible actually to be a digression from Plato’s main theme in the Meno (1991: 145). 
Ionescu, on the other hand, thinks, as the verses begin with “<οἷσιν> γὰρ ἂν (81b7)”, 
interprets “gar” as providing the reason and explanation for the immorality of the soul (2007: 
95). But, the purification through reincarnation, according to my interpretation, could have a 
more important meaning for the Socratic duty of inquiry. Although Orphics and Pythagoreans 
are said to have avoided meat and blood for their purification,
107
 Socrates obviously does not 
talk about any such traditional ritual purification or religious taboos in this context. What 
would be implied is that the soul (or human beings) can be perfected by completing our duty 
of inquiry, i.e. recollection. Socrates has combined the purification with his own faith in 
philosophical labours.
108
 
 
Another philosopher who is explicitly committed to the immortality of the soul and the duty 
of purification is Empedocles, who is said to have been one of the zealous followers of 
Parmenides and the Pythagoreans,
109
 and the teacher of Gorgias as an excellent rhetorician.
110
 
Empedocles attributes to Pythagoras a great wisdom gathered in ten or twenty human lives 
through reincarnation.
111
 He also thinks that souls can be incarnated in irrational animals and 
plants, as well as in human bodies,
112
 and maintains that he himself has previously been a boy, 
a girl, a bush, a bird, and a leaping, journeying fish.
113
 In the Empedoclean version of 
reincarnation, we can see similar views which are also found in the poem quoted by Socrates 
in the Meno. It says that the soul rises up to a higher social status through purification, e.g. 
prophets, bards, doctors and princes, until it reaches the gods.
114
 
 
But at the end they come among men on earth as prophets, bards, doctors and princes; and 
thence they arise as gods highest in honour, sharing with the other immortals their hearth and 
                                                     
106
 For more details regarding the Persephone and Titan’s stories, see Dodds 1951: 155; West 1983: 74-75, 98-
100, 164-166, Ionescu 2007: 49-52. 
107
 Cf. Dodds 1951: 149; KRS: 230-231. 
108
 Cf. also Scott 2006 93-94 for a partially similar interpretation. 
109
 KRS [335]: Simplicius in Phys. 25, 19, quoting Theophrastus (DK31A7). 
110
 KRS [336]: Diogenes Laertius VIII, 58 (DK31A1). 
111
 KRS [259]: Empedocles: Fr. 129, Porphyrius Life of Pythagoras 30. 
112
 KRS [415]: Sextus M. IX, 129. 
113
 KRS [417]: Empedocles: Fr. 117, Diogenes Laertius VIII, 77.  
114
 Empedocles also says that he is one of who is exiled from the gods in KRS [401]: Fr. 115, Hippolytus Ref. 
VII, 29, 14 (II. 1-2, 4-14) and Plutarch de exilio 17, 607c. Cf. also Ionescu 2007: 99. 
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their table, without part in human sorrows or weariness (KRS [409]: Empedocles: Frr. 146 and 
147, Clement Strom. IV, 150, I and V, 122, 3). 
 
Ionescu maintains that there could be two reasons why the poem is appealing to Meno, both 
of which are convincing for me. The first reason is that the poem has a certain characteristic 
with which Meno is already familiar, namely Empedoclean doctrine, through Gorgias. 
Ionescu says that “Socrates already witnessed Meno’s sympathy for Empedocles’ naturalism 
(76c7-e). He can thus plausibly expect that Meno would have some acquaintance also with 
the other, religious or mythical… part of Empedocles’ thought (2007: 53)”. It is plausible that 
Meno who may be somehow accustomed to Empedoclean doctrines of reincarnation is apt to 
accept the idea that the same souls are reborn amongst various creatures, even though he is 
unlikely to be dedicated to any philosophical schools. The second reason is that both of these 
poems by Pindar (quoted by Socrates) and by Empedocles combine the labour of purification 
with heroic promotion in society. Ionescu says “the mythical content of the verses (81d8-c4) 
proposes an attractive ideal, since it recommends a way of achieving the designation of a hero 
in the persona of a king, an athlete, or a wise person (Ibid. 53)”. 
 
Impressively, the poem presents the re-arrival to this world of the soul as the rewards after 
Persephone’s punishment in Hades. This is in fact something clearly different from the myth 
in the Phaedo which regards the body as a prison to the soul, and death as the liberation from 
the contamination of the body (64c-69d).
115
 Dodds maintains that before Plato the psyche is 
spoken of as the seat of the emotional features of the self, including courage, passion, pity, 
anxiety, and animal appetite, seldom, if ever, as the seat of reason, and that the “soul” was not 
a reluctant prisoner of the body, but it was the life or spirit of the body, and perfectly at home 
there (1951: 138-139).
116
 However, this view cannot be straightforwardly applied to at least 
the myth in the Meno, which regards the return to this world as the reward of purification. 
And, it is plausible that the view of the human excellence as a divine reward for purification 
attracts Meno, who desires a successful career in society and repeatedly asks Socrates how 
virtue is acquired (70a1-4; 86c7-d2). 
                                                     
115
 It is, however, certain that Socrates in other dialogues does not simply believe that the reward of 
philosophical purification is mere social promotion in society (e.g. Republic 248d, 619a-620d; Theaetetus 172c-
177c). Cf. note 144. 
116
 Concerning the doctrine regarding body as a prisoner of soul, there has not yet been any consensus amongst 
scholars. Dodds maintains that “It was only when rebirth was attributed to all human souls that it became a 
burden instead of a privilege (1951: 151)”. Schofield, on the other hand, says that the doctrine that “the body is a 
sort of prison in which the soul is preserved” was Orphic and early Pythagorean (KRS: 221-222). 
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On the other hand, there is a controversial problem that the myth is inevitably committed to, 
which is the matter of Determinism. The poem already implies the answer to Meno’s initial 
question, that is, virtue is brought by Persephones’ forgiveness, namely as a divine gift (Meno 
99e7).
117
 According to the poem, although the efforts of purification in the present time will 
credit the honourable life in the next reincarnation, conversely, present wickedness, laziness, 
and wrongdoings are in the end the results of previous guilt. “Should then the quality of our 
present life no longer matter?” Ionescu asks; “The only way it makes punishment and 
rewards relevant for the way we live our present life, given that a next life cannot be readily 
assumed, is to regard them as metaphoric images for the punishment and rewards that our 
soul experiences during this life. – no true sense of freedom and responsibility would be left 
for our race (2007: 56; 95)”. 
 
Annas argues that throughout the dialogues from the Gorgias, Phaedrus to Republic, the 
Platonic myth of the immortality of the soul eventually results into the problem of Fate and 
Necessity (1982: 133). She maintains that in the Republic Plato is clearly aware of the 
problem correlated with his own myth of the immortality of the soul, “for in the middle of the 
pageant of necessity [in the myth of Er], he suddenly insists that the souls do have a free 
choice of lives (Ibid.)”. The same sort of epistemological issue would be also examined 
through later dialogues, e.g. in the Phaedrus 248a-b; Republic 621a-b, and finally in the 
Theaetetus 151b, while in the Meno even a slave is shown to be capable of recollection by 
Socrates, only some blessed youths are, in the Theaetetus, potentially intellectually pregnant 
in order to be engaged in philosophical inquiry, in which the immortality of the soul and the 
theory of recollection no longer appear. As Ionescu criticises that “moral imperatives are 
meaningful only on the assumption that there is an afterlife and/or a future incarnation (2007: 
56)”, the poem certainly embraces another philosophical problem concerning Fate, Necessity, 
free will, and human responsibility. The question which arises is: if the poem is true, isn’t the 
duty of inquiry rather no longer a matter?
118
 My suggestion is that both the problem of free 
will and the impossibility of transition from ignorance to knowing (i.e. that of inquiry) are not 
yet the main concern at the Meno, although it may sound a too rough solution. Both are 
certainly raised by Plato as philosophical matters which require further investigations, but left 
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 Cf. also Sharples 1991: 145. 
118
 The relevant problem might be implied by Socrates elsewhere in the Meno as a self-contradiction of the poet 
Theognis. In his poem, Theognis speaks as if virtue is taught, and in other places, as if it is impossible to change 
a bad man to a good one by persuading him with wise words (95d-96a). 
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without being given any clear solution in this dialogue, which I will keep examining more 
closely below. 
 
 
 
3.   ‘Knowledge’ in the Myth 
 
 
4.   The object of recollection (81c5-d5). 
 
The lines which follow the poem present an image of knowledge provided by recollection. 
Socrates says that our soul has leaned all things, and there is nothing which it had not learned, 
so we may be capable to recollect what the soul has already known. He maintains that this 
process is exactly what is ordinarily called ‘inquiring and learning’ by people: 
 
 Ἅτε οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατός τε οὖσα καὶ πολλάκις γεγονυῖα, καὶ ἑωρακυῖα καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε καὶ τὰ 
ἐν Ἅιδου καὶ πάντα χρήματα, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτι οὐ μεμάθηκεν· ὥστε οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν καὶ περὶ 
ἀρετῆς καὶ περὶ ἄλλων οἷόν τ' εἶναι αὐτὴν ἀναμνησθῆναι, ἅ γε καὶ πρότερον ἠπίστατο. ἅτε γὰρ 
τῆς φύσεως ἁπάσης συγγενοῦς οὔσης, καὶ μεμαθηκυίας τῆς ψυχῆς ἅπαντα, οὐδὲν κωλύει ἓν 
μόνον ἀναμνησθέντα – ὃ δὴ μάθησιν καλοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι – τἆλλα πάντα αὐτὸν ἀνευρεῖν, ἐάν τις 
ἀνδρεῖος ᾖ καὶ μὴ ἀποκάμνῃ ζητῶν· τὸ γὰρ ζητεῖν ἄρα καὶ τὸ μανθάνειν ἀνάμνησις ὅλον ἐστίν. 
 
As the soul, being immortal, has been born many times, and has seen all things here and in 
Hades, there is nothing that it has not learned; so it is not surprising that it is able to recollect 
what it previously knew, both about virtue and other things. For, as the whole of nature is akin, 
and the soul has learned everything, nothing prevents anyone, after recalling one thing only –
what men call learning – discovering everything else for himself, if the man is brave and does 
not tire of inquiry; for inquiry and learning are, as a whole, recollection (81c5-d5; my 
translation). 
 
The passage above does not mention anything about particular personality or unique 
memories of previous lives (e.g. specific events or personal experience). It is likely that 
Socrates’ point is not to defend the notion that personal consciousness survives through 
reincarnation,
119
 which the Pythagoreans and Empedocles, on the other hand, could have 
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 Cf. Ionescu 2007: 55 for the similar point. 
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been committed to, although this looks to contradict the view of the poem that the reward and 
the penalty are attributed to each individual soul. There are instead some new points that we 
are told about the objects and the subject of recollection: 
 
(1) The soul has seen all things here and in Hades.
120
 
(2) There is nothing that the soul has not learned. 
(3) So, it is not surprising that the soul can recollect what it previously knew including 
virtue and other things. 
(4) The whole nature is akin. 
(5) The soul has learned everything. 
(6) So, nothing prevents anyone from recollecting everything else if he could recollect 
even one thing.
121
 
(7) It will happen, if the man is brave and determined enough to inquire into what the soul 
knows. 
 
This part, firstly, gives us some clear information about the objects of recollection.
122
 The 
main interpretative question is, I think, how to understand the fact that Socrates mentions the 
distinction of the two realms of here and Hades in (1). As some commentators argue, the 
objects of recollection in the Phaedo and Phaedrus are Platonic forms which are experienced 
by the immortal soul without the intermediary of the bodily organs. Especially in the Phaedo, 
they belong to the realm of Hades.
123
 Granting that is also applicable to the Meno, it would 
be, at first sight, possible to regard ‘things here’ as sensible objects and ‘things in Hades’ as 
intelligible. However, it is rather unclear whether Plato thinks Hades as the realm of Platonic 
forms at this moment. ‘Hades’, in the Meno, appears twice firstly in the consequence of 
Persephone’s poem and later again in its Homeric sense (100a5), both of which are presented 
as the region of the gods and of the souls before and after embodiment. Although Ionescu still 
thinks that those objects in Hades must, in any case, share the main characteristics of Platonic 
                                                     
120
 Although a thorough analysis of Platonic usage of empirical terms in his dialogues could be useful, I here 
simply understand the term ‘seeing’ as a synonym for ‘learning’, because Socrates rephrases (1) to (2) and (5) 
only by changing the verb from ‘seen’ to ‘learned’. Cf. also Ionescu who interprets ‘seeing’ as ‘purely 
intellectual knowing’ (2007: 58). I, however, think that it is still controversial to determine how Plato 
distinguishes ‘intellectual’ knowing from other kinds, if she is granting that there is such a distinction in the 
Meno. 
121
 Socrates changes the subject of recollection from ‘the soul (3)’ to ‘anyone (6)’ and ‘the man (7)’. See chapter 
IV-4-9 for the detailed analysis on the subject of recollection in the Meno. 
122
 See chapter IV-4-9 for the detailed analysis on the subject of recollection. 
123
 Cf. Sharples 1991: 147; Ionescu 2007: 58-59. 
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forms such as eternity, immutability, perfection, and universality (2007: 60), I do not see any 
evidence that Socrates thinks ‘things Hades’ are more real or important than ‘things here’ as 
the objects of recollection. It seems to me more plausible to think that Socrates simply 
regards Hades as a region in which the soul has learned something else which it did not learn 
through the earthly lives during its countless rebirths.
124
 As Ionescu herself realizes (Ibid. 59), 
without understanding so, the interpretation of ‘the whole of nature is akin (4)’, which 
obviously includes both the regions, is difficult to understand, because, if there is such a clear 
distinction between the objects here and those in Hades, it would not be possible to say so 
easily those are the same kinds and not two different kinds which belong to two different 
worlds. 
 
It is convincing that Tigner analyses the kinship of all nature as implying that all recollectable 
things belong to the same ontological family (1970: 4), because it perfectly fits the 
indispensable assumption concerning the immortal soul as the source of knowledge. 
However, his argument is as a whole confusing. Tigner firstly addresses Klein’s 
interpretation that “everything, every bit the soul recollects, can be understood as a ‘part’ of a 
‘whole’ and can be traced back to a common origin… This assumption makes the world a 
‘whole’ (Ibid. 2)”. He, on the other hand, while following Klein, maintains that, since 
Socrates says that nothing prevents the soul from recollecting everything else, if there are 
such things which can prevent the soul from recollecting, those things are simply not the 
same kind of thing that the recollectable things are (Ibid. 3), and says “All he [Plato] needs is 
for “recollectables” to be sufficiently alike that they can all be approached by using the same 
(dialectical) method (Ibid. 4)”. I, however, found it problematic to assume that there are also 
some things outside of the soul’s epistemological realm. In (2), Socrates explicitly affirms 
that there is ‘nothing’ which the soul did not learn, and it seems to me to reject any other 
existences beyond its epistemological realm. I cannot see any evidence in the Meno that 
Socrates supposes that there is more than one ontological family in the way which Tinger 
thinks Socrates does. 
 
In addition, Tigner’s distinction between what is recollectable and what is not is, I think, 
quite controversial for the case of the Meno. Tigner gives an example of a theorem and rats as 
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 The fact is that the myth of the soul’s learning here again involves the same paradox, namely the 
impossibility of learning what the soul did not know. However, my point in this chapter is, as I mentioned, that 
Socrates’ main concern in the Meno is not the intellectual transition from not-knowing to knowing but the 
possibility of knowledge. See chapter IV-4-9, and 5-10, 11. 
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things which belong to two distinct ontological families. He maintains that since the methods 
for discovering theorems are different from the methods for discovering rats, rats do not 
belong to the same ontological family to which theorems belong (1970: 3).
125
 However, as I 
argued against Phillips, such a simple dichotomy between empirical objects and theoretical or 
rational objects are, I think, misleading for understanding what Socrates attempts to resolve 
in the Meno. Tigner’s interpretation certainly does not explain why Socrates mentions not 
only things in Hades but also ‘things here’ as the objects of recollection, which obviously 
designates the different things not in Hades, but covers those which the soul has learned in 
this world while embodied. My point is, for the theory of recollection in the Meno, not only 
that rat and theorems in this context would belong to the same ontological family, but also 
that the ontological family is the only one which is the object of knowledge. 
 
There are also other three items of evidence that recollection will provide both kinds of 
knowledge, and no reason can be found that it excludes those objects which can be acquired 
through sense perception and experience. So far as the Meno is concerned, Socrates does not 
undervalue empirical knowledge compared with theoretical or rational knowledge as objects 
of inquiry. Rather, he often emphasizes the significance of empirical investigations, and these 
two kinds of inquiry complete each other. Firstly, when Anytus, without having seen them, 
evaluates those who were called sophists, such as Protagoras, as those who ruin and corrupt 
their followers, Socrates wonders that Anytus is a prophet (μάντις) and how he knows these 
things without any experience (ἄπειρος) of those sophists (91b-92c). Although Anytus claims 
that “Easily, for I know who they are, whether I have experience of them or not (92c4-5)”, 
Socrates himself withholds from judging whether they really are such people.
126
 The second 
piece of evidence is the example of the way to Larissa. Socrates compares those who know 
with the ones who have been there by themselves and are able to lead people correctly, while 
those who just have true beliefs with the ones are able to do so without having any experience 
but because of his judgement proved right (97a9-b3).
127
 Although one might think that the 
example is just a metaphor for theoretical inquiries, these provide clear evidence that, 
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 A quite similar idea on the distinction between zebras and the nature of virtue is also found in Fine 2007: 344. 
126
 One might think that Socrates would agree with Anytus’ view and that this implies that Anytus has a true 
opinion by divine gift. However, even if this is so, Socrates would say that it is a true opinion but not knowledge 
because Anytus’ guess merely happens to hit the mark (97b ff.), and also I think that Socrates’ view looks 
similar but not identical to Anytus’. 
127
 Comparing it with the immortality of the soul and the theory of recollection also proved by the slave’s 
geometrical demonstration, it is plausible that Socrates implies his own stories are also still true opinions. See 
also 98b1: Socrates says “I too speak as one who does not have knowledge but is guessing”. 
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whether empirical or theoretical, the experience of doing it independently by oneself is an 
important factor for knowing something.
128
 
 
The third piece of evidence is, I think, more convincing. When Socrates examines whether 
virtue is teachable or not with the method of hypothesis in the latter half of the dialogue (86c 
ff.), the argument goes back and forth in two directions, from theoretical to experimental and 
experimental to theoretical. One is from ‘virtue is knowledge’, then ‘it can be taught’. Then, 
the other way around, the arguments go back from the perceptible fact that ‘there is no 
teacher of virtue’, so ‘virtue cannot be taught’, in which the experimental fact denies the first 
conclusion.
129
 This movement is, in fact, the parallel between Socrates response and the 
slave’s geometrical demonstration, namely whether the myth of the immortality of the soul 
and the theory of recollection as a logically convincing certainly fit the reality that the slave 
can recollect, which can be thought to be confirmed by the experiment. So, the theoretical 
argument is verified by the experimental facts.
130
 The difference between these two inquiries 
is simply that, on one hand, the myth apparently explains reality and is supported by what in 
actuality happens in the slave’s geometrical demonstration. On the other hand, the theoretical 
inquiry on the teachability of virtue contradicts the experimental fact that there are no 
teachers of it, which eventually requires a modification of the theoretical inference to 
distinguish knowledge from true beliefs. In other words, virtuous behaviours may be led not 
only by knowledge but also by true beliefs (96e). Socrates’ inquiries in the Meno alternate 
between its theoretical and experimental examinations. If we compare these movements with 
the final conclusion in Republic IX, the difference in the methods between the two dialogues 
is obvious. To Glaucon, who mentions that the Republic which Socrates presents exists in 
theory but nowhere on earth (τῇ ἐν λόγοις κειμένῃ, ἐπεὶ γῆς γε οὐδαμοῦ οἶμαι αὐτὴν εἶναι) 
(529a11-b1), Socrates responds that it is perhaps in heaven as a model and that it makes no 
                                                     
128
 It is sometimes thought that Socrates’ use of empirical terms (e.g. ‘seeing’, ‘looking at’, ‘touching’) and 
empirical examples to argue for forms are merely metaphors (cf., for example Mason 2010: 65), but I do not 
think that Platonic forms constitute the entirety of his philosophy. 
129
 Some commentator think that only the former argument is a serious inquiry for Socrates which regards virtue 
as knowledge as thus teachable (e.g. Bedu-Addo 1984), however, this line of interpretation contradicts the fact 
that Socrates claims that virtue is knowledge but not teachable in the Protagoras (361a-b). Again, I wonder 
whether Socrates, who examines what knowledge is in Theaetetus which is considered to have been written 
rather later, persists in this specific conclusion. It is more likely that to reach any fixed claim is not important in 
the Meno, rather the method is the issue there. Although one might still think that the method with hypothesis 
(86e-87d) is problematic, and the conclusion led by the method cannot be reliable (cf. Bluck 1964: 23), the 
method (but not the proposition) is something said to have been employed by Socrates in the Phaedo (99d-100a) 
and recommended by Parmenides in the Parmenides (135e-136c). Thus, I do not think that the method itself 
involves a serious problem, although Socrates obviously thinks that it is an issue to inquire into whether virtue is 
teachable or not before knowing what virtue is (Meno 86e, 100b4-6). 
130
 Compare this with Ctesippus’ request to Euthydemus’ argument (p. 41). 
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difference whether it is or ever will be somewhere (διαφέρει δὲ οὐδὲν εἴτε που ἔστιν εἴτε 
ἔσται) (592b2-4). While in the Republic, it is not an immediate issue whether the theories 
(logoi) can be applied to what can be accomplished in ‘reality’, in the Meno, it is exactly an 
issue. 
 
In addition, in the geometrical demonstration, Socrates and the slave also use the same 
method in which Socrates each time encourages the slave to compare his answer and what 
actually happens in the diagram drawn in front of him. To compare his own answer with the 
diagram makes the slave realize that his answer does not fit the drawn diagrams. For 
example, when the slave boy saw the square with twice the length of the sides, i.e. four feet, 
he notices that it makes the original square four times as big, not twice. It is probably less 
clear than usually supposed whether Plato thinks that geometry is a purely theoretical inquiry 
in the Meno. The same sort of example on the relation between geometry and reality appears 
in Sextus’ Against the Logicians in which he examines the Pythagorean criterion of truth: 
 
The Rhodians, anyway (so they say), inquired of Chares the architect how much money it would 
cost to build the colossus. And when he made a determination, they asked him again how much 
it would be if they wanted to build it twice the size. And when he demanded twice as much, they 
gave it, but he, after spending the amount given to him on the starting-points and designs, did 
away with himself. But when he had died, the craftsmen realized that he should have demanded 
not twice but eight times as much; for he needed to increase not only the length but every 
dimension of the work… Therefore – Everything is like number – that is, like reason, which 
judges and is similar in kind to the numbers that constitute everything (M. I. [107-109], italics 
mine). 
 
The architect is said to have made the same sort of mistake which the slave does in Socrates’ 
demonstration. When it is said that everything is like number, ‘everything’ means what 
actually happens and exists in the world. When number explains ‘reality’ well and correctly, 
numbers do not insist that they are more real than anything else, rather they explain well ‘the 
reality of the world’ which can be experienced and perceived, although both thoughts and 
sense perception may often make mistakes. Similarly, at least in the Meno, the recollectable 
objects do not exclude perceptible objects. Rather, they must be the half part of what is 
recollectable, so knowable. Annas also maintains that, as Platonic myths show, “Heaven and 
hell are no longer places outside our world, rather, they are parts of our world… What we call 
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the world, we are told, is only one lowly part of a vast universe (1982: 126)”. Her point is, I 
think, entirely applicable also to the Meno, and I would like to suggest that both intelligible 
and sensible in the Meno belong to the same ontological family, in that they originate from 
the single intellectual resource, namely the immortal soul, and together are parts of the 
whole.
131
 
 
 
5.   Socrates’ belief (81d5-e2). 
 
Socrates then maintains that they should not believe the eristic argument, which clearly 
designates the passage 80d5-e5, but should believe the arguments which the immortality of 
the soul and theory of recollection suggest. If you believe the former, you will become lazy, 
but if the latter, you will be strenuous for inquiry: 
 
We must, therefore, not believe that eristic argument (οὔκουν δεῖ πείθεσθαι τούτῳ τῷ ἐριστικῷ 
λόγῳ·), for it would make us lazy, and cowardly men like to hear it, whereas my argument 
makes them hard-working and keen on the inquiry. I believe that this is true, and I want to 
inquire along with you into what virtue is (ᾧ ἐγὼ πιστεύων ἀληθεῖ εἶναι ἐθέλω μετὰ σοῦ ζητεῖν 
ἀρετὴ ὅτι ἐστίν (81d5-e2, my translation). 
 
The striking thing is how Socrates speaks of the possibility of inquiry as a matter of his 
personal belief. Socrates maintains that they should believe (πείθεσθαι) the myth, rather than 
be persuaded by the eristic argument, and that he himself believes (πιστεύων) that it is true. 
Many commentators ignore why braveness (ἀνδρεῖος) in the previous line (p. 66, (7)) is 
involved with inquiry. Although one might think that is because courage is simply a sort of 
virtue, it is not clear, if it is the case, why Socrates mentions only courage but not justice, 
moderation, or munificence (Meno 74a4-6, 78d7-e2), which are apparently required, if 
courage is, for inquiry. The requirement of courage, according to my interpretation, implies 
the courage of ‘believing’ the indefinite possibility of knowledge and inquiry. What Socrates 
says is: without the immortality of the soul and the theory of recollection, we cannot be sure 
yet whether knowledge of and inquiry into what we do not know is really possible, but let us 
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 It may at a first glance seem strange that sensible things belong to the immortal soul. However, since sense 
organs belongs to us rather than to the external objects, I think that it is not very surprising that Socrates in the 
Meno thinks that perceived things derive from our internal resources rather than from the external world. Cf. 
chapter V-3 for Gorgias’ argument on sense perception. 
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believe that our soul has already known everything and try to recollect what we do not yet 
know. Socrates’ response is indeed full of his personal commitment to the possibility.  
 
 
 
4.   The Demonstration of Socrates’ Two Stories 
 
 
6.   Meno’s suspicion (81e3-82a4). 
 
How far were Socrates’ stories persuasive for Meno? The answer seems to be: not 
completely. Meno asks Socrates what exactly it means that we do not ‘learn’ but what is 
usually called learning by people is in fact recollection, and to teach him that it is really so. 
Socrates is careful not to contradict himself by saying that he will teach it just after claiming 
that there is no teaching or learning, but only recollection.
132
 So, Meno rephrases by asking 
Socrates to show (demonstrate) it if it is possible for him. 
 
M: Yes, Socrates, but how do you mean that we do not learn (ὅτι οὐ μανθάνομεν), but that 
what we call learning is recollection (ἣν καλοῦμεν μάθησιν ἀνάμνησίς ἐστιν)? Can you teach 
me that this is so? 
S: As, I said just now, Meno, you are a rascal. You now ask me if I can teach you, when I say 
there is no teaching but recollection, in order to show me up at once as contradicting my own 
words. 
M: No, by Zeus, Socrates, that was not my intention when I spoke, but just a habit. If you can 
somehow show me that things are as you say, please do so (ἀλλ' εἴ πώς μοι ἔχεις ἐνδείξασθαι ὅτι 
ἔχει ὥσπερ λέγεις, ἔνδειξαι). 
S: It is not easy, but I am nevertheless willing to do my best for your sake (81e3-82a4). 
 
Although some commentators believe that the slave’s geometrical demonstration is the main 
part of Socrates’ response, it is clear that Meno recognizes what Socrates already replied to 
his question, namely that we do not ‘learn’, nor ‘teach’, but only recollect. Meno is asking 
here to show (ἐνδείκνυμι) – but not teach (διδάσκω), as Socrates makes him change the word 
– that what Socrates told him is really so. What does it mean ‘to show that is so’? The most 
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 Cf. chapter III. 
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plausible answer is, I think, to show that what is said in the myth of the immortality of the 
soul and the theory of recollection will certainly happen in ‘reality’ or, more precisely 
speaking, to let Meno ‘see’ that the soul is really immortal and that it can recollect what it has 
already known. Meno’s request is to show him that Socrates’ stories are not merely a tale, but 
‘real’. Before and after beginning the demonstration with the slave, Socrates three times 
directs Meno’s attention. Firstly he says “Pay attention then whether you think he is 
recollecting or learning from me (82b6-7)” and Meno answers “I will pay attention (Ἀλλὰ 
προσέξω; 82b8)”. Secondly, Socrates says “Watch (Θεῶ) him now recollecting things in 
order, as one must recollect (82e12)”, and then again, “Look (or Keep watching) (Φύλαττε) 
(84d1)”. The issue of the demonstration is whether Meno can ‘see’ that the slave really 
recollects or is merely given the answers from outside in the sense that Socrates teaches the 
slave and the slave learns from Socrates. This is why the passage 80d5-e5 is often taken to 
originally suggest the problem between innatism and empiricism, namely whether the slave 
reclaims ‘knowledge’ back from his own inner resources or ‘knowledge’ is completely put 
into him by Socrates, i.e. like stamps on a wax tablet or piecemeal.
133
 This problem is, 
however, not what Socrates in the Meno is primarily concerned with.
134
 Rather what Socrates 
is asked for by Meno here is the verification of his own beliefs that the soul knows 
everything. How can anyone prove it? This must certainly be a difficult request, and 
Socrates’ choice is to prove it by the slave’s geometrical demonstration. 
 
 
7.   The state of aporia as a condition of inquiry (84a3-d2). 
  
Since the process of the demonstration is not directly related to what I regard as the main 
paradox of the Meno, I just would like to point out an important word by Socrates for the 
purpose of this thesis, that is, Socrates clearly regards the state of aporia as a condition of 
inquiry opposing Meno’s view which considers it the consequence of Socrates’ elenchus and 
dialectic requirements.
135
 The context is as follows: Socrates at the beginning of the 
demonstration asks Meno to choose one of his attendants, and calls a slave who has never 
learned geometry since he was born. Socrates confirms that the slave can communicate in 
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 Cf. Theaetetus 191c. 
134
 As I repeatedly mention above, I do not deny that is also one of Plato’s main concerns in the Meno, and all 
these interpretations are related to each other. But, my point is simply that it is not the direct response to what I 
suggest the underlying paradox and Socrates attempts to disarm in the Meno. 
135
 Cf. pp. 10-11. I will argue about the significance of aporia in the Meno more closely in chapter V-5-2. 
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Greek and knows what a square is like by drawing it in the sand in front of him (82b-c). 
Socrates asks the slave how long each side will be in a square that is twice as big as the 
original square whose side is two feet (82d-e). The slave confidently answers that the length 
of the side must be twice as long (i.e. four feet), and Socrates points out to Meno that the 
slave thinks he knows what he in fact does not know (82e). However, the slave, as his two 
answers having been proved to be wrong, falls into the state of aporia, and realizes that he 
does not know the answer. The slave responds, “By Zeus, Socrates, I do not know (84a1-2)”, 
and Socrates points out the slave’s improvement: 
 
Do you realize, Meno, to what point he has proceeded in his recollection? […] even now he does 
not yet know, but then he thought he knew, and answered confidently as if he did know, and he 
did not think himself being in aporia, but now he does think himself being in aporia, and as he 
does not know, neither does he think he knows (84a3-b1). 
 
The slave’s state of aporia here is obviously compared with the numbness of Meno (80a-b), 
and Socrates maintains that the numbness is beneficial for removing intellectual self-conceit. 
While Meno thinks that his numbness is the consequence of Socrates’ demanding 
requirements, Socrates points out to Meno that is a necessary condition of inquiry (i.e. 
recollection): 
 
Do you think that he would have tried to inquire into or to learn what he thought he knew, 
though he did not, before he fell into aporia and realized he did not know and longed to know? 
[...] Keep watching how he will come out of that state of aporia and discover while inquiring 
along with me (84c4-d2).
136
 
 
The state of aporia is important, because it is a realization that there is something which you 
do not know and need to know. The point is that it is a condition of inquiry, but not 
everything. Even if you realize there is something which you do not know, it does not 
guarantee that you are capable to know it. We need two conditions to sustain the possibility 
of inquiry, one is that you know that there is something for you to inquire into, and the other 
is that you are capable to discover that which you did not know, namely the possibility of 
knowledge. Socrates’ stories provide the evidence: the soul has already known what you have 
not yet recollected, so inquiry and discovery are possible by means of recollection. The slave 
                                                     
136
 I have added ‘and discover (καὶ ἀνευρήσει)’ which Grube omits. Compare with Scott’s interpretation which 
considers that Socrates ignores the problem of discovery. 
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at the end reaches the right answer that the length of the diagonal of the original square will 
make a square twice the size (85b5). 
 
 
8.   The result of the demonstration (85b8-e3). 
 
Socrates asks Meno what he thinks about the achievement of the slave. Socrates points out 
that, although the slave first did not know the answer to the geometrical question, he only has 
expressed his own opinions and finally achieved the right answer. This means that true 
opinions about what one does not know are always within him, and the slave also would 
recollect anything else that the soul has already known in the same way as he does about 
geometry. Thus, Socrates and Meno agree that the result of the demonstration supports the 
assumptions that the soul initially has true opinions and we would know all things that the 
soul has already known. 
 
So the man who does not know has within himself true opinions (ἀληθεῖς δόξαι) about the things 
that he does not know? […] These opinions have now just been stirred up like a dream, but if he 
[the slave] were repeatedly asked these same questions in various ways, you know that in the 
end he will know about these things as accurately as anyone. […] For he will perform in the 
same way about all geometry, and all other objects of learning (τῶν ἄλλων μαθημάτων ἁπάντων) 
(85c8-e3, my translation). 
 
The remarkable point is, as many commentators argue, that Socrates thinks that the slave’s 
last answer is still a true opinion, but not knowledge,
137
 but that by means of being asked 
repeatedly, he will ‘know’ these things as accurately as anyone else. Thus, Socrates says, if it 
is the case that a man takes back ‘knowledge’ from himself, it can be called ‘recollection’ 
(85d). Socrates’ terminology here is quite ambiguous, and there have been various 
interpretations on the demonstrative pronouns to specify the meanings.
138
 However, in any 
event, this account of knowledge completely corresponds to the distinction between true 
opinions and knowledge in the latter half of the dialogue. Socrates compares true opinion 
with an untied work of Daedalus and a runaway slave. What makes knowledge different from 
                                                     
137
 Although the slave apparently also recollects false opinions or fails to recollect when he gives false answers 
through the process that is left untouched in the Meno. Probably, we have to wait until the Theaetetus, in which 
the reasons of false opinions are examined by Socrates as the issue of his own aporia (187c-200d). Cf. also 
Scott 1995: 38. 
138
 Cf. Suzuki 2010: 35-38 for the various interpretations. 
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opinions is that, according to Socrates, it is tied down strongly with reasoning (97e-98a). In 
the Gorgias, Socrates claims that the art of rhetoric should firstly be used to accuse 
themselves and, foremost (480c), the repetition of questioning here may imply that true 
beliefs will, by passing through many and any strong refutations, become stable ‘knowledge’. 
 
 
9.   The subject of recollection & the possibility of inquiry (85e9-86a10). 
 
Socrates then distinguished the slave as the subject of recollection from his soul. Since the 
slave himself has not learned geometry in his present life, he must have learned it before he 
was born as a human being: 
 
If he has not acquired them [true opinions] in his present life, is it not clear that he had them and 
had learned them at some other time? [...] Then that was the time when he was not a human 
being? [...] If then, during the time he exists and is not a human being he will have true opinions 
which, when stirred by questioning, become knowledge, will not his soul have leaned during all 
time? For it is clear that during all time he exists, either as a man or not (85e9-86a10). 
 
Socrates’ argument is as follows: since the slave could recollect what he has not learned in 
his present life, it means that he has already learned it in some other previous life, whether he 
was a man or not.
139
 But, if something which was learned in some other life remains within 
the slave, it follows that the soul should be immortal, if his body not. Thus, his soul is that 
which has already learned everything. I agree with Ionescu who thinks that this part shows 
that the soul by its very nature is “everlastingly in possession of knowledge (2007: 91)”.140 
Socrates, as she points out, uses the perfect tense to express the soul’s permanent state 
throughout all time as “having always already learnt (ἐμεμαθήκη: 86a1, μεμάθηκα: 86a9)”, 
and it is plausible to imply that “this learning is not in fact assignable to a determinable 
moment in the slave’s life, but is rather a state that characterizes the stable condition (Ibid. 
89)”. Compare this with the analysis in p. 66, you will realize Socrates’ ambiguous phrase 
about the subject of recollection at 81c5-d5. In (3), the subject of recollection is said to be 
‘the soul’ by Socrates, but, he restates it into ‘anyone’ and ‘he’ in (6), and ‘the man’ in (7), in 
                                                     
139
 This could imply that ‘things here’ at 81c6 includes the things which the soul has learned while embodied in 
other creatures such as animals, plants, or anything else (see p. 64). If this is the case, its epistemological realm 
goes beyond even that of human being’s perceptible things. 
140
 Cf. also Sharples 1985: 156 for an alternative interpretation. 
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which it is said that ‘the man’ should be brave and determined to complete the recollection. 
This is a fallacious reformulation when it comes to the problem of inquiry: if all souls have 
already learned everything, why do we have to recollect what our soul must have already 
known? This is what [S1’] in Socrates’ restatement questions (see p. 51). Why does the fact 
that all souls know not mean that all of us also know? 
 
The fact which tends to be overlooked by commentators is, concerning the epistemological 
side of various myths of the immortality of the soul in Platonic dialogues, one of the biggest 
differences between the myth in the Meno and those in other dialogues such as the Phaedrus 
and Republic is that the Meno’s does not explain anything about the forgetfulness of the soul 
or the intellectual difference amongst each soul, instead stresses that all souls equally know 
everything, and obscurely distinguishes the soul (as the intermediary of the objects of 
recollection) from a man (as the subject of recollecting) to preserve the space for recollection 
for us.
141 
In other dialogues, however, the subject of recollection is clearly illustrated as the 
soul itself. In the Phaedrus, for example, it is said that although the soul of every human 
being has somehow seen the reality following gods’ chariots, only a few remain whose 
memory is good enough to remember what it has seen: some get only a brief glance at the 
reality, and some forget when they involve with bad company after they were born in this 
world (249e). In the Republic, on the other hand, the souls drink the water from the River of 
Unheeding after travelling the Plain of Forgetfulness, and forget everything that they have 
seen in Hades before returning to this world. Since some drink more than a certain amount, 
such souls remember less what they have seen (620e-621a). The forgetfulness of the soul is 
something which is completely missing in the Meno. This is one of the reasons why I think 
that Plato’s main concern in the Meno is not the problem of inquiry, i.e. the transition from 
the state of not-knowing (i.e. oblivion) to that of knowing (i.e. recollection), and Socrates 
response strongly focuses on the knowing state of the soul. 
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 Cf. Euthydemus 295e: In the second argument that everyone knows everything, Socrates begins to add “by 
means of the soul” to “I know” to avoid any contradictions, which makes Euthydemus upset. 
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5.   Socrates’ Epistemological Positive Dogmatism 
 
 
10.   The truth of reality (ἡ ἀλήθεια τῶν ὄντων) (86b1-4). 
 
My interpretation, I think, fits well Socrates’ conclusion at the end of the slave’s geometrical 
demonstration. Socrates maintains: 
 
Then if the truth of reality (ἡ ἀλήθεια τῶν ὄντων) is always in our soul, the soul would be 
immortal so that you should always confidently try to inquire and recollect what you do not 
know at present – that is, what you do not recollect (86b1-4)? 
 
What Socrates lastly emphasizes is that the truth of reality (or of the things, ‘ἡ ἀλήθεια τῶν 
ὄντων’) can be thought to be always in our soul, and it follows the soul immortal, so that we 
can confidently inquire into what we do not know. Socrates’ point is not because the 
transition from not-knowing to knowing is possible, rather ‘knowing (as recollection)’ would 
be possible, because the soul always has the truth of reality as which is waiting for our 
recollection. Socrates here uses ‘ἡ ἀλήθεια τῶν ὄντων’ to indicate our objects of recollection, 
and we are finally told by Socrates what were those things which the soul has learned here 
and in Hades, the thing which were called ‘everything’, whose nature is as a whole akin, and 
what the soul would be able to recollect, which will eventually become ‘knowledge’. This is, 
as Socrates now says, ‘the truth of reality’, and ‘the truth of reality’ is the possession of our 
soul. This is striking, because this implies a holistic report on what knowledge is. Returning 
the analysis at p. 66, Socrates first says that the soul knows everything in (1) and then that 
there is nothing that the soul does not know in (2). So, he says, nothing prevents anyone from 
recollecting everything else if he could recollect even one thing in (6). The object of 
recollection, namely the truth of reality, is as a whole akin by nature, so if you can really 
recollect even only one thing, all other things will be also recollected one by another. 
Socrates here also provides a controversial unity between epistemology and ontology by 
means of the immortal soul as the intermediary, that is, the things which we can recollect and 
the soul has already known are ‘everything’ which exist. 
 
This holistic view of knowledge can be considered to have come from the Eleatics including 
Parmenides, who maintains that what-is is the only thing which can be known to us. His 
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poem, the Way of Truth, begins with the argument on what-is as the only object of inquiry, 
which is the path of Persuasion to Truth, while what-is-not is unknowable, which is the 
delusion of the way of inquiry:  
 
Come now, and I will tell you…, the only ways of enquiry that are to be thought of. The one, 
that [it] is and that it is impossible for [it] not to be, in the path of Persuasion (πειθοῦς) (for she 
attends upon Truth); the other, that [it] is not and that it is needful that [it] not be, that I declare 
to you is an altogether indiscernible track: for you could not know what is not (τό γε μὴ ἐόν) – 
that cannot be done – nor indicate it (KRS [291]: Fr.2, Proclus in Tim. 1, 345, 18; Simplicius in 
Phys. 116, 28 (lines 3-8)). 
 
‘What-is’ is for Parmenides the only real thing uncreated, imperishable, whole and single, 
unshaken and perfect.
142
 Quite similar to that Socrates’ expresses the object of recollection as 
‘the whole of nature is akin’, Parmenides maintains that what-is is continuous and close to 
each of its other parts: 
 
Nor is it divided, since it all exists alike (πᾶν ἐστιν ὁμοῖον); nor is it more here and less there, 
which would prevent it from holding together, but it is all full of being (ἐόντος). So it is all 
continuous: for what is draws near to what is (ἐὸν γὰρ ἐόντι πελάζει) (KRS [297]: Fr. 8, 22-5, 
Simplicius in Phys. 144, 29). 
 
As Schofield points out (KRS: 251), Parmenidean fragments contains a controversial 
ambiguity in its epistemology and ontology, because this continuity of what-is can be read in 
two ways, either it is continuous, because any object of inquiry are characterised as a single, 
or all thinkable things ‘exist’ and one of things that are, which is the central issue of the next 
chapter. Before looking into the problem closely, let us summarize the whole argument of 
Socrates’ response in the Meno. 
 
 
11.   Socrates’ optimism 
 
To conclude, Socrates declares his view on his own arguments: he himself does not insist that 
his argument is right in all aspects, but would fight for the point that to think they must 
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 Cf. KRS [295]: Fr. 8, 1-4, Simplicius in Phys. 78, 5: 145. 
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inquire into what they do not know makes them better, braver and less idle than to think it 
impossible for them to discover it and so that they must not inquire into it: 
 
I do not insist that my argument is right in all other respects, but I would contend at all costs 
both in word and deed (καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ) as far as I could that we will be better men, braver 
and less idle, if we think (οἰόμενοι) that one must inquire into the things one does not know, 
rather than if we think (οἰοίμεθα) that it is not possible to discover what we do not know and that 
we must not inquire into it (ἃ μὴ ἐπιστάμεθα μηδὲ δυνατὸν εἶναι εὑρεῖν μηδὲ δεῖν ζητεῖν) (86b6-
c3). 
 
I cannot find any dogmatic assumption in these words. Socrates obviously accepts that his 
argument might eventually turn out to be false, but even if it does and the result is exactly the 
same as that of someone who thought it impossible and has not even tried to inquire into what 
they did not know, it will be better for Socrates. 
 
The immortality of the soul itself was probably, as we have seen, not something that could 
easily be believed even at Socrates’ time. In the Phaedo, when Cebes raises further doubts 
that the soul is immortal at all and suggests it eventually perishes, Phaedo tells Echecrates, 
those in attendance were, as facing Socrates’ death, all depressed without knowing which to 
believe. A minute earlier, Phaedo says, they were convinced by Socrates’ arguments on the 
immortality of the soul, but soon they again fell into confusion, no longer being able to 
believe that the previous argument was true (88c ff.). Phaedo reveals that it drives them to 
doubt “not only what had already been said but also what was going to be said, lest we be 
worthless as critics or the subject itself admitted of no certainty (88c5-7)”. This clearly 
expresses something which likely happened when they could not see any divine element in 
their own intellectual activities. The most important feature of the slave’s geometrical 
demonstration is that it seems to provide the certainty (if it can be thought to be sure that 
what the slave can recollect is finally all true opinions from his soul, which will become 
knowledge about the truth of reality) to convince them of the possibility of knowledge and 
inquiry. If you think that is true, you will be confident that your inquiry will be fruitful. But, 
if you doubt that the truth of reality is within us, you would not be sure whether you can 
inquire into and discover anything which you do not know, because your inquiry immediately 
loses certainty and you might not be able to eternally escape from the pile of your mere silly 
beliefs. 
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Although Annas does not mention the myth in the Meno, her argument on Platonic myths 
clearly discerns the crucial role of the myth in the Gorgias, which is, I think, also the most 
adequate for the case in the Meno. In the Gorgias, against Socrates who regards rhetoric as a 
part of flattery (466a), Callicles criticises Socrates’ arguments, regarding doing what is unjust 
to others being worse than suffering it at the hands of others as really flattery catering to the 
weak and the majority of the public. Callicles calls Socrates “a true crowd pleaser (ἀληθῶς 
δημηγόρος) (482c5)” and attacks by insisting that although Socrates always claims to be 
pursuing the truth, he is in fact the very one who brings the discussion around to the sort of 
crowd-pleasing vulgarities that is admirable only for unreflective people (482e3-6). He asks 
Socrates whether he certainly thinks that the man who is in such a position in the city of 
being unable to protect not only himself but also his friends and family is really good (522c4-
6). Socrates here introduces the myth of judgement after death, according to which if a man 
has lived a just and pious life, when his life comes to an end, he goes to the Isles of the 
Blessed to enjoy complete happiness, while if a man has lived unjustly and impiously, he 
goes to Tartarus, the prison of payment and retribution. Socrates tells Callicles that Zeus 
decided that the judgement should take place after their death only observing their immortal 
souls separated from their body when they are still fully dressed with appearance, parentage 
and wealth to deceive the judges’ eyes so that the people are given deserved judgements 
(523a-524a). Socrates introduces this story as a “very good logos (μάλα καλος λόγος)” and 
believes that it is true, although, he wonders, Calicles may feel that it is merely “a myth 
(μῦθος)” (523a). 
 
Socrates’ concern about how he will be able to show his soul to be as good as possible in 
front of the judges after death, rather than in front of the public while alive, is totally 
supported by his strong belief in the myth.
143
 He says that the myth leads him to conclude that 
death is actually nothing but the separation of the soul from the body, and the soul as well as 
the body stays in the condition it was in when the person was alive as evidence of how he has 
lived. Annas maintains that the myth of the final judgement provides a consequentialist 
reason to be just, rewards are given to the just and punishment to the wicked, which she calls 
“moral optimism (1982: 125)”: 
 
                                                     
143
 Socrates also maintains, “that is what I have heard and believe that it true (πιστεύω ἀληθῆ εἶναι·) (Gorgias 
524a8-b1)” and “I am convinced by these logoi (ὑπό τε τούτων τῶν λόγων πέπεισμαι) (526d3-4)”. 
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[B]eing good will benefit you, if not now then “in the end”. And this is the moral message that 
Socrates has been defending throughout the Gorgias – justice is really the best bet, though 
worldly wisdom fails to see this. […] If we accept this morally optimistic claim, then we can see 
that we do have reason to be just… the wicked person is simply short-sighted, failing to perceive 
the massive mistake. […] we don’t seem to have any very convincing basis for the moral 
optimism… without such belief the myth will indeed strike someone like Callicles as being just 
an old wives’ tale, something that would be morally significant, if it were true, but dependent on 
a hypothesis that we have no good reason to believe (Annas 1982: 125). 
 
Concerning the details, although there are some differences between Meno’s myth and 
Gorgias’,144 Gorgias’s myth provides the foundation for moral optimism, I think, Meno’s 
myth for intellectual optimism (i.e. epistemological positive dogmatism) in the same way. 
Without such commitment, there are no convincing reasons, as Annas points out, for us to be 
persuaded by Socrates’ optimistic position compared with the opposite. At the end of the 
Gorgias, Socrates suggests that Callicles believe the logos, rather than what he currently 
believes. If it is a matter of which side to believe, the myth of the Meno too will suggest us to 
believe the positive view about the possibility of knowledge, rather than the pessimistic 
counter-position. Socrates elsewhere in the Meno mentions the Eleusinian mysteries, which 
are attributed to Persephone and Demeter, her mother. After defining what colour is 
following Gorgias’ and Empedocles’ manner, Socrates says to Meno that this way is not 
better at all, and that Meno will also agree with Socrates if he stays to be initiated to the 
mysteries (76e6-9). It is plausible that Socrates’ words here allude to the myth of the 
immortality of the soul.  
                                                     
144
 Although comparison of the details between two myths would be very useful in order to see the transition in 
Platonic philosophy, it is beyond the scope of this thesis. I would just like to point out two main differences: 
firstly, in the Gorgias Socrates would reject higher social status, such as tyrants, kings, potentates enjoy as 
divine rewards (cf. p. 63). He maintains that they tend to commit the most grievous and impious wrongs, being 
in a position in which it is difficult to stop doing such things (525d). Secondly, the Isles of the Blessed (523b-c), 
the place of complete happiness, is also something that does not appear in the Meno, which only regards ‘this 
world’ as the upper world, and Hades as the underworld. 
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V.   Gorgias’ Epistemological Negative Dogmatism 
 
 
 
1.   Gorgias’ On What Is Not or On Nature 
 
My main suggestion in this thesis is that one of the two horns of the passage 80d5-e5, [M’”] 
and [S2’] (the impossibility of coming to know what is not known: see chapter III-4), 
originates with Gorgias’ three theses in his On What is Not or On Nature (Περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος 
ἢ Περὶ φύσεως): [G1] there is nothing, [G2] even if there is something it cannot be known, 
[G3] even if it is knowable, it cannot be shown to others. They at first glance appear to 
express three impossibilities of existence ([G1]), knowledge ([G2]), and communication 
([G3]), respectively concerned with ontology ([G1]), epistemology ([G2]), and philosophy of 
language ([G3]). However, Gorgias’ arguments are not understood so simply, partly because 
of his way of putting the arguments as a response to Eleatic doctrines. The two sources of 
evidence, a peripatetic anonymous author’s On Melissus, Xenophanes, and Gorgias (979a11-
980b22)
145
 and Sextus’ Against the Logicians ([65-75]), respectively presents the beginning 
of Gorgias’ argument as follows: 
 
ΠΕΡΙ ΓΟΡΓΙΟΥ. Οὐκ εἶναί φησιν οὐδέν· εἰ δ' ἔστιν, ἄγνωστον εἶναι· εἰ δὲ καὶ ἔστι καὶ γνωστόν, 
ἀλλ' οὐ δηλωτὸν ἄλλοις. 
 
Gorgias says that there is nothing; and if there is (something) it is unknowable; and if there is 
(something) and it is knowable, yet it cannot be shown to others (MXG. 979a11-13, my 
translation). 
 
Γοργίας δὲ ὁ Λεοντῖνος ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μὲν τάγματος ὑπῆρχε τοῖς ἀνῃρηκόσι τὸ κριτήριον, οὐ 
κατὰ τὴν ὁμοίαν δὲ ἐπιβολὴν τοῖς περὶ τὸν Πρωταγόραν. ἐν γὰρ τῷ ἐπιγραφομένῳ Περὶ τοῦ μὴ 
ὄντος ἢ Περὶ φύσεως τρία κατὰ τὸ ἑξῆς κεφάλαια κατασκευάζει, ἓν μὲν καὶ πρῶτον ὅτι οὐδὲν 
ἔστιν, δεύτερον ὅτι εἰ καὶ ἔστιν, ἀκατάληπτον ἀνθρώπῳ, τρίτον ὅτι εἰ καὶ καταληπτόν, ἀλλὰ τοί 
γε ἀνέξοιστον καὶ ἀνερμήνευτον τῷ πέλας. 
                                                     
145
 Although it is difficult to determine the date of this work, according to Kerferd, it is generally thought to 
have been written between the third century B.C. to the first century A.D., and possibly has some relation to 
Aristotle’s Πρὸς τὰ Μελίσσου ά, Πρὸς τὰ Ξενοφάνους ά, and Πρὸς τὰ Γοργίου ά, which are mentioned in the 
catalogue of Aristotle’s works in Diogenes Laertius v. 25 (1955: 4). Schiappa, on the other hand, supposes that 
it was written in the first two centuries from the appearance of certain Stoic technical terms (1997: 15). 
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Gorgias of Leontini belonged to the same troop as those who did away with the criterion, but not 
by way of the same approach as Protagoras. For in the work entitled On What Is Not or On 
Nature he sets up three main points one after the other: first that there is nothing; second, that 
even if there is [something], it is not apprehensible by human being; third, that even if it is 
apprehensible, it is not expressible or explainable to the next person (M. I. [65]). 
 
As Guthrie points out “the title ‘On Nature (περί φύσεως)’ was given indiscriminately to the 
writings of the Presocratics (1962: 73)”, we can find many treatises with this same title by 
those who are generally called ‘natural’ philosophers: for example, Anaximander’s, 
Xenophanes’ and Heraclitus’ On Nature, Empedocles’ On the Nature of What Is, and 
Melissus’ On Nature or What is. 146  Also, there is a certain agreement amongst many 
commentators that Gorgias replies to the Eleatic doctrine, including Parmenides’ and 
Melissus’, in On What is Not or On Nature,147  though there have been many different 
evaluations of the intrinsic value of it. Guthrie says that  “One cannot doubt that the 
deliberately provocative title was chosen by Gorgias himself, nor that it was intended as a 
parody of titles already extant (Ibid. 73)”. Robinson regards Gorgias as pictured in Plato’s 
Gorgias not as a serious thinker, and believes that his argument is merely a parody of real 
philosophy, which is criticized as neither “the real thing, nor is it even very much like the 
real thing (1973, 60)”.148 On the other hand, some commentators on Plato’s Meno dimly 
notice the likely connection between “Meno’s paradox” and Gorgias’ argument. Ionescu 
mentions that Meno’s paradox may be ‘scepticism’ (2007: 44). Weiss and Scott point out the 
possibility that Meno relies on the memory on the ‘sceptical’ argument by Gorgias (Weiss 
2001: 52; Scott 2006: 78). However, none of them has explored the exact relation between 
them, and Plato’s view on Gorgias’ arguments has not yet received very much attention.149 
 
This chapter will show that Gorgias’ first argument overturns Eleatic doctrines by using the 
same ontological terminology without any commitment to the ontological claim with which it 
concludes, and then that his second argument, as a response to the Eleatic epistemology, is 
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 Cf. KRS [95], 166, [192], [338], [521]. 
147
 E.g. Kerferd 1955: 23; Hay 1990: 330; Porter 1993: 291; Wardy 1996: 9; Gagarin 1997: 38; Gaine 1997: 11; 
Schiappa 1997: 16; Notomi 1999: 203. 
148
 See also Schiappa 1997: 16-17, for a variety of evaluations. 
149
 Schiappa points out that even the authenticity of the ascription of the work to Gorgias has been doubted, 
because neither of Plato nor Aristotle explicitly mentions it anywhere (1997: 15). However, as I will argue, 
Meno 80d5-e5 can be thought the evidence that Plato not only knew at least a very similar argument which is 
attributed to Gorgias but also dealt with the argument seriously in the Meno. 
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concerned with the impossibility for human beings of acquiring knowledge of reality either 
by intellect or sense perception. Thirdly, Gorgias’ third argument can be read as the denial of 
teaching as a transmission of ‘knowledge’, and we will see that three arguments are, as a 
whole, addressing epistemological problems. As a result, it will be finally shown that his 
arguments provide a paradoxical counterargument to what can be drawn from the Eleatic 
doctrine and upon which one of two horns ([M’”] and [S2’]) of Meno 80d5-e5 is developed. 
 
In so far as Gorgias’ underlying assumption on the relation amongst intellect, sense 
perception, the truth of reality, and language are concerned, as Kerferd also maintains (1955: 
5), no essential difference can be found between the two sources. The main difference is that 
while Sextus apparently focuses on simply reporting Gorgias’ sayings (Schiappa 1997: 15), 
the anonymous author of MXG analyzes and criticizes Gorgias’ arguments, and also points 
out the significance of Gorgias’ arguments insofar as they are concerned with the difficulties 
(aporiai) raised by earlier philosophers.
150
 Sextus, again, mentions Gorgias’ underlying 
assumptions on sense perception and intellect in the Outlines of Pyrrhonism II ([57-59]), 
which is also useful for narrowing down the interpretative possibilities. It has been thought 
that Gorgias himself never published and that the original arguments were probably an oral 
discipline.
151
 For this reason, neither of two sources may be completely reliable, and there are 
many obscure points for interpretation. In order to examine Gorgias’ arguments, I will first 
attempt to understand the arguments by Sextus and then refer to the criticisms by the 
anonymous author. 
  
                                                     
150
 The author says “This and all his [Gorgias’] other arguments are concerned with difficulties (aporiai) raised 
by earlier philosophers, so that in examining their view these questions have to be discussed (MXG 980b20-22)”. 
151
 E.g. Gagarin 1997: 38; Schiappa 1997: 15. Since Gorgias’ argument, as Schiappa points out (Ibid. 24), uses 
the similar move in the well-known Eleatic argument, it must be easily transmitted and remembered. Gagarin on 
the other hand suggests the possibility that it was originally a written work (Ibid. 40, n.1). See also note 7. 
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2.   What-Is and What-Is-Not in Gorgias’ Challenge to the Eleatics 
 
 
1.   There is nothing. 
 
Gorgias’ first argument that there is nothing, according to Sextus, consists of three 
demonstrations. If there is anything, Gorgias says, either there is what-is (τὸ ὂν) or what-is-
not (τὸ μὴ ὂν), or are both. But it will be demonstrated that there is neither what-is (τὸ ὂν), 
nor what-is-not (τὸ μὴ ὂν), therefore there is not anything ([66]). The first demonstration is 
that ‘there is not what-is-not’. In so far as what-is-not is considered as not-being (οὐκ ὂν) it 
will not be (οὐκ ἔσται). On the other hand, so far as what-is-not is considered being, it will on 
the other hand be (ἔσται). But it is absurd that something should both be and not be at the 
same time. Again, if there is what-is-not, there will not be what-is, because what-is and what-
is-not would have the opposite attributes of being and not-being. However, it is not the case 
that there is not what-is, and neither will there be what-is-not ([67]). Therefore there is not 
what-is-not. 
 
Gorgias, as Kerferd points out (1981: 94), here apparently uses ‘being (ὂν)’ and ‘not-being 
(οὐκ ὂν)’ as corresponding to ‘to be (ἔστι)’ and ‘not to be (οὐκ ἔστι)’. Thus, his 
demonstration concludes that since what-is-not is not-being, it at the same time not to be (οὐκ 
ἔσται). Gorgias clearly relies on the same ontological foundation on which Parmenides 
established his argument.
152
 But, Gorgias, the anonymous author points out, uses Parmenides’ 
and Zeno’s argument in order to object to them (979a23). For the second demonstration is 
that there is not what-is either. Gorgias reaches the completely opposite conclusion from the 
same premises for the argument for what-is used by the Eleatics: 
 
[I]f there is what is, it is either eternal or generated or eternal and at the same time generated. 
[…] [I]f what is is eternal, it does not have any beginning. [69] For everything that undergoes 
generation has some beginning, but the eternal, being ungenerated, did not have a beginning. But 
not having a beginning, it is unlimited. But if it is unlimited it is nowhere. For if it is anywhere, 
that in which it is is distinct from itself, and thus what-is will no longer be unlimited since it is 
enclosed by something. For what encloses is bigger than what is enclosed, but there is nothing 
bigger than the unlimited, so that the unlimited is not anywhere. [70] Then again, nor is it 
                                                     
152
 Cf. chapter IV-5-10. 
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enclosed within itself. For the thing in which it is and the thing in that thing will be the same, 
and what is will become double, both place and body (for the thing in which it is is place, and 
the thing in that thing is body). But this is absurd; therefore what is is not within itself. So that if 
what is is eternal, it is unlimited, and if it is unlimited, it is nowhere, and if it is nowhere, it is 
not. Therefore if what it is eternal, it is not a being in the first place. [71] Then again, nor can 
what is be generated. For if it has been generated, it has been generated either out of a being or 
out of a non being. But it has not been generated out of what is; for if it is a being, it has not 
been generated but already is. But neither has it been generated out of what is not; for what is 
not cannot generate anything, on account of the fact that what is capable of generating 
something is bound necessarily to share in reality. Therefore, what is is not generated either. 
[72] In the same way, neither is it the combination, both eternal and generated. For they are 
destructive of one another… (italics mine). 
 
Gorgias’ conclusion is problematic, because even if what-is is eternal and unlimited, it does 
not follow that it is nowhere, rather it is more plausible that what-is is everywhere.
153
 As the 
first demonstration shows, Gorgias explicitly says “it is not the case that there is not what-is 
([67])”. The fact is, I think, that Gorgias uses ‘nowhere’ as the synonym of ‘everywhere’. 
How is this possible? It seems to me that the only possible way to understand this is that 
expressions of location, either everywhere or nowhere, for what-is make no difference any 
more, if it is infinite ([69]). If it is everywhere, it must not require any word to specify its 
location, because it is identical with space itself, i.e. it is the very thing which locates its 
‘parts’ in it. The controversial point is that ‘everywhere’ usually means that there is what-is, 
while ‘nowhere’ means that there is not what-is, namely it does not exist. However, the 
question raised by Gorgias is that if what-is is the only thing that exists in reality, the term 
expressing where what-is is located does no longer matter, and only all generated things are 
embraced in the same reality, which is what-is ([71]). Gorgias totally overturns the ordinary 
meaning of the words, and also denies, by using the same technique, number, continuity, 
magnitude, and the body of what-is: 
 
[73] Besides, if it is, it is either one or many. But it is neither one nor many, as will be shown; 
therefore there is not what-is. For if it is one, it is either of a certain quantity or continuous or a 
magnitude or a body. But whichever of these it is, it is not one. If it is of a certain magnitude it 
will be divided, while if it is continuous it will be cut. Similarly, if it is thought of as a 
                                                     
153
 Another fallacious point is that Gorgias here changes its temporal eternity to spatial infinity. It is logically 
unacceptable unless we generously understand that Gorgias tries to cover both aspects, although if so it should 
be ‘always’ and ‘everywhere’. 
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magnitude it will not be invisible, and if it turns out to be a body it will be triple; for it will have 
length and breadth and depth. But it is absurd to say that what is is none of these; therefore what 
is is not one. [74] Then again, neither is it many. For if it is not one, it is not many; for the many 
is a combination of things taken individually, which means that if the one is done away with, the 
many are also done away with at the same time. 
 
Gorgias, in this part, maintains that, if what-is is either of a certain quantity, continuous, or a 
magnitude or a body, it follow that what-is possesses some qualities which it should not 
possess in its nature. So, what-is cannot be, Gorgias rejects, qualified with any of those terms. 
It is, therefore, not even ‘one’ ([73]). Melissus would be the first to call what-is ‘The One (τὸ 
ἓν)’ rather than Parmenides. It is said that Melissus maintains “For if it were <infinite>, it 
would be one; for if it were two, the two could not be infinite, but would be limited by one 
another (KRS [531]: Melissus; Fr. 6, Simplicius de caelo 557, 16)”. There is also other 
evidence that ‘the One (τὸ ἓν)’ is introduced by Melissus in the second part of the XMG 
(974a9-22). Although it is, as Schofield points out (2007: 395),  natural to consider 
Parmenides to be committed to the idea that if there is something there can be only one thing, 
Parmenides does not clearly name it ‘One’ anywhere.154 
 
It is certain that many Presocratic natural philosophers name the same thing by different 
terms, for example, what-is, being, everything, the One,
 
and God,
155
 and, being a rhetorician, 
Gorgias could have noticed and pointed out the controversial usage of the terms. Although 
Gorgias’ way of argument can also be regarded as a parody of such natural philosophies, I 
cannot see any comical or joking aspect to the point raised by Gorgias. Even if it is a parody, 
it does not mean that Gorgias’ point is not worth consideration. Rather it seems to me that 
Gorgias attracts attention to the problems by means of using his art of rhetoric.
156
 In the 
                                                     
154
 Schofield, as I agree, mentions that “[W]hen Plato and Aristotle represent monism as the principal thesis of 
the Eleatics…, they must be reading Parmenides through Melissan spectacles (KRS 2007: 395)”. However, it 
also might be an interpretative issue to regard that as Plato’s misunderstanding, as Socrates explicitly mentions 
Melissus in the Theaetetus: “I am afraid our criticism might be a very cheap affair. And if I feel like this before 
the many who have made the universe one and unmoved, Melissus and the rest of them, I feel it still more in the 
face of the One – Parmenides (183e)”. 
155
 Cf. MXG 977a14-36: the anonymous author tells us that Xenophanes calls it ‘God’. 
156
 The identical concern of how to call ‘everything’ is also found in Plato’s Sophist: The Eleatic stranger 
attempts to clarify the meaning of ‘everything’, asks Theaetetus “What do you mean, everything? (233e)” and 
himself maintains “I mean everything to include you and me and also the other animals and plants… the sea and 
earth and heaven and gods and everything else (234a)”. The Eleatic stranger also clearly mentions the same 
problem that “our Eleatic tribe, starting from Xenophanes and even people before him, tell us their myth on the 
assumption that what they call “all things” are just one (242d)”, and later examine whether everything and one is 
the same as what-is (τὸ ὂν) (244b). It is likely that this is a response to Gorgias’ arguments on namelessness of 
what-is. 
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Parmenides, we can see a similar but more careful examination by Parmenides following his 
pupil, Zeno’s ways (136a). Parmenides’ examination of ontology is composed of nine 
hypotheses beginning with the following two: (1) if it is one (137c4; εἰ ἕν ἐστιν); (2) if there 
is one (142b5; ἓν εἰ ἔστιν). Although a close analysis of all of Parmenides’ arguments on 
various antinomies is beyond the scope of this thesis, I would like to point out that 
Parmenides there does not suppose that there must be the one at all, rather examines what is 
called ‘one’ according to all hypotheses in various directions and with regard to all aspects, 
i.e. one or many; part and whole; beginning, middle and end; eternal or limited; its shape, 
such as straight or curved; everywhere or nowhere; at rest or in motion; generation and 
destruction; similar or dissimilar; bigger or smaller, younger or older, and so on. 
 
Parmenides’ first argument from the hypothesis ‘if it is one’, is in fact identical with Gorgias’ 
second demonstration which hypothesizes ‘if there is what-is and it is one ([73])’. In it 
Parmenides examines all the negative predications of the one; he says that it is not many, 
neither a part nor a whole, does not have any beginning, end or middle but is unlimited, 
without shape, neither straight nor curved, nowhere, neither at rest nor in motion, does not 
come to be, neither the same nor different from anything nor itself, neither bigger or smaller, 
neither younger or older, and finally concludes that it even is not one. Parmenides leads the 
conclusion that it is not one from the hypothesis that what is called ‘what-is’ is one, and says 
that it, therefore is not named, told, thought, understood nor perceived (Οὐδ' ὀνομάζεται ἄρα 
οὐδὲ λέγεται οὐδὲ δοξάζεται οὐδὲ γιγνώσκεται, οὐδέ τι τῶν ὄντων αὐτοῦ αἰσθάνεται: 142a4-
6). But, this is just the beginning of Parmenides’ examination. Parmenides next begins with 
the opposite hypothesis that the one is and in an opposite way, namely examining all positive 
predications of it, and the completely opposite conclusion is reached that it has a name and an 
account, and is named and said; and all such things which pertain to the other things also 
pertain to the one (Καὶ ὄνομα δὴ καὶ λόγος ἔστιν αὐτῷ, καὶ ὀνομάζεται καὶ λέγεται· καὶ 
ὅσαπερ καὶ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα τῶν τοιούτων τυγχάνει ὄντα, καὶ περὶ τὸ ἓν ἔστιν: 155d8-e2). At the 
end of the dialogue, Parmenides eventually concludes that “whether one is or is not, it and the 
others both are and are not, and both appear and do not appear all things in all ways, both in 
relation to themselves and in relation to each other (166c2-5)”.157 
 
                                                     
157
 Note how similar this comment is to the claim on which eristic argument is established (cf. chapter III). 
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This is rather a surprising conclusion in the context of Plato’s Parmenides, because, except 
for this dialogue, there is no evidence to show that Parmenides argues in such a way. 
According to another fragment, Parmenides explicitly maintains that names and thought were 
only applicable to what-is because it is the only thing that there is and that is the reason why 
only what-is is thought (KRS [299]: Fr. 8, 32-49, Simplicius in Phys. 146, 5).
158
 On the other 
hand, what-is-not should not be either called or thought. Parmenides pulls us back from what-
is-not as it is not the genuine way of inquiry:
159
 
 
It [what-is-not] never was nor will be, since it [what-is] is now, all together, one, continuous. For 
what birth will you seek for it? How and whence did it grow? I shall not allow you to say nor to 
think from not being (ἐκ μὴ ἐόντος), for it is not to be said nor thought that it is not; [...] But it 
has in fact decided, as is necessary, to leave the one way unthought and nameless (for it is no 
true way) (οὐ γὰρ ἀληθὴς ἔστιν ὁδός), but that the other is and is genuine. And how could what 
is (τὸ ἐόν) be in the future? How could it come to be? For if it came into being, it is not: nor is it 
if it is ever going to be in the future. Thus coming to be is extinguished and perishing unheard of 
(KRS [296]: Fr. 8, 5-21, Simplicius in Phys. 78, 5; 145, 5) (italics mine). 
 
Plato’s Parmenides may explain how Gorgias’ argument was born through those 
examinations of Zeno’s antinomies,160 and also that Plato takes the problem raised by Gorgias 
seriously (cf. chapter V-5). Gorgias, in his third demonstration that there is not both what is 
and what is not either, and concludes that there is nothing ([75-76]). Gorgias maintains that if 
there are both what-is and what-is-not, then, both are the same so far as being (or not-being) 
is concerned. But, since it is already proved that there is not what-is-not, and what-is has been 
shown to be the same as this. Again, Gorgias says, if there are both what-is and what-is-not, 
since they are not the same thing, it is not the case that there are both. If what-is is the same 
as what-is-not, since it follows that they are the same thing, it is not the case that there are 
both. Gorgias therefore maintains that it follows there is nothing (οὐδὲν ἔστιν) from his three 
demonstrations. Gorgias’ conclusion here is very confusing. It seems to me that if there are 
not both, there should be one of them, namely what-is, otherwise, there are both what-is and 
what-is-not in different ways, rather that there is nothing. 
                                                     
158
 “Therefore it is right that what-is (τὸ ἐὸν) should not be imperfect; […] The same thing is there to be thought 
and is why there is thought. For you will not find thinking without what-is (ἄνευ τοῦ ἐόντος), in all that has been 
said (*or in which thinking is expressed). For there neither is nor will be anything else besides what-is (τοῦ 
ἐόντος)”. 
159
 Cf. also KRS [293]. 
160
 Cf. KRS: 279; and Socrates’ comment on Zeno in the Phaedrus 261d: “his [Zeno’s] listeners will perceive 
the same things to be both similar and dissimilar, both one and many, both at rest and also in motion”. 
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Schiappa summarises three possible, traditional interpretations on Gorgias’ first argument 
that ‘there is nothing (οὐδὲν ἔστιν) in the existential sense, which he respectively calls the 
interpretation of (1) the radical nihilist, (2) the “pure being”, and (3) the object-of-inquiry 
(1997: 23). First, as Schiappa points out, when Gorgias’ argument is regarded as a parody, 
‘there is nothing’ tends to be understood as “a nihilistic denial of reality (Ibid. 24)”, namely 
there are absolutely no existing things anywhere (1). Second, Schiappa maintains that ‘there 
is nothing’ can also be read as nothing exists ‘metaphysically’. He provides an example that 
“I exist (Ibid. 24)”, and if something which really exists, i.e. what-is, should be 
unchangeable, perfect, and eternal as Parmenides claims, he could not make such a claim “I 
exist”, because he was born and will pass away. Therefore ‘there is nothing’ is capable of 
being interpreted as the denial of metaphysical existences, i.e. nothing metaphysically exists 
(2). Third, Schiappa suggests that ‘there is nothing’ can imply that there is nothing which is 
true or which is the case, and that it could means that nothing exists unconditionally. The 
difference between (2) and (3) is that while the former rejects any non-metaphysical 
existences (such as ‘I’), the latter accepts that everything exists conditionally (3). Lastly, 
Schiappa adds Kerferd’s “predicative” reading which regards that Gorgias means that there is 
no way in which the ontological verbs (e.g. be, exist) can be applied to any subjects without 
contradictions (Kerferd 1981: 96). Although Schiappa himself does not draw any conclusion 
thinking that “it is impossible to translate or describe Gorgias's arguments without imposing a 
particular interpretation (1997: 27)”, I am inclined to accept the forth line of reading which he 
last suggests. 
 
The paradox is, according to my interpretation, created by Gorgias to be capable of being 
argued both ways. The anonymous author criticizes Gorgias’ conclusion for two reasons by 
claiming that it does not follow at all that nothing exists (μηδὲν εἶναι) (979a34 –b19).161 
Firstly, even if there is not what-is-not, it does not mean that what-is-not is not in the same 
way as what-is is. The former could mean something that is not, while the latter actually is as 
well. So, it is possible that what-is-not is in the different way from that of what-is.
162
 
                                                     
161
 White notes that the Greek word for “nothing,” mēden, literally means something like “not even one” (mēde 
hen) in Cooper (1997: 258, n.9). 
162
 This is an identical position to that which Ctessipus tries to defend in the Euthydemus (cf. chapter III-2-2). 
Aristotle in the Rhetoric points out that this confusion is made use of in eristic arguments comparing them with 
dialectical arguments: “In dialectic, for instance, it may be argued that what-is-not is, on the ground that what-
is-not is what-is-not; or that the unknown can be known, on the ground that it can be known to be unknown… in 
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Secondly, even if Gorgias’ way of argument is valid, the anonymous author maintains, a 
completely opposite consequence is equally available, namely that there is everything. He 
says that, although it is strange to say that there is what-is-not, if there is both what-is and 
what-is-not, it does not necessarily follow that there is nothing. Rather, that there is 
everything no less than that there is nothing. I think that the latter is what Gorgias intends. As 
the anonymous author claims, Gorgias’ method certainly provides an alternative possible way 
of arguing the same object of knowledge against that of Parmenides’.163 I agree with Kerferd 
who points out that Gorgias is surely not concerned to deny the existence of what-is and 
what-is-not at all, but the consequence must be rather that “things exist in any case, whether 
they are τὸ μὴ ὄν or τὸ ὂν” (1955: 11). This follows that Gorgias’ first argument is not 
concerned with the ontology of what-is at all, but with the function of names as references to 
‘what-is’ (in Parmenidean terms) and the controversial usage of any predications for it. 
Whatever name and whatever predication you give it, there is no difference for the object so 
called. Gorgias points out the absurdity that different people name and predicate it in 
different ways however one likes. So for him, I think, it is equally reasonable not to name and 
not to predicate it at all: any expression or description can be abandoned, and just nothing 
remains instead, which can be said that there is ‘nothing’. 
 
 
 
3.   Denial of the Possibility of ‘Knowledge 
 
 
2.   Even if there is something, it cannot be known. 
 
In the second argument, Gorgias maintains that, since what is thought is what-is-not, even if 
there is something, this is inapprehensible for human beings (ἀνθρώπῳ). If this claim is 
compared with Parmenides’ claim which holds that what-is-not cannot be thought and only 
what-is is thought, it is clear that Gorgias turns upside-down Parmenidean argument. Gorgias 
says that because ‘a human flying’, ‘chariots speeding over the ocean’, and ‘Scylla and 
                                                                                                                                                                     
eristic, the imposture comes from not adding any clause specifying relationship or reference or manner; so here 
it arises because the probability in question is not general but specific (1402a4-17)”.  Cf. also Sophist 240c3-5. 
163
 My point here is not to claim that what Gorgias targets can be regarded as Parmenides’ own philosophical 
position, rather Parmenides was, I think, struggling with the same problem that his epistemological arguments 
embrace. The nature of Parmenidean epistemology requires further investigation, but it is beyond the scope of 
this thesis. 
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Chimaera’, which are obviously what-is-not, are thought of, it would be the case that what is 
thought is what-is-not; it is, Gorgias maintains, more reasonable than accepting that what is 
thought is what-is. Gorgias’ arguments result in the negative conclusion of the impossibility 
of true-thinking, namely all thoughts are of what-is-not, i.e. false: 
 
[77] Next it has to be shown that even if there is something, this is unknowable and 
inconceivable by human beings. For, says Gorgias, if things that are thought are not beings, what 
is is not thought. And reasonably so. For just as, if things that are thought had as an attribute that 
they are white, white things would also have as an attribute that they are thought, so if things 
that are thought have as an attribute that they are not beings, then necessarily beings will have as 
an attribute that they are not thought. [78] So the statement “if things that are thought are not 
beings, what is is not thought” is sound and preserves consistency. But (to anticipate) things that 
are thought are not beings… [79] For if things that are thought are beings, all things that are 
thought are, however anyone thinks them – which does not seem right. For it is not the case that 
if someone thinks of a human flying or chariots speeding over the ocean, a human is right away 
flying or chariots are speeding over the ocean. So it is not the case that things that are thought 
are beings. [80] In addition, if things that are thought are beings, non-beings will not be thought. 
For opposite things have opposite attribute, and what is not is opposite to what is; and for this 
reason, if being thought is an attribute of what is, not being thought will definitely be an attribute 
of what is not. But this is absurd; for Scylla and Chimaera and many non-beings are thought. 
Therefore it is not the case that what-is is thought. 
 
Plato’s Sophist is, I think, concerned with the same problem that is investigated by Gorgias, 
namely, what what-is-not should be, and attempts to solve it in a way similar to that used by 
the anonymous author of MXG.
164
 The Eleatic stranger with Theaetetus supposes a keen 
listener to their argument who wonders what the name ‘what-is-not (τὸ μὴ ὂν)’ should be 
applied to.
165
 The Eleatic stranger says that that which is called ‘what-is-not’ by sophists 
cannot in fact be called either ‘something (τὶ)’ or ‘it (αὐτὸ)’, maintains that it is unthinkable, 
unsayable, and unutterable (237c), and criticises sophists for regarding what-is-not as 
thinkable and sayable and having ended into aporia (εἰς ἄπορον) (239c6).166 The Eleatic 
                                                     
164
 Matthews points out, as I agree, that “in the Sophist, perplexities become a target of inquiry (1999: 103)”. 
165
 Cf. Sophist 237b-c: “But suppose one of our listeners weren’t debating or playing a game but had to think 
seriously and answer the following question: What should the name what is not (τὸ μὴ ὂν), be applied to?” The 
Eleatic stranger here could mean that this question should be answered if the questioner is not merely playing a 
game, which probably implies eristic sort of arguments using various antinomies to refute counterarguments 
(see also Sophist 234a). 
166
 One might wonder whether Gorgias can be thought same as whom the Eleatic stranger here regards as 
sophists, because Gorgias is clearly distinguished from them in the Gorgias as a rhetorician (465c, 482c6, d6), 
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stranger and Theaetetus agree that what-is-not is in fact one amongst many things that are (i.e. 
what-is) (258c2-3). Supposing that speaking and thinking are in some ways similar, the 
Sophist is also concerned with one of the eristic arguments, namely that every speaking is 
true and false-speaking is impossible,
167
 which is the opposite to Gorgias’ second argument. 
The Eleatic stranger addresses the question of false speaking, namely what it is to speak 
what-is-not. He presents two statements about Theaetetus, one is “Theaetetus sits” and the 
other “Theaetetus flies”, and maintains that, although both statements speak about what-is, 
viz. Theaetetus, the former is as he is but the latter not as he is (262e).
168
 
 
This confusion between what-is and what-is-not repeatedly appears in various ancient sources, 
and the origin of the confusion could have derived from Parmenides’ terminology. 169 
Parmenides’ fragments are, as Schofield (KRS: 251) and Schiappa (1997: 21) point out,170 
capable of both the ontological reading and the epistemological reading, and I agree with 
Schiappa who thinks that Parmenides’ central interest is more probably epistemological. But, 
the problem is that Parmenides appears to mix up epistemology and ontology in his 
terminology: his argument in a sense seems to be committed to the contradictory claims that 
everything which is thought is of what-is and what-is-not cannot be thought and false, but 
some thoughts are false while some are true. It is as a result capable of being understood 
(even if Parmenides himself does not intend) as accepting that what does not ‘actually’ exist 
or something false, e.g. a flying chariot or flying Theaetetus, also belong to what-is, and 
inevitably commits itself to the claim that all which are thought are of what-is, namely 
truth.
171
 On the contrary, Gorgias argues that, even if there is something, viz. what-is, it is 
outside of thought and speech, and a running horse for example belongs to what-is-not as 
well as a flying chariot does. Both Parmenides and Gorgias use those terms, what-is and 
what-is-not, as respectively equivalent to being and not-being, and also truth and falsehood. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
and I too certainly think that Plato distinguishes Gorgias from other sophists. I think that, although Gorgias 
argues in the similar way in which other sophists do on what-is-not, Gorgias possibly never commits himself to 
any specific argument as true or false. It is more likely that Gorgias is just capable to argue in both ways as a 
rhetorician for persuading people. Cf. also Notomi 1999: 45, n. 6. 
167
 In the Euthydemus, that false speaking is impossible is attributed to Protagoras and his followers (286c). Cf. 
chapter III-2-2. 
168
 Cf. also Owen 1999: 423-431 for a close analysis on the argument in the Sophist. 
169
 Cf. Notomi calls it “the self-contradictory nature of Parmenides’ position (1999: 177)”. 
170
 See p. 79. 
171
 Cf. MXG 980a9-12 for the same criticism by the anonymous author. One might still think that Gorgias is 
simply wrong, because imaging Chimera is different from believing that there is really a Chimera. However, the 
problem is, if there is only what-is, and what-is is the only thing which we can think of (as Eleatics may 
maintain), how can we say it more reasonable to think that there is what-is than to think there is a Chimera, if 
both what-is and Chimera belong to the same epistemic realm which we can think of. 
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Thus, the Eleatic stranger in the Sophist suggests the alternative solution of admitting that it, 
whatever it is, embraces both truth (what-is) and falsehood (what-is-not) in it, claiming that 
“in order to defend ourselves we’re going to have to subject father Parmenides’ saying to 
further examination, and insists by brute force both that what is not somehow is, and then 
again that what is somehow is not (241d5-7)”.172  
 
However, more importantly, this is not merely an issue over terminology. The genuine 
problem is that if there is both what-is and what-is-not in our epistemological realm as the 
Eleatic stranger suggests, what is the criterion to judge the truth and falsehood for human 
beings? Intellect, sense perception, both of them, or neither of them? Parmenides is said to 
have committed himself to a doctrine of what-is as accessible and known only through human 
intellect, but not through perception: he maintains that if you inquire through your sense 
perceptions, habits and experiences you will be brought to the false way of inquiry into what-
is-not.
173
 But, even if one relies on either or both of them, isn’t there still a possibility that 
one may make mistakes in thinking or in his inquiry into what-is? How can we distinguish 
only what-is accurately from what-is-not, if they both are in some ways? The first thinker 
who realized the seriousness of the problem in Parmenidean epistemology is probably 
Empedocles. He, unlike Parmenides, clearly pays attention to the limitation and uncertainty 
of human intellect. Empedocles reflected, according to Sextus, “on the fact that the truth is 
not completely ungraspable, but is graspable as far as human reason reaches (M. I. [124])”. 
Schofield also maintain that although Empedocles bewails the limited understanding of the 
things that most men achieve, “he promises that an intelligent use of all the sensory evidence 
available to mortals, aided by his own instruction, will (contrary to Parmenides’ claim) make 
each thing clear to us” (KRS: 285).174 It is likely that Gorgias is also concerned with this 
same epistemological problem.
175
 
 
                                                     
172
 The Eleatic stranger is, however, still committed to a ‘holistic’ view of knowledge while attempting to solve 
the problem by distinguishing the ontological and epistemological terminology. Cf. Sophist 257c: He says 
“Knowledge is a single thing, too, I suppose. But each part of it that has to do with something is marked off and 
has a name peculiar to itself. That’s why there are said to be many expertises and many kinds of knowledge”. 
173
 KRS [294]: Parmenides: Fr. 7, Plato Sophist 242a (lines 1-2); Sextus M. VII, 114 (lines 2-6). 
174
 Cf. also KRS [342]: Empedocles: Fr. 2, Sextus M. VII, 123: “… who, then, boasts that he has found the 
whole? Not so are these things to be seen or heard by men, or grasped by the understanding. You then, since you 
have turned aside to this place, shall learn: no further can mortal with reach”. However, in another fragment, 
Empedocles also maintains that it will be revealed if you use intellect to understand what is perceived (cf. KRS 
[343]: Empedocles: Fr. 3, line 9, Sextus M. VII, 125.), and Empedocles’ epistemology eventually embraces 
some ambiguities and contradictions. Cf. also KRS [396]. 
175
 Fundamentally, this epistemological paradox is derived from the metaphysical problem that derived from the 
Eleatics, although I do not expand the argument further on that aspect in this thesis. 
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Gorgias’ intellect is said by Sextus to deny both the senses and the intellect (PH. II. [64]). 
Gorgias indeed rejects not only intellect but also sense perception as the criterion of truth 
with a unique theory.
176
 He maintains that because we see visible things by sight, and hear 
audible things by hearing, it is the same for thinking; thinkable things are grasped by thinking. 
But, it is certain, according to Gorgias, that what is perceptible is not what-is, so what-is is 
not apprehensible through sense perception either. 
 
[81] …things that are seen are called visible for this reason – because they are seen – and 
audible things are called audible for this reason – because they are heard. We do not reject 
visible things because they are not heard, or put aside audible things because they are not seen; 
each one ought to be judged by its own sense, not by another. In just the same way, things that 
are thought will be, even if they are not seen by sight or heard by hearing, because they are 
grasped by means of their own criterion. [82] So if someone thinks of chariots speeding over the 
ocean, even if he does not see them, he ought to believe that there are chariots speeding over the 
ocean. But this is absurd; therefore it is not the case that what-is is thought and apprehended (my 
italics). 
 
This part at the same time reveals the views of sense perception as criteria for each. There are 
respectively different criteria, Gorgias says, by which to judge each object. So, the visible is 
judged by sight, and sound by hearing.
177
 However, if what is thought is not what-is, how is it 
                                                     
176
 An alternative view is found in Kerferd (1981: 71-72): “Parmenides himself however had no followers 
among the sophists when he wished to deny the reality of the phenomenal world”, but this view is probably too 
narrow to think that all sophists are committed to the doctrine which regards sense perception as the criterion of 
the truth. 
177
 In the practice of stating what shape and colour respectively are in the Meno (75a-76e), Socrates asks 
whether Meno says that there are effluvia of things following Empedocles’ and Gorgias’ manner, and whether 
there are also channels through which the effluvia make their way. After Meno strongly agrees, Socrates states 
that colour is an effluvium from shapes which fits sight and is perceived (76d4-5). It is likely that Gorgias uses 
the Empedoclean theory of sense perception for his argument (see KRS [391]: Empedocles; Theophrastus de 
sensu 7 (DK31A86)), and Socrates there alludes to Gorgias’ argument on sense perception as well as that on the 
impossibility of knowledge. Before stating what colour is, Socrates says that he will gratify Meno by following 
Gorgias (76c2-5) (see Gorgias 462d, for Socrates’ view on ‘rhetoric’ as one of arts of ‘flattery’). Although 
Charles thinks that this is the very answer which Socrates attempts to give of the essence of colour (2010: 126), 
rather, I think, this answer can be committed to Gorgias’ epistemological negative dogmatism (cf. also Sedley 
2011: xiv). The second example that shape is the limit of solid (στερεοῦ πέρας σχῆμα εἶναι. 76a7) also embraces 
the problem which is found the Parmenidean cosmology. Socrates firstly confirms that Meno calls something 
‘end (τελευτή)’ as ‘a thing as a limit (πέρας) or boundary (ἔσχατος)’, and that there is something which is called 
‘finished’ or ‘completed’. Socrates then states that shape is the limit of solid. However, Socrates is apprehensive 
about the correct usage of words considering the fact that Prodicus would disagree with them (75e). There is a 
Parmenidean fragment which explains why this second answer is problematic: “But since there is a furthest limit 
(περαῖς πύματον), it is perfected (τετελεσμένον), like the bulk of a ball well-rounded on every side, equally 
balanced in every direction from the centre. […] for being equal to itself on every side, it lies uniformly within 
its limits (περαῖσι) (KRS [299]: Fr. 8, 32-49, Simplicius in Phys. 146, 5) (cf. also KRS [298]). Limit and centre 
are something which are denied by Gorgias (M. I. [69]; MXG 979b22), and also the Eleatic stranger discusses 
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possible that what is seen and what is heard are what-is? The anonymous author analyses this 
as follows: “if just as what we see is not the more because we see it, so also what we think is 
not the more for that… so that even things are, they would be unknowable by us (980a15-
19)”. In other words, there are perceived and thought things because they are perceivable and 
thinkable by us. One might think this an identical view to Plato’s Protagoras’ relativistic 
philosophy which regards those perceived things as true for the perceiving person (cf. 
Theaetetus 151e ff.).
178
 However, Gorgias does not regard such perceived things as true for 
anyone, and despite the fact that it is based upon a similar theory of sense perception, Gorgias 
rejects its credibility as the criterion of truth. Therefore, for Gorgias, neither sense perception 
nor intellect is the criterion of truth, but merely the criteria for each respective kind of 
cognizable thing.
179
 
 
Gorgias, therefore, denies intellect as that which judges perceived things as well as sense 
perception as that which judges thoughts.
180
 One might think that Gorgias entirely 
undermines both perceptible and intelligible things. However, this is probably wrong, 
because Gorgias does accept each correspondence between visible things and seen things, 
audible things and heard things, thinkable things and thought things. Thus, the more plausible 
interpretation is, I think, that Gorgias merely accepts that the external objects are not 
completely identical with either perceived or thought things, and for this reason, it is 
impossible for human beings to apprehend the truth of the objects (i.e. reality) by either 
thought or perceptions as they are, but they can be understood only as they are seen, heard 
and thought. The senses and intellect could somehow be related to the truth of reality. But, 
since this exists outside of both human intellect and sense perception, there is an unfilled gap 
between one belonging to the external world (external to both intellect and sense) and human 
intellect and sense which attempt to apprehend it. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
this same fragment in the Sophist against Parmenides. He maintains that if what-is (τὸ ὂν) has, as Parmenides 
says, a middle and extremities, it would also have parts, and this is not reasonable (244d-245a). Thus, I am 
inclined to think that the practice exemplified in the Meno is, contrary to traditional interpretations which regard 
it as the practice of ‘definition’, rather related to problems taken over from Presocratics. 
178
 Cf. Robinson 1973: 50. 
179
 An alternative interpretation is Kerferd (1955: 16): “What he [Gorgias] was concerned with was the status of 
phenomena”. However, it seems to me that Gorgias, unlike Heraclitus, does not say anything about the object of 
perception as ‘phenomena’, rather clearly focuses on the mechanism of perception. 
180
 This might be something which Socrates rejects in the Theaetetus. Socrates says “it would be very strange 
thing, I must say, if there were a number of perceptions sitting inside us as if we were Wooden Horses, and there 
were not some single form, soul or whatever one ought to call it, to which all these converge – something with 
which, through those things, as if they were instruments, we perceive all that is perceptible (184d1-5)”. 
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4.   The Impossibility of Making Someone Know 
 
 
3.   Even if it is knowable, it cannot be shown to others. 
 
Gorgias’ third argument maintains that even if there is something, and it is apprehensible, it is 
not communicable to other people. It outwardly sounds as if he is arguing for the 
impossibility of communication between people.
181
 But the reasons given by Gorgias are not 
so simple:  
 
[83] And even if it were apprehensible, it is not expressible to someone else. For if beings are 
visible and audible and generally perceptible things, which exist externally (ἅπερ ἐκτὸς 
ὑπόκειται) and the visible ones are apprehended by sight and the audible ones by hearing and not 
vice versa, then how is it possible for these things to be communicated to someone else? [84] 
For what we communicate with is speech (logos), but speech is not the existing beings (τὰ 
ὑποκείμενα καὶ ὄντα); therefore it is not the beings that we communicate to our neighbours, but 
speech, which is different from the existing things. Just as the visible, then, could not become 
audible, and conversely, so what is, since it exists, externally (ἐπεὶ ὑπόκειται τὸ ὂν ἐκτός), could 
not become our speech. [85] And if it is not speech it cannot be disclosed to someone else. 
Again, speech, he says, is constituted from the external objects (ἀπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν 
προσπιπτόντων) that strike us – that is, from perceptible things. For from the occurrence of 
flavour there is born in us the speech uttered concerning this quality, and from the impact of 
color that concerning color. And if this is so, it is not that speech is indicative of the external 
thing; rather, the external thing becomes revelatory of speech (italics mine). 
 
Here, Gorgias firstly regards beings (τὰ ὄντα) as existing externally ([83]), secondly 
differentiates ‘logos’ from those existing things ([84]), and then claims that ‘logos’ 
communicated to someone else does not produce the same thing in his mind as that which the 
speaker knows (if it is known by the speaker).
182
 Gaines maintains that “in the third argument, 
Gorgias does not talk about the impossibility of communication but is concerned with the 
question of “whether representations derived from discourse are identical to perception of 
external existents (1997: 9)”, because “discourse does not provide immediate perception (Ibid. 
7)”. The reason why Gaines thinks that the third part is concerned with the relation between 
                                                     
181
 Cf. Wardy 1996: 14. 
182
 Cf. also MXG 980b16-17. 
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perception and discourse is that he gives more weight to the argument of XMG, judging that 
the source for the anonymous author is more reliable on the basis of the terminology (Ibid. 
3).
183
 The passage runs as follows: 
 
But even if they are knowable by us, how, he [Gorgias] asks, could any one indicate them to 
another? For, how, he says, could any one communicate by word of mouth that which he has 
seen? And how could that which has been seen be indicated to a listener if he has not seen it?  
For just as the sight does not recognize sounds, so the hearing does not hear colours but sounds; 
and he who speaks, speaks, but does not speak a colour or a thing. When, therefore one has not a 
thing in mind, how will he get it there from another person by word or any other token of the 
thing except by seeing it, if it is a colour, or hearing it, if it is a noise? For he who speaks does 
not speak a noise at all, or a colour, but word; and so it is not possible to think a colour, but only 
to see it, nor a noise, but only to hear it. But even if it is possible to know things, and to express 
whatever one knows in words, yet how can the hearer have in his mind the same thing as the 
speaker? For the same thing cannot be present simultaneously in several separate people; for in 
that case the one would be two. 
 
But if, he argues, the same thing could be present in several persons, there is no reason why it 
should not appear dissimilar to them, if they are not themselves entirely similar and are not in 
the same place; for if they were in the same place they would be one and not two. But it appears 
that the objects which even one and the same man perceives at the same moment are not all 
similar, but he perceives different things by hearing and by sight, and differently now and on 
some former occasion; and so a man can scarcely perceive the same thing as someone else 
(980a20-b17). 
 
Gaines thinks that Gorgias here focuses on the gap between the speaker’s perception and 
what the hearer understands from his discourse. However, this interpretation is, I think, 
slightly controversial, because firstly it does not fit even the second paragraph above as he 
thinks that it talks about perception. The first argument is identical to the argument in M.: 
even if it is possible to know things, and to express whatever one knows in words, Gorgias 
says, it is not possible for the hearer to have the same thing in his mind as the speaker. So, 
Gorgias obviously presupposes such a situation in which the speaker expresses precisely 
                                                     
183
 Gaines mainly points out that while the anonymous author uses ‘δηλόω’ which is consonant with the 
vocabulary of Gorgias's day, Sextus uses the adjective ἀνέξοιστος whose earliest use is found in the second 
century A.D. (cf. pp. 81-82), and I accept the reasons which lead him to think that MXG is more reliable. 
However, even if this is the case, it is not certain that the third part is concerned with the relation between 
discourse and perception. 
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whatever he knew through his perception. Now the perceived thing is for the hearer the 
words (logos) from the speaker, rather than the original objects perceived by the speaker, and 
the hearer hears the words but does not see a colour or a thing. What is said impossible by 
Gorgias here is, more precisely, for the hearer to acquire the same thing (even if it is possible 
for the speaker to express the object as it is in words), because if such a thing were possible, 
surely the speaker and the hearer must be one but not two. Thus, the part explains the 
difference between the words (as spoken by the speaker and apprehended by the hearer) and 
the thing which the hearer has in his mind.
184
 It, I think, means that if they are different 
persons, it will hardly be possible that the hearer has the same thing as the speaker. The 
sentence which can be read to mention the relation between the perception of the speaker and 
his words seems to me only the second sentence which certainly maintains that it is 
impossible for anyone to communicate what he has seen by word of mouth. The second 
paragraph certainly says a different thing. However, the point is, I think, the same. Even if the 
same thing could be present in a different person, how would it appear to one as it appears to 
the other? Any perceived thing appears to different persons (or even to the same person) in 
different ways, even when they are together and experience the same thing at the same time. 
So, Gorgias concludes that it is scarcely possible that the expressed words are present in 
entirely the same way in the hearer even if it is possible for the speaker to know and express 
the external objects. 
 
Moreover, Gaines’ interpretation contradicts the last sentence in the Sextus’ passage ([85]) in 
which Gorgias is said to reject the general view which holds that ‘logos’ is the representation 
of the objects, but conversely claims that the logos is generated from the external object and 
the spoken logos again produces something different from what is apprehended by the 
speaker, and then the hearer will receive something different from what the logos expresses. 
Gorgias points out the difference between the logos (even if it is expressed by the knowing 
speaker) and what it can put in another person’s mind. That means, as Gaines himself also 
maintains (1997: 4), that even if the speaker knows something he cannot put the same 
knowledge into someone else by means of words. In other words, the hearer cannot know 
what is known by the speaker. Indeed, the most impressive element in [85] is how much 
                                                     
184
 Hay points out the interesting connection between Gorgias’ argument and a parody of Euripides asking 
Mnesilochus whether he has heard everything which you will presently see in person (1990: 333), which is 
concerned with the same question of how you can know whom you will see by hearing about him when sight is 
a different thing from sounds. 
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Gorgias emphasizes that the things externally exist from each other and the gaps between one 
and other’s truth.185 Thus, Gorgias, according to Sextus, concludes: 
 
[86] … For, he says, even if speech exists, it differs, however, from the rest of the things that 
exist, and visible bodies differ the most from words; for the visible is graspable through one 
organ and speech through another. Therefore speech does not indicate the majority of existing 
things, just as they do not disclose each other’s nature. 
 
To summarise my interpretation of Gorgias’ three arguments, I suggest that those three 
arguments are concerned with epistemology. He firstly maintains that if something (e.g. 
what-is) is, it follows that there is nothing, because if what-is is the only thing which exists 
and is real, it make no difference to argue in the opposite way, namely there is nothing. 
Secondly even if there is something, it is not known by human beings, because it is, as 
existing externally, not graspable as it is either through the intellect or through the senses. 
Thirdly, even if it is knowable, you cannot simply make someone else know it. As words 
logoi is not the thing, even if the logoi could precisely express it, it could scarcely produce 
the same thing in the hearer as that which the speaker has in his mind. And, even if the hearer 
could have the same thing, it cannot appear to him as it appears to the speaker. Therefore, one 
cannot simply learn what is known by the speaker through words. One might feel how 
pessimistic Gorgias is about the relation between what-is, intellect, sense perception, and 
language. It is in fact not entirely clear whether Gorgias himself considers that the gaps are so 
huge as to prevent understanding between people, and whether for this reason Gorgias and 
his followers fell into desperation and used arguments in merely eristic ways. However, 
whether Gorgias commits himself to these arguments or not, it can be imagined that such 
people (including Gorgias) abandon their arguments as tools to refer to the truth of ‘reality’, 
and think that they are in any case speaking only for apparent persuasions. Certainly such 
arguments, standing independently and losing any relation with intellect, perception, and 
reality, may have been used merely for the purpose of refuting other arguments.
186
 
 
 
                                                     
185
 Although these terms expressing ‘external’ existences might be closely connected to Sextus’ own 
interpretation, I do not think there is any serious problem especially in Sextus’ text, because the anonymous 
author’s interpretation also focuses on the acquisition of the external objects through perception. 
186
 Gorgias’ genuine aim of his art of rhetoric requires further investigations also with carefully looking into his 
other fragments, which is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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5.   The Paradox Again 
 
 
1.   The passage 80d5-e5 again. 
 
At the end, let us again return to the passage 81d5-e5 in the Meno and see how it exactly 
related to Socrates’ positive dogmatism ([P]) and Gorgias’ negative dogmatism ([N]) on the 
possibility of knowledge. Each position respectively claims: 
 
 [P] Everyone can know the truth of reality because it is the possession of our immortal 
souls. 
[N] No one can know the truth of reality either through intellect or through sense 
perception because it exists externally to us. 
 
Both of them are concerned with the possibility or impossibility for human beings to know 
the truth of reality, and in fact with the question of where the objects of knowledge are 
situated: in the former case inside ourselves, in the latter outside of our intellectual realm. 
Assuming that there are such ‘the truth of reality’, two equally valid positions create an 
antinomy. Then, these two sides of the argument bring about an eristic argument about the 
impossibility of coming to know it either by inquiry, by learning or by accident: 
 
[P’] Everyone knows the truth of reality. 
[N’] No one knows the truth of reality. 
 
Socrates’ epistemological positive dogmatism is initially committed to the claim that 
everyone already possesses the truth of reality within us and that there is no need for anyone 
to inquire into/learn it. On the other hand, the epistemological negative dogmatism is 
committed to the claim that no one knows what the truth of reality is at all, because it 
originally is not within us, so no one knows how to begin the inquiry into it and, even when it 
is present in front of us, no one can recognizes it. Anyway, whichever you choose, there is no 
possibility for you to transit from the state of ignorance to knowing. If you already know, you 
are always knowing, while if you do not know, you were and will never knowing. Thus, the 
eristic argument says: 
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[E] It is impossible for anyone to coming to know (inquire into/learn) either what 
everyone knows or what no one knows. 
 
I think that Socrates’ epistemological positive dogmatism and Gorgias’ epistemological 
negative dogmatism well fit the two horns of our reformulated version of Socrates’ 
restatement (cf. chapter III-4): 
 
 [S’] It is not possible for anyone to inquire into either what everyone knows or what no 
one knows. 
[S1’] No one will inquire into what everyone knows, since everyone knows it and there is 
no need for anyone to inquire. 
[S2’] No one will inquire into what no one knows, since no one even knows what they are 
going to inquire into.
 
 
 
This view which [S2’] suggests is, as we have seen, identical to Gorgias’ view on the truth of 
reality, and is certainly the [Y] version of epistemological negative dogmatism (cf. 51): there 
is the thing which people call ‘what-is’ or ‘reality’, but no one knows what it is. Therefore, it 
is hardly ever possible for anyone to inquire into and discover it. This is, I think, different 
from the [Z] version, an ontological question in which we even do not know even the 
existence of the objects of knowledge.
187
 On the other hand, Socrates responds to it that the 
truth of reality is in the scope of what is intelligible and perceptible, namely in our soul’s 
epistemological realm.
188
 So it must be possible for us to inquire into it and discover it.  
 
Although there is still a concern that there could be something which we cannot reach, 
existing beyond our intellectual capacity, Socrates tells us not to worry, because our soul is 
immortal, and it has already learned everything about the truth of reality, and there is nothing 
outside of that realm. The immortality of the soul presented by Socrates guarantees the 
possibility of knowledge. But, the next problem emerges: if the soul has already known the 
                                                     
187
 There might be a possibility that the [Z] version also can be applied to Gorgias’ first argument. However, it is 
not clear whether Gorgias is also concerned with the ontological status of the objects of knowledge in the first 
argument. On the other hand, in the second argument, Gorgias explicitly hypothesizes that there is something, I 
think that we can see more clearly that Gorgias there has the [Y] version of epistemology in mind. 
188
 One might still think that Plato does not think that there is any truth in perceptible things. However, as I 
argued above, there is no evidence that Plato regards the truth in this way in the Meno. Although I do not deny 
that some dialogues hold such a position, I suspect that it is all of Platonic philosophy. Again, although Sextus 
also regards Plato as having considered that only intelligible things are true (M. II. [4]), he at the same time 
accepts that Plato is both dogmatic and aporetic (PH. I. [221]). Cf. also PH. I. [7]. 
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truth of reality, how is it possible for us to inquire into what has been already known? 
Socrates again replies that inquiry and learning are in fact recollection of what the soul has 
already known. So, since we have not yet recollected, we have to recollect what the soul 
knows, thus inquiry and discovery are possible through recollection. 
 
 
2.   The paradox: a cause of the state of aporia or a condition of inquiry. 
 
One might think that the problem is after all not resolved at all. Calvert may be one of those 
who would think so. He points out that both Meno’s argument and Socrates’ response are 
committed to a same problematic ‘logical error’ which goes back to Parmenides (1979: 
144).
189
 Two senses of knowing presented in Socrates’ response, as opposite to that in 
Gorgias’ epistemological negative dogmatism, eventually fall on the knowing side of the 
dichotomy, namely not-yet-recollecting and recollecting, and neither Socrates’ nor Gorgias’ 
position allows in any case the movement from ignorance to knowing, which is generally 
considered to be the very process of ‘knowing’. Why won’t we still question; “if it is the 
case, doesn’t it mean that it is, anyway, impossible for us to newly know something which 
the soul has not yet known, and to move from the state of ignorance to knowing about the 
new things rather than what the soul has already known?” or, “what is the evidence that there 
won’t be anything else which the soul has not yet learned throughout the whole future, if 
learning is merely recollection?” Both the only way to answer the paradox, i.e. by exposing 
the sharp dichotomy between knowing and not-knowing, and the original cause of the 
paradox that both Socrates’ and Gorgias’ arguments assume, namely, the Eleatic ‘truth of 
reality’ are left untouched by Plato in the Meno. 
 
What I am hesitant to give a conclusive answer in this thesis is whether Plato considers the 
underlying paradox which I have suggested a specific issue which causes the state of 
aporia.
190
 Since there are, as we have seen at chapter IV-5-11, no dogmatic assumptions in 
                                                     
189
 An alternative interpretation is offered by Ionescu, who thinks that the paradox is concerned with the conflict 
between the Sophistic atomistic view of knowledge and the Socratic holistic view of knowledge (2007: 40). 
190
 Cf. Aristotle clarifies ‘aporēma’ as such an issue as is the cause of the state of ‘aporia’ in the Topics. He 
defines aporēma as “a deduction that reasons dialectically to a contradiction (συλλογισμὸς διαλεκτικὸς 
ἀντιφάσεως) (162a17-18)”, and also maintains that “it is when we reflect on both sides of a question and find 
everything alike to be in keeping with either course that we are perplexed (aporia) which of the two we are to do 
(145b16-20)”.  The underlying paradox which I have suggested in the thesis may be something which Sextus 
might maintain as one of the difficulties which indicate that we should suspend judgement. He maintains that “if 
they say that we will judge the senses and the intellect with intellect and the senses, so that things are judged 
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Socrates’ conclusion about his own epistemological positive suggestion, it is certain that the 
Meno is not completely dogmatic. However, we can also see that Socrates regards the state of 
aporia as the beginning of inquiry, rather than the consequence (chapter IV-4-7), and when 
Socrates suggests that he and Meno find what virtue is together since they are of one mind 
(ὁμονοοῦμεν) that they should inquire into what they do not know (86b-c), Socrates appears 
to be committed to the positive dogmatism on the possibility of knowledge. While it is, as we 
have seen, likely that Socrates sees the underlying paradox on the possibility of knowledge, 
he chooses to commit himself to the positive view. The genuine question is, I think, rather 
than whether Socrates sees the underlying paradox or not; “Why does Plato here let his 
Socrates take a positive position on the possibility of knowledge?” and “what does Plato 
think about the real cause of the paradox?” 
 
There have been some discussions over Socrates’ aporiai. Politis, for example, argues that 
Plato already in the early dialogues uses ‘aporia’ not only in the meaning of a state but also 
of ‘a matter of perplexity’ (2006). Politis maintains there are two kinds of aporia: e.g. in the 
Laches and Euthyphro, ‘aporia’ expresses the interlocutors’ state of speechlessness faced 
with the Socratic demand for ‘definitions’, and the interlocutors think that Socrates is the one 
who is responsible for their victimized state (Ibid. 96). On the other hand, we can also see 
some puzzles which leave Socrates himself at a loss. For example, in the Apology, Socrates 
says that the oracle declaring that Socrates is the wisest puts him into perplexity (21b7-9), 
and in the Protagoras, Socrates explicitly says that the question of whether virtue can be 
taught is something which gives him ‘aporia’ (320b4-c1). Moreover, in the Charmides, 
Socrates even tells Critias how he is in aporia over the puzzle of whether it is possible to 
know that one knows and does not know what he knows and does not know (167b6-8). 
Politus, though he does not mention the paradox which I suggest, thinks that the Meno is the 
dialogue which includes both of these two kinds of aporia. Socrates says that he is indeed no 
less perplexed than Meno about what virtue is, and claims that the state of aporia, as 
                                                                                                                                                                     
with some of those and not with others they take for granted what is under investigation (τὸ ζητούμενον 
συναρπάζουσιν); for we are still investigating whether anyone can judge through these (PH. II. [65], italics 
mine)”. According to Sextus, we cannot yet determine anything about the criterion of truth (PH. II. [79]: Cf. 
also PH. I. [140]). For him, Gorgias’ negative claim on the possibility of knowledge about the truth of the 
external existing things cannot be considered the same as scepticism, but rather in a negative way. Thus, Sextus 
suspends the judgement because “we cannot say anything about the nature of external existing objects (PH. I. 
[128], italics mine)”. Sextus, therefore, says that “I determine nothing” meaning “I now feel in such a way as 
neither to posit dogmatically nor to reject any of the things falling under this investigation (ὑπὸ τὴν ζήτησιν) 
(PH. I. [197], italics mine). Cf. also Meno 79d3: Socrates forbids a sort of answers “under investigation (τὴν διὰ 
τῶν ἔτι ζητουμένων) (79d3)”, and note how Sextus’ terminology is Socratic. 
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demonstrated in the slave’s geometrical demonstration, is the start of inquiry. Also in the 
Theaetetus, aporia is, as presented in Socratic midwifery, an active and productive 
intellectual state (148e). 
 
Matthews objects to the view that regards the paradox in the passage 80d5-e5 as a paradox 
for Socrates: in so far as the paradox of inquiry in the Meno is concerned, Socrates obviously 
assumes that inquiry is possible and calls the denial an ‘eristic argument’ (1999: 100-101).191 
He argues that the state of Socrates in the Meno is obviously distinct from that in the 
Theaetetus in which Socrates reveals his self-consciousness of always falling into aporia over 
the question in what way false judgement is possible.
192
 Socrates there explains the matter as 
something which has often bothered him and which gets him into great aporia (187d). The 
point is that Socrates, in the Meno at least, does not accept that the argument at the passage 
80d5-e5 causes in him a state of aporia. Although Matthews’ argument is convincing, I 
wonder whether calling the argument ‘eristic’ and not saying that he is in aporia over the 
matter is a sufficient reason to decide that Socrates thinks that the argument does not holds 
any problems. 
 
I myself see an interesting correspondence with Plato’s Parmenides. I agree with Hay that 
Plato makes Parmenides mention Gorgias’ argument with his own mouth (1990: 335-336).193 
Since Socrates claims that forms of what-is exist separate from human beings, and belong in 
God’s realm, Parmenides says that if forms are such, there must be many difficulties and the 
main one is as follows (133a-e): 
 
“[S]uppose someone were to say that if the forms are such as we claim they must be, they cannot 
even be known. If anyone should raise that objection, you wouldn’t be able to show him that he 
is wrong, unless the objector happened to be widely experienced and not ungifted, and consented 
to pay attention while in your effort to show him you dealt with many distant considerations. 
                                                     
191
 Matthews also regards the paradox as the impossibility of inquiry. Cf. also Matthews 1999: 30. 
192
 Socrates says that, since everything is either a thing we know or a thing we don’t know, there appears to him 
to be no space for false judgement (Theaetetus 188c). 
193
 Hay however does not notice that amongst two arguments raised by Parmenides only the latter could be 
Gorgianic: Parmenides says “[T]he forms inevitably involve these objections and a host of others besides – if 
there are those characters for things, and a person is to mark off each form as ‘something itself.’ As a result, 
whoever hears about them is doubtful and objects that they do not exist, and that, even if they do, they must by 
strict necessity be unknowable to human nature; and in saying this he seems to have a point; and, as we said, he 
is extraordinarily hard to win over (135a)”. Cf. also Kerferd 1955: 3; Matthews 1999: 84.  
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Otherwise, the person who insists that they are necessarily unknowable would remain 
unconvinced (133b-c)”. 
 
Socrates is hesitant to decide what the forms are and where they exist, i.e. whether they are a 
thought (νόημα) in our mind (ψυχή), or things outside our intellectual realm (132b ff.). 
Parmenides warns Socrates that if the forms exist separately from us when someone says that 
they are unknowable it will be difficult to convince him. In other words, if the forms are not 
our possession, it is likely that someone will object to the possibility of human beings 
knowing them, and it will be immensely difficult to convince him. 
 
Parmenides here also points out, that if the person who realizes these difficulties 
accompanying the forms, completely denies their existence, and does not allow that the forms 
appear anywhere, he would be again at a loss without knowing which way to head. Moreover, 
such a person would also destroy the power of dialectic.
194
 Socrates accepts these problems 
as something which he has already been aware of (134e-c2). Parmenides here implies that if 
one completely rejects the notion that there are forms, in any perceiving, thinking, or 
speaking, it would at the same time destroy any intellectual discourse and understanding of 
each of human beings, i.e. the power of dialectic. In the Gorgias, Socrates tells Callicles, one 
of the most stubborn interlocutors in Platonic dialogues, “if human beings didn’t share 
common experiences (πάθος), some sharing one, other shared by others, it would not be easy 
for him to communicate what he experiences to the other. I say this because I realize that you 
and I are both now actually sharing a common experience (481c5-d2)”, which is, I think, 
exactly a response to Gorgias’ third argument on the impossibility of people’s having the 
same thing in their mind through words.
195
 Socrates’ words seem to mean that if one admits 
that there are not such things as, e.g. what the truth is, what reality is, and what virtue is 
shared by all of us, and all together abandon them, we will never reach solid agreement 
                                                     
194
 It is likely that Gorgias inquired into contradictions and paradoxes (antinomies), in such a way that his art of 
rhetoric was capable of arguing either sides of the same matter with equally valid consequences. In the Phaedo, 
Socrates talks about those people who investigate contradictions (90b-c). Socrates says that such people, as a 
result of spending time in the study of contradictions, come to hate any argument and are deprived of truth and 
knowledge of reality. So, Socrates suggests, conversely, that they try to believe that it is they who are not sound, 
but not the arguments, and take courage and be eager to attain soundness, rather than criticizing the fact that no 
argument is ultimately sound (90d-e). What happens in the Phaedo is that Socrates overturns the perspectives 
from maintaining that there is a problem in logoi as solid references of the truth, to regarding it as their lack of 
knowing what is true. So, the issue is not in logoi, but in them, who do not know how to use the arguments. Cf. 
also Sophist 259e: “To dissociate each thing from everything else is to destroy totally everything there is to say. 
The weaving together of forms is what makes speech possible for us”. 
195
 Socrates here also maintains that “our [Socrates and Callicles’] mutual agreement will really lay hold of truth 
in the end (487e)”. 
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through discourse or any consistency in our practices, and consequently ‘dialectic’ is 
pointless. The point is that the Socratic method of dialectic is the very response to Gorgias’ 
art of rhetoric: in the Meno, there is an underlying concern over logos as a means of 
philosophical inquiry, namely the difference between Gorgias’ rhetoric and Socratic dialectic, 
and Plato’s project should be examined in a broader perspective beyond any individual 
dialogue.  
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VI.   Conclusion 
 
 
 
To summarise my three main suggestions over the interpretation of the passage 80d5-e5 in 
the Meno, firstly, Socrates’ evaluation of Meno’s question as ‘an eristic argument’ has a two-
fold meaning. (1) it is eristic because Meno makes use of the horn of the ready-made eristic 
argument that one cannot inquire into either what he knows or what he does not know in 
order to attack Socrates’ two controversial claims that he does not know what virtue is at all 
and wants to inquire into it. Meno uses the counterargument by picking up Socrates’ words 
literally without taking into account whether Socrates really does not ‘know’ at all or what 
Socrates means when he claims not to ‘know’ what it is at all. On the other hand, (2) Meno’s 
question is eristic also in a deeper sense, because the argument originates with Gorgias’ 
epistemological negative dogmatism which is committed to the claim that it is impossible for 
human beings to come to know the truth of reality. Socrates detects this deeper 
counterargument against the possibility of knowledge, and attempts to disarm it. So, secondly, 
my suggestion was that Socrates’ main response in the Meno is the myth of the immortality 
of the soul which holds the possibility of knowledge by means of the knowing soul. Thirdly, I 
suggested that the horn of the underlying paradox originates with Gorgias’ rhetorical 
arguments in his On What Is Not or On Nature which demonstrate that it is impossible for 
human beings to know the truth of externally existing things either through intellect or sense 
perception. As a result, Gorgias’ negative position and Socrates’ positive position together 
form the real paradox on the possibility of knowledge on the truth of reality, and this is what I 
regard the underlying paradox of Meno 80d5-e5. Although the impossibility of inquiry, 
namely transition from not-knowing to knowing, is one of the paradoxes which accompany 
the fundamental paradox, I have shown that many other paradoxes are derived from the 
underlying paradox between intellectual optimism and pessimism. 
 
Although it is likely that Plato attempts to investigate the difference between Gorgias’ 
rhetoric and Socrates’ dialectic in the Meno, as Schiappa objects to the simple dichotomy 
between rhetoric and philosophy (1997: 17), the difference between them is in fact not 
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entirely clear in the Meno.196 Socrates is later disappointed that he and Meno are not well 
educated by their teachers: he says “as if you and I are not very good, and you were not 
adequately trained by Gorgias, nor I by Prodicus (96d5)”. This implies, I think, that Socrates 
is aware that many contradictions of their arguments are attributable to their undisciplined 
usage of words. Although Kerferd says that Prodicus is interested in the proper meaning of 
words, whereas Socrates is interested in the real thing (1981: 74), it seems to me that these 
two perspectives are just two sides of the same coin, as are the two methods, Socratic 
dialectic and Gorgias’ rhetoric. What I can imagine at this moment is that Plato’s aim is 
rather to show these aporiai through the Meno. The Meno is full of interesting contradictions 
by means of using various meanings of terms such as virtue, learning, teaching, knowing etc. 
Without fixing the meaning of terms, Socrates often contradicts his own arguments, whether 
intentionally or not. For this reason, this dialogue has accepted various interpretations. That 
could be, I would like to suggest, what Plato intentionally shows through Socrates in the 
Meno. 
 
In the case of the Meno, as we have seen, Socrates aligns the first premise with the myth of 
the immortality of the soul, objecting to Gorgias’ epistemological negative dogmatism. By 
committing to the positive view, Socrates says that they can inquire into what they do not 
know, namely what virtue is. Although this at first glance looks merely dogmatic, this 
premise on the possibility of knowledge surely enables them to proceed further. Without this 
premise, their argument would not start, otherwise, endlessly involve circular contradictions 
and end up with aporiai again and again.
197
 But, is it really a problem, and what is wrong 
with opinions and beliefs, if there is not yet anyone who knows the truth of reality? 
Opinion/belief (doxa) is a keyword of this dialogue. Not only Anytus speaks of teaching as a 
matter of believing.
198
 At the end of the dialogue, Socrates himself asks Meno “convince your 
guest friend Anytus here of these very things of which you have yourself been convinced, in 
order that he may be more amenable. If you would persuade him, you will also confer a 
                                                     
196
 Remember Meno’s first statement on what virtues is (71e1-72a4) which might reject Socratic unitarian 
assumption. Cf. also the first sentence in Aristotle’ Rhetoric begins “Rhetoric is the “counterpart” of Dialectic 
(1354a)”. Cf., also M I. [6-7]: “For Aristotle says that Empedocles got rhetoric started, of which dialectic is a 
“counterpart” [antistrophon] – that is, correlated with it [isostrophon], because of being related to the same 
material… And Parmenides would seem to be not inexperienced in dialectic, since again Aristotle took his 
companion Zeno to be the originator of dialectic. Cf. also KRS [328]. 
197
 One might think that the Meno at any event ends up as aporia, but it is on a different matter, not over what 
virtue is, but over whether virtue is teachable. Meno’s own question of whether what Meno regards as virtue is 
teachable or not has already been answered: it comes from a divine inspiration (99b-100b). 
198
 Anytus says “any Athenian gentleman he may meet, if he is willing to be persuaded (ἐάνπερ ἐθέλῃ 
πείθεσθαι), will make him a better man than the sophists would (92e3-6)”. 
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benefit upon the Athenians. (σὺ δὲ ταὐτὰ ταῦτα ἅπερ αὐτὸς πέπεισαι πεῖθε καὶ τὸν ξένον 
τόνδε Ἄνυτον, ἵνα πρᾳότερος ᾖ· ὡς ἐὰν πείσῃς τοῦτον, ἔστιν ὅτι καὶ Ἀθηναίους ὀνήσεις) 
(100b7-c2)”. Indeed, the better you understand the art of rhetoric, the better you understand 
what fundamental opinions/beliefs the argument relies on. In other words, you would better 
see upon what underlying premises the speaking person establishes his arguments. The real 
issue for Socrates might be how to use the art for philosophical purposes. Although Socrates’ 
commitment to the positive dogmatism would allow them to proceed further by escaping 
from the present aporia, the next aporia might be that any agreement can really be regarded 
as truth, or at least what is closer to truth, which appear in the Clitophon (409e).199 
 
In the circulate aporiai in his dialogues, I wonder, what Plato was really looking for the 
answer to Socratic question of what virtue is. In the slave’s geometrical question, the answer 
to Socrates’ question is an incommensurable number, and it certainly won’t be able to be 
answered by a specific number, without presenting the technical term for the line which 
crossovers from one point to the opposite in a square, namely ‘diagonal (διάμετρον; 85b4)’. 
However, what the slave finally ‘discovers’ was not a specific number or such a name as the 
answer, instead he identifies and indicates the line which makes the square twice as big in the 
drawn diagram. Without any number, he simply points out the length with his finger (85b). 
This is indeed a remarkable way of solving the problem which cannot be answered with a 
specific number, and it is said to be ‘true opinion’ by Socrates. Although it will require 
further investigation, as Plato chose this special demonstration as the demonstration of the 
possibility of knowledge and inquiry into what virtue is, it would not surprising even if Plato 
wonders that the question of what virtue is can be answered with a specific statement but can 
be given a solution.
200
 
 
  
                                                     
199
 Clitophon criticizes Socratic inquiry into virtue saying that “the argument always goes around in a circle 
back to where it began (410a2)”. 
200
 Cf. Politis 2006: 105. 
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